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ABSTRACT 
 The feeling of generating and controlling external effects through our own 
actions is known as Sense of Agency (SoAg). When we act we are generally in control 
of what we are doing and, therefore, we are aware and responsible for both our 
actions and their consequences. For many years, researchers have tried to identify 
appropriate measures to study the SoAg. It has often been investigated using explicit 
tasks in which participants verbally reported if they felt they were the authors of a 
certain effect. However, in our everyday life, we experience a continuous flow of 
actions and their effects, and we do know that we are the authors of an action 
without interrogating ourselves about it or constantly making explicit judgments. 
Therefore, the use of implicit measures seems to better reflect the complex agency 
dimension. A very famous and reliable implicit measure is represented by 
Intentional Binding (IB). This effect occurs when a temporal compression between a 
voluntary action and its sensory consequence is observed (i.e., actions are perceived 
as occurring later than they really do, while the sensory effect is perceived as 
occurring earlier). The effect is limited to voluntary actions; in fact, IB is absent or 
reduced for situations in which the action is not driven by volition (e.g., passively-
induced movement). Since its discovery, IB has been considered a valid quantitative 
index of SoAg and has been applied to study agency, both in healthy individuals 
and in clinical populations. In the light of this implicit measure, the aim of the 
  viii 
research presented here was to examine the SoAg from different perspectives, in 
order to provide new penetrating insights to comprehend this phenomenon. After 
the implementation of a new paradigm to measure IB (Study I), four main intriguing 
facets have been explored. In Study II, the main focus was to investigate the 
development and the evolution of the SoAg across the lifespan. Results indicated 
that SoAg follows a U-inverted shape, with children and elderly showing a reduced 
SoAg as compared to adult participants. Subsequently, the neural underpinnings of 
SoAg have been investigated (Study III), uncovering the important contribution of 
the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) in the perceived action-effect linkage. 
In Study IV the multisensory nature of the SoAg was explored, highlighting its 
supramodal nature and demonstrating how SoAg is governed by the same rules at 
the root of the multisensory integration. After having shed light on these different 
aspects in healthy populations, the last experiment (Study V) investigated the SoAg 
in the clinical domain, specifically referring to Parkinson Disease (PD) as a target 
pathology because of its characteristic difficulty in planning and initiating voluntary 
actions. Findings showed a reduced SoAg in this clinical population.  
The results obtained from all the experiments included in the present thesis 
have been discussed in light of current theories of SoAg. 
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RIASSUNTO 
Nella vita di tutti i giorni, mediante le nostre azioni, contribuiamo a 
indirizzare l’esito del nostro comportamento. In quanto agenti decidiamo quali 
azioni mettere in atto, valutando e giudicando nel contempo l’impatto e le possibili 
conseguenze che esse avranno sul mondo esterno e sulle persone che ci circondano. 
Tale capacità di giudizio e di valutazione delle conseguenze delle proprie azioni 
viene definita in letteratura come agentività (o Sense of Agency: SoAg), caratteristica 
essenziale della natura umana. Ad oggi, il modello sperimentale dominante per lo 
studio del SoAg è basato su paradigmi di tipo esplicito, chiedendo ai partecipanti di 
giudicare se un determinato evento sensoriale è causato dalla loro propria azione o 
dall’azione di un altro agente. Tuttavia, nonostante questi paradigmi siano stati 
molto utilizzati in letteratura, essi sono stati criticati in quanto non sembrano 
catturare l’esperienza implicita di agency che accompagna le nostre azioni 
quotidiane. Le esperienze quotidiane di agency infatti non coinvolgono 
necessariamente giudizi espliciti. Frequentemente si compiono azioni intenzionali 
in maniera quasi automatica, senza dover necessariamente pensare al fatto che ‘io’ 
sono stato l’autore di una determinata azione; basti pensare all’azione di prendere 
un bicchiere d’acqua quando abbiamo sete o di guidare. In questi casi si ha SoAg 
anche senza fornire alcun tipo di giudizio esplicito. Le misure implicite forniscono 
dunque un modo alternativo e migliore per esplorare e quantificare la vera natura 
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del SoAg. Ad oggi, una delle più famose e utilizzate è l’Intentional Binding (IB), 
ovvero la compressione dell’intervallo temporale che si instaura tra un’azione 
volontaria e l’effetto sensoriale prodotto.  
Nella presente tesi si è deciso di utilizzare l’IB come misura implicita in 
quanto fenomeno molto robusto e replicato da molti studi. Traendo vantaggio da 
questo tipo di paradigma, il presente lavoro di ricerca ha avuto l’obiettivo di 
contribuire alla comprensione di alcuni meccanismi neuro-cognitivi sottostanti il 
SoAg. Dopo l’implementazione di un nuovo paradigma per la misurazione dell’IB 
(Studio I), sono stati presi in esame quattro differenti aspetti. Nello Studio II si è 
cercato di comprendere come il SoAg si sviluppi e si modifichi nell’arco di vita. I 
risultati hanno mostrato come il SoAg sembri seguire una traiettoria di sviluppo, 
venendo acquisito gradualmente nel corso dell’ontogenesi e ‘decrementando’ in età 
più avanzata. Successivamente, lo Studio III si è focalizzato sul tentativo di 
identificare le basi neurali di tale fenomeno, evidenziando un contributo cruciale 
dell’area pre-supplementare motoria. Nello Studio IV è stato fornito un contributo 
rilevante alla comprensione della natura multisensoriale del SoAg, corroborando le 
attuali evidenze scientifiche che suggeriscono come il SoAg sembri essere governato 
dalle stesse regole che stanno alla base dell’integrazione multisensoriale. Infine, 
nello Studio V, l’attenzione è stata rivolta all’ambito clinico, considerando un 
gruppo di pazienti con malattia di Parkinson, caratterizzata da un disturbo nella 
pianificazione e nel controllo delle azioni volontarie. Questi pazienti hanno 
  xi 
presentato un SoAg significativamente ridotto rispetto ai controlli sani.  
I risultati ottenuti dagli esperimenti descritti in questa tesi sono stati discussi 
alla luce delle attuali teorie proposte per lo studio del SoAg.  
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  1 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Our voluntary actions are typically accompanied by a Sense of Agency (SoAg; 
Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). We feel that we can choose and control our own actions 
and through them the outside world. We also feel that we are responsible for them. 
Although the SoAg plays a relevant role in our society given the profound impact 
on the legal system (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Frith, 2013; 2014), its comprehension 
is still far from being exhaustive and a number of relevant questions are still 
unanswered. Some of these include: (1) does the SoAg change across our lifespan? 
Can children and elderly be considered responsible for their actions in the same way 
as adults? (2) what are the neural areas underlying the SoAg? (3) can the SoAg be 
considered a multisensory supramodal mechanism? (4) is the SoAg modified when 
the individual is affected by certain diseases characterized by a lack of voluntary 
control over one’s own actions? This thesis attempts to address these questions by 
investigating the mechanisms underlying the SoAg from a neurocognitive 
perspective and by adopting an implicit measure to study the SoAg, that is to say 
the Intentional Binding effect (IB: Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002).  
The present work is composed of two main parts: one theoretical and the 
other experimental. The first part, composed of two chapters, offers an in-depth 
introduction to the SoAg (Chapter 1) and to Intentional Binding (IB; Chapter 2) as 
an implicit measure to study SoAg. The second part concerns the outline of the 
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experimental work. By taking advantage of IB as a reliable implicit measure of SoAg, 
in Study I (Chapter 3) a new paradigm, with the aim to reliably assess IB in both 
healthy and clinical populations, overcoming the main limitations linked to the 
methodologies currently adopted, is proposed. Utilizing this new paradigm, IB was 
replicated in a group of young adults. This methodological advance was then used 
in the second study to address the question of how agency develops and changes 
across the lifespan (Chapter 4). Agency plays an important role in society because it 
is strictly bound to the idea of responsibility for one’s own actions (Haggard & 
Tsakiris, 2009; Frith, 2013; 2014). However, if the agent is a child or an older person, 
the feeling of being responsible for the consequences of a given action may differ 
from what an adult would feel: as a matter of fact, executive functioning represents 
the essential prerequisite for the emergence of SoAg (Haggard, 2008; Haggard & 
Tsakiris, 2009) and the frontal lobe is known to be the neural substrate for these 
abilities (Stuss & Levine, 2002). Many studies have revealed how vulnerable the 
frontal lobe is to structural and neurochemical changes occurring with age (e.g., e.g., 
Fuster, 1993; Giedd, Blumenthal, Jeffries, Castellanos, Liu et al., 1999; Raz, 2000; 
Casey, Tottenham, Liston & Durston, 2005): in fact, while the frontal lobe must still 
reach its full full maturation during childhood, in old age it starts to slowly 
deteriorate. This evolution is usually characterized by changes in executive 
functioning (e.g., West, 1996; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). Along this line, the findings 
described in Chapter 4 showed that children and elderly did show a different pattern 
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of results – namely a decreased SoAg - as compared to that in young adults, 
suggesting that an intact functioning of frontal lobes is indeed required. However, 
although SoAg and IB have been extensively studied from a behavioural point of 
view, their neural bases remain relatively unexplored and the possible frontal lobe 
contribution hypothesis advanced in the second study has remained only highly 
speculative. Therefore, in the third part of the present thesis (Chapter 5) transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS), a non-invasive neuromodulation technique 
(Dayan, Censor, Buch, Sandrini & Cohen, 2013), was adopted to shed light on the 
possible role of the frontal lobe with regard to the SoAg. In particular, the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), a brain region known for its key role in action 
planning and initiation (Nachev, Wydell, O’Neill, Husain & Kennard, 2007), was 
considered as potentially implicated in the phenomenon. The right primary auditory 
cortex (PAC) was also targeted as a control area and modulated with the same 
parameters within participants, as a region potentially involved in the processing of 
the auditory effects of the action. A significant reduction in IB was observed only 
after modulation of the pre-SMA, which thus supported the causal contribution of 
this prefrontal area in the perceived linkage between action and its effects. No 
involvement of the area implicated in the processing of the sensory effects produced 
by the action (here, the PAC) was detected, suggesting that the perception of sensory 
effects in IB does not take place in the primary sensory areas, supporting the idea 
that SoAg might be supra-modal in nature. Taking as a reference point the crucial 
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contribution of the pre-SMA, the subsequent experiments (Study IV and Study V) 
were then performed to additionally provide indirect evidence of pre-SMA 
involvement in the experience of agency. Specifically, Study IV (Chapter 6) aimed to 
test the ‘supramodality hypothesis’ advanced in Study III. The findings supported 
the view according to which the SoAg would follow the same rules at the root of 
multisensory integration, providing additional behavioural evidence regarding the 
multisensory nature of the SoAg. In addition, the results indirectly supported the 
crucial implication of the pre-SMA and its key-role in binding intentional action to 
their sensory consequences, independently of the specific sensory nature of those 
effects. The findings also supported the hypothesis that pre-SMA might indeed 
represent a crucial station for the integration of incoming sensory information from 
the primary sensory cortices. In Study V the potential clinical implications of the 
SoAg were then examined (Chapter 7) by considering a disease characterized by pre-
SMA hypo-activation, such as PD. Compared to matched healthy controls, the PD 
patients showed a reduced SoAg, providing further indirect evidence of pre-SMA 
contribution to the SoAg.  
A general discussion contextualizing the results obtained by the studies 
presented in this thesis will be presented in Chapter 8 (but see also ‘Discussion’ 
sections for each experimental chapter).  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SENSE OF AGENCY 
 In our everyday life many actions are performed in order to achieve specific 
goals. The cognitive neuroscience of action has mostly focused on the brain 
mechanisms responsible for voluntary movements control (e.g., Castiello, 2005; 
Kalaska, 2009). In contrast, the subjective experience of voluntary action has been 
partially neglected by the literature (Haggard, 2005; 2008). In regard to this latter 
point, it can be said that voluntary actions are characterized by two specific 
psychological components: intention and agency (Haggard, 2008). The vast majority 
of studies has focused on the first aspect, that is on the relation between intention 
and voluntary action, showing that motor acts are preceded by preconscious brain 
activity, which reaches awareness only in later stages, just before action execution 
(e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Soon, Brass, 
Heinze & Haynes, 2008). However, as human agents in the world, our actions do 
not end with the mere motor act, as they also imply effects in the external 
environment. It is at this point of the chain of events that agency plays its role, 
referring to the link between the voluntary execution of movements and their effects, 
experienced as external sensory consequences (Haggard, 2008). In order to 
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exemplify the chain, it is best to use a common situation that each of us can relate 
with: after a very bad day at work, all we need when we finally arrive at home is to 
listen to some good music. Such storyline can be broken up into the two above-
mentioned processes characterizing our voluntary actions. The volitional part 
corresponds to the shaping of the intention (e.g., listening to the music), which 
subsequently implements the corresponding motor program in order to achieve our 
goal (e.g., arm movements to reach the button in order to switch on the radio). The 
agency part is inserted subsequently, when our movements are then associated with 
the expected consequences (e.g., feeling the music). Such auditory reafferences 
contribute to the feeling that we have been the authors of that action.  
This specific experience of oneself as the agent of one’s own actions and 
subsequent consequences has been defined as SoAg (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). 
SoAg has been a topic of interest mainly to philosophers (Gallagher, 2000; de 
Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; Pacherie, 2008), but over recent years it has also 
received attention from psychology and cognitive neuroscience researchers because 
of its great impact on both the single individual and on the society in general. As a 
matter of fact, SoAg is deeply entwined with our everyday notions of freedom and 
responsibility and is intrinsic to ethical and law questions concerning responsibility 
and guilt (e.g., Moretto, Walsh & Haggard, 2011; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). 
Indeed, when we voluntarily perform actions, we feel responsible for them and for 
their consequences. The fact that individuals are aware of their actions is a central 
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feature of democracies and, it is on these bases that the guilt of a crime can be legally 
established. Moreover, there are some neurological and psychiatric pathologies 
characterized by a ‘compromised’ SoAg. For example, psychotic patients report that 
their actions are not their own, but are rather imposed on them by some other agents 
(for a review, see Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Therefore, the study of SoAg can be 
crucial for the investigation of clinical disorders characterized by a lack of voluntary 
control of actions and can provide insights pertinent to all of us, helping to define 
the boundaries of the responsibility of voluntary actions. 
This chapter will provide an overview on the state of the art knowledge on the 
most relevant findings regarding SoAg. 
 
1.1 MODELS UNDERLYING THE SENSE OF AGENCY 
Two main models have been proposed to describe the underlying 
neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for the SoAg. The Comparator Model (CM; 
Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) suggests that SoAg arises mainly from processes 
underlying motor control and is inferred retrospectively, after the action has been 
performed, on the basis of the external consequences of the action. The Apparent 
Mental Causation Theory proposed by Wegner (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 
2003), which focuses on situational cues, suggests that SoAg arises when external 
events are consistent with our intentions. This dichotomy has, nevertheless, been 
outdated in favour of more recent models, such as the Two Step Model (Synofzik, 
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Vosgerau & Newen, 2008) and the Cue Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner & 
Haggard, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Voss, 2013) according 
to which both internal and external cues are thought to influence the SoAg. 
 
1.1.1 THE COMPARATOR MODEL 
The CM was originally conceived as a model of motor learning and motor 
control (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000); however, it can also provide a useful 
framework for explaining the SoAg (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; 
Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001). According to this hypothesis, two types of 
internal models are implemented in the central motor system, the inverse and forward 
models. The inverse model has the main function of selecting the appropriate motor 
commands for achieving the desired goal. At the same time, a copy of the motor 
commands (i.e., the efference copy) is used by the forward model to predict the 
sensory consequences of the action. In case of a match between the predicted and 
the actual outcome, the action is experienced as self-performed; in case of 
incongruence another agent is considered the author of the action (Figure 1.1). In 
other words, SoAg is strong when there is a close match between the predicted and 
the actual sensory consequences of an action, and it is reduced when predicted and 
experienced consequences do not match. According to this model, SoAg necessarily 
occurs after the action has been performed, when the sensory evidence about the 
consequences of an action becomes available. Within the CM, the sensory feedback 
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is only required for comparison purposes and does not per se carry the critical 
information for emergence of the SoAg. 
 




This view has received considerable empirical support from both behavioural 
and neuropsychological studies, as well as from investigations on its neural 
correlates (e.g., Voss, Ingram, Haggard & Wolpert, 2006; David, Newen & Vogeley, 
2008). A pioneer experiment was conducted by Nielsen (1963) who asked 
participants to draw a line on a piece of paper; they could either see their own hand 
or an ‘alien hand’ (i.e., the experimenter’s hand) drawing the line. In particular, the 
alien hand’s movements spatially deviated from the participant’s own movement. 
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Interestingly, participants adjusted their own movement to the false visual feedback 
without being aware of the adjustment.  
Since 1963 many adaptations of this manipulation have evolved. Up to now, 
the experimental design usually implemented to test the CM consisted in inserting 
spatial (e.g., Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, Frith, Decety & 
Jeannerod, 2003; Synofzik, Their & Lindner, 2006) and temporal (e.g., Leube, 
Knoblich, Erb, Grodd, Bartels et al., 2003; MacDonald & Paus, 2003) discrepancies 
between an action and its sensory effect. Taking as an example a typical spatial task, 
participants usually receive distorted visual feedback of their hand moving a 
joystick. When the movement of the virtual hand does not correspond to the 
participants’ movement or when an angular bias is introduced between the 
participant’s and the virtual hand’s movement, participants tend to attribute it to 
another agent. Overall, these studies demonstrated that the SoAg is gradually 
reduced as temporal or spatial discrepancies increase. The CM has been adopted 
also to study abnormalities of action awareness (see Paragraph 1.4.1).  
Although the CM dominates SoAg research basing its strength on several 
convincing behavioural and neuroimaging findings (for a review see: David et al., 
2008), it has been criticized because it is unable to explain some aspects of SoAg 
(Synofzik et al., 2008; Vosgerau & Synofzik, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013), such as the 
role of emotional valence of sensory effects or personal beliefs about an action.  
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Recent empirical studies within the motor prediction framework suggests a 
more complex picture that enhances the role of stages preceding the actions, such as 
action selection and preparation to the SoAg (Wenke, Fleming & Haggard, 2010; 
Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon, Sidarus & Haggard, 2014). What is important 
here, as compared to the CM, is the intention-action link (i.e., the process through 
which intentions are transformed into specific actions), rather than the action-effect 
one. SoAg would, therefore, depend on prospective signals arising from internal 
circuits of action preparation, rather than on a post-hoc, retrospective comparison 
between predicted and current states of the environment, as postulated by the CM. 
SoAg could, therefore, be generated prospectively, before the actual outcome of 
actions is known (Figure 1.2).  
  




Figure 1.2. The reviewed CM of the experience of agency (adapted from Chambon, Sidarus et al., 




Evidence supporting this view comes from studies in which the action 
selection variable (i.e., selecting between alternative actions) was manipulated (for 
a review, see: Chambon, Sidarus et al., 2014). For example, Wenke et al. (2010) 
investigated this component of the SoAg using an experimental design dissociating 
action selection from action–outcome matching processes. Participants were asked 
to respond to a left- or right-pointing arrow with a left or right key-press, 
respectively. Responding to the target caused the appearance of a colour patch 
afterwards. Participants had to judge how much control they felt over the patch of 
colour that followed their key-press. Prior to the directional target, a subliminal, 
unknown prime was presented, whose arrow directions were either identical 
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(‘compatible condition’) or opposite (‘incompatible condition’) to the subsequent 
target direction. The colour presented depended on whether the participant’s action 
was compatible or incompatible with the preceding subliminal prime, but did not 
depend on the prime identity or the chosen action alternative alone. Participants 
reported a stronger sense of control over the effects of an action (i.e., the colours) 
that were compatible with the preceding primes than over colours that followed 
prime-incompatible actions. Importantly, this effect was not due to predictability of 
action outcomes, since the relation between the key-press action and the colour 
outcome was always equally predictable. Rather, the stronger experience of control 
could only be explained by the fluency of the action selection (i.e., by an internal 
signal influenced by the prime–target relation), which necessarily occurs prior to 
movement. Results from this study and from other action priming experiments 
suggest that the SoAg is not merely due to retrospective matching occurring after the 
effects of action, but is also partly prospective, arising at the action selection stage (for 
similar results, see also Damen, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2014). 
 
1.1.2 THE APPARENT MENTAL CAUSATION MODEL 
The importance of postdictive, external cues (e.g., background and context-
related information like thoughts and beliefs) is emphasised in the Apparent Mental 
Causation Theory or Inference Model (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003). Here, 
SoAg arises when three principles are met: of priority, consistency and exclusivity. 
  16 
Accordingly, in order for the SoAg to arise, the thought – or the intention - has to (i) 
appear prior to the action (priority); (ii) be consistent with the action itself 
(consistency) and (iii) no alternative causes have to be present (exclusivity). Therefore, 
the simply co-occurrence of outcomes coherent with the agent’s intentions would be 




Figure 1.3. The apparent mental causation model (adapted from Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
 
 
Similar to the CM (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2001), if the intention (here, the predictive element) to produce an 
  17 
outcome matches the actual sensory consequences following one’s own action, 
individuals perceive causal responsibility for those consequences. If the intention 
mismatches with the outcome, a reduced SoAg is experienced. However, contrary 
to the CM, intentions depend only minimally on motor signals. Indeed, the cues are 
independent of action execution and the actual execution of a voluntary action is not 
necessary to SoAg. It is the match between prior conscious thoughts and the 
observed outcome of the action that makes the agent infer retrospectively that 
he/she was at the origin of the sensory event. 
Support for the Apparent Mental Causation Theory comes from a study by 
Wegner and Wheatley (1999) who induced a false SoAg for movements that 
participants did not perform, priming them with thoughts relevant to a movement 
made by a confederate and making them rate the action as self-caused. These 
findings suggest that individuals are not intrinsically informed about their own 
actions, and rather rely on inferential processes to make sense of them. Therefore, 
the inferential view does not give any special role to efferent information internal to 
the motor system in generating the experience of action. Similarly, Johansson, Hall, 
Sikström, and Olsson (2005) presented participants with photographs of two faces. 
The participants had to choose the most attractive one. The photograph chosen was 
presented again to the participants, who were asked to explain the reason for their 
choice. When the Authors covertly manipulated the photographs by switching the 
chosen and non-chosen cards, they found that in case of a mismatch between the 
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initial choice and actual outcome (i.e., when the cards were switched) the 
participants failed to notice the difference, and nevertheless explained a choice they 
in fact did not make. Evidence for this theory has also been provided by further 
studies which used priming to manipulate thoughts about the effect of an action 
before it was performed (e.g., Wegner, Sparrow & Winerman, 2004; Aarts, Custer & 
Wegner, 2005; Aarts, Custers & Marien, 2009; Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Sato, 2009; 
Nahab, Kundu, Gallea, Kakareka, Pursley et al., 2011). 
 
1.1.3 THE TWO-STEP MODEL 
Since both the predictive (i.e., internal motoric signals: CM; Blakemore et al., 
1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001) and postdictive (i.e., 
external and situational cues: the inference model, Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 
2003) theories have major limitations and do not exhaustively depict the complexity 
of the SoAg, Synofzik et al. (2008) proposed a Two-Step Model of the SoAg in order 
to account for both internal and external factors. This model includes a basic 
perceptual level - the Feeling of Agency (FoAg) - and an explicit level – the Judgment 
of Agency (JoAg) (Figure 1.4). 
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Figure 1.4. The Two-Step model (adapted from Synofzik et al., 2008). 
 
 
The FoAg consists in sensorimotor processing and is affected by the 
match/mismatch between the internal forward model and the actual sensory 
feedback. Here, an action or a sensory event is merely classified as self- or not-self-
caused and no external attributions are possible at this level. Subsequently and 
based on the FoAg, a judgment is formed at the JoAg level. Here, also contextual 
information, like background beliefs or information about the environment, are 
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taken into account. For example, a mismatch detected at the FoAg level triggers the 
primary feeling of not being the author of a certain event and subsequently, at the 
JoAg level the search for the actual agent occurs.  
 
1.1.4 THE CUE INTEGRATION THEORY 
The Two-Step account (Synofzik et al., 2008) described in the previous section 
does not provide any criteria defining how cues are selected and integrated to shape 
the SoAg. In order to fill theses gaps, the Cue Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner et 
al., 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013) has been proposed (Figure 
1.5). Accordingly, in order to determine the cause of a sensory event, the brain must 
integrate information from multiple cues within a Bayesian model (Moore, Wegner 
et al., 2009; Moore & Fletcher 2012). Thus, these cues are weighted, depending on 
their availability and their reliability in a given situation, to produce the SoAg, with 
most weight being given to the most reliable cue. Usually predictive signals, such as 
internal predictions, provide the fastest and most reliable information about one’s 
own actions. However, when predictive cues are weak or imprecise, other cues, like 
post-hoc ones (i.e., action feedback or the affective action outcome) receive a higher 
weight. It seems straightforward that the extent to which the FoAg and the JoAg 
contribute to the SoAg depends on an interplay of interacting cues.  
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Figure 1.5. The Cue Integration Theory (adapted from Synofzik et al., 2013). 
 
As showed in Figure 1.5, the sensorimotor predictive cues (i.e., the so-called 
‘sensorimotor priors’) can be modulated by cognitive cues, like background beliefs. 
For instance, motor processing can be influenced using priming (Wegner et al., 2004; 
Aarts et al., 2005) or prior beliefs induced by contextual information (Desantis, 
Roussel & Waszak, 2011). In addition, the FoAg is determined by postdictive cues in 
a sensorimotor format, like the visual feedback of one’s action (Synofzik, Their, 
Leube, Schlotterbeck & Lindner, 2010). Both predictive and postdictive components 
can contribute to the FoAg. The JoAg is then based on the FoAg and takes into account 
cognitive cues, like background beliefs, and information about the environment. At 
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both levels (i.e., the FoAg and the JoAg), the cue integration process can be modulated 
by affective components (e.g., affective valence of the action outcome (Wilke, 
Synofzik & Lindner, 2012). However, evidence supporting the notion of optimal cue 
integration is still scant (e.g., Moor, Wegner et al., 2009; Desantis et al., 2011; Bednark 
& Franz, 2014; see Paragraph 2.1). This framework is also suited to explain various 
psychopathological disorders of agency (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; see Paragraph 
1.4.1).  
Although a growing body of literature has started to consider the importance 
of a combination of different cues to capture the entire complexity of the SoAg (e.g., 
Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Synofzik et al., 2010; Moore & Fletcher, 2012), these 
models only partly consider emotional dimension. Indeed, up to the present 
moment, the potential role played by emotions has been largely neglected in the 
field of agency research. In fact, agency and emotions constantly interact in our daily 
life and agency could therefore change according to the emotional valence of an 
action’s outcomes. To fill this gap, Gentsch and Synofzik (2014) thus proposed the 
Affective Coding of Agency model (Figure 1.6), as an essential extension of the Cue 
Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et 
al., 2013). Accordingly, SoAg is influenced by a combination of sensorimotor, 
cognitive and emotional cues (Wilke et al., 2012; Takahata, Takahashi, Maeda, 
Umeda, Suhara et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013; Gentsch, Weiss, Spengler, 
Synofzik & Schütz-Bosbach, 2015). 
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A.                         B. 
Figure 1.6. The Affective Coding of Agency (adapted from Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014). Panel A: the 
contribution of emotional cues with sensorimotor and cognitive cues in the formation of the SoAg. 
Panel B: the influence of emotional cues at different stages of agency processing. 
 
 
In addition, affective coding of agency may be differentially altered in various 
neuropsychiatric diseases (e.g., schizophrenia vs. depression), thus helping to 
explain the dysfunctions of agency experiences in these diseases (Gentsch & 
Synofzik, 2014).  
 
1.2 CURRENT MEASURES TO STUDY THE SENSE OF AGENCY 
The objective quantification of the SoAg, especially in a laboratory setting, is 
not an easy endeavour. Given the high relevance and complexity of this 
phenomenon, researchers have struggled to find appropriate measures to study the 
SoAg. In the ensuing sections explicit and implicit testing attempts will be reviewed. 
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1.2.1 EXPLICIT MEASURES 
For many years, the most common approach to the study of agency has 
involved explicit judgements. Using self-reported judgments, participants were 
asked either to report whether a particular sensory event (e.g., the appearance of a 
symbol on a computer screen) was caused by their own action or by the action of 
another agent (e.g., Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Tsakiris, 
Haggard, Franck, Mainy & Sirigu, 2005; Daprati, Wriessnegger, Lacquaniti, 2007), or 
to report how much control they felt for producing an outcome (e.g., Metcalfe & 
Greene, 2007; Preston & Newport 2010; Yomogida, Sugiura, Sassa, Wakusawa, 
Sekiguchi et al. 2010). Usually, when a spatial (e.g., Daprati et al., 2007) or temporal 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Farrer, Bouchereau, Jeannerod & Franck, 2008) 
congruence between one’s own action and its sensory feedback is detected, agency 
is self-attributed.  
Although having significantly contributed to shedding light on factors 
influencing the conscious SoAg, the self-report approach presents some limitations. 
Indeed, it is well known from social psychology that explicit measures are sensitive 
to different biases, such as the use of explicit strategies, social desirability, 
expectations and beliefs about the task, to mention some of the most relevant ones 
(Podsakoff & Organ 1986; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006; Gawronski, LeBel & 
Peters, 2007). In addition, explicit tasks are influenced by limits related to 
introspection and subjectivity insights (Wolpe & Rowe, 2014), making their use 
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problematic especially in patients and special populations – such as children and 
elderly - introducing confounding factors. Furthermore, the explicit attribution is 
self-biased in itself: participants consistently overestimate their actual agency over 
external events (e.g., Daprati, Franck, Georgieff, Proust, Pacherie et al., 1997; 
Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard & Fink, 2007).  
 
1.2.2 IMPLICIT MEASURES 
The majority of investigations have utilized tests requiring explicit reports of 
agency. However, given the abovementioned limitations, the creation of implicit 
tasks has become crucial for exhaustively characterizing the SoAg. This is especially 
true if we also consider the fact that our everyday experiences of agency do not 
generally involve explicit judgements and we usually feel in control of what we are 
doing without explicitly reflecting upon it. Therefore, implicit measures provide an 
important and alternative way of quantifying SoAg, and may be better suited to 
capture its complexity. In fact, one of the main advantages of implicit tasks is that 
they do not require explicit attributions and intentional access, making them 
particularly suitable to study agency in clinical samples. Up to now, a number of 
implicit measures of the SoAg have been proposed, like the kinematic of movements 
(Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Knoblich & Kircher, 2004), sensory attenuation 
Blakemore et al., 1998; Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2000) and IB (Haggard et al., 
2002). The kinematic of movements provides a detailed mathematical 
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characterization of body movements through space and time, including linear and 
angular displacements, velocities and accelerations. Therefore, it can reveal the 
underlying, implicit properties of our actions that cannot be verbally reported 
otherwise. In addition, it can be used to demonstrate goal-directed behaviour in the 
absence of awareness (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Knoblich & Kircher, 2004) since 
it captures subtle adjustment in motor commands that otherwise would go 
unnoticed by researchers. Sensory attenuation refers to the fact then that the effects of 
one’s voluntary actions are characterized by a reduced behavioural and neural 
response in terms of perceived intensity as compared to externally triggered effects 
(Blakemore et al., 1998; 2000). For example, the activity of the primary 
somatosensory cortex was found to be diminished in response to self-produced 
compared to external touch (Blakemore et al., 1998). Similarly, in the auditory and 
visual modality, electroencephalography (EEG) studies revealed a reduction in the 
amplitude of the N1 event-related potential following self-generated auditory 
events or visual stimuli (for recent reviews, see Waszak, Cardoso-Leite & Hughes, 
2012; Hughes, Desantis & Waszak, 2013). With regard to the clinical populations, the 
absence of sensory suppression in patients suffering from hallucinations 
(Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone et al., 2000) is considered evidence for the role 
of this implicit measure in SoAg (Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000; Ford & 
Mathalon, 2004).  
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Within the context of the present research, however, there is yet another 
implicit measure, namely the IB (Haggard et al., 2002). This effect refers to the 
finding that a voluntary action and its following sensory effect are perceptually 
attracted toward one another in time, as compared to when both events occur in 
isolation. Chapter 2 will describe in detail the features and the mechanisms 
underlying this fascinating phenomenon.  
 
1.3 NEURAL BASES OF THE SENSE OF AGENCY  
Until now, the brain network hypothetically subserving the SoAg has not had 
a clear anatomical characterization, given inconsistent results obtained through 
discrepant experimental situations (see Paragraph 1.2 of this Chapter; for reviews, 
see David et al., 2008 and Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati & Nadel, 2011).  
In order to present the complexity and the heterogeneity of the phenomenon, 
in the next sections the most important findings regarding the neural correlates of 
the retrospective (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et 
al., 2001), prospective (Chambon, Sidarus et al., 2014) and inference (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003) accounts of the SoAg will be reviewed. It is worth 
noting that all these studies involve explicit tasks, which are the most common 
paradigms in the SoAg scenario and unfortunately investigations on the neural 
correlates of implicit measures of agency, namely the IB effect, have been restricted 
to a handful of studies summarized in Chapter 2 (Paragraph 2.4). 
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1.3.1 NEURAL BASES OF THE RETROSPECTIVE ACCOUNT 
With respect to the CM (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2001; see Paragraph 1.1.1), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and 
the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) are the brain regions usually activated by explicit 
tasks asking participants to judge whether their own action is responsible for a 
specific sensory event (e.g., Fink, Marshall, Halligan, Frith, Driver et al., 1999; Farrer 
& Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003). However, these areas usually appear to be involved 
mainly in conflicting, non-agency rather than in agency conditions according to 
studies in both patients and healthy participants (e.g., Spence, Brooks, Hirsch, 
Liddle, Meehan et al., 1997; Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck & Jeannerod, 1999; 
Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer, Franck, Frith, Decety, Georgieff et al., 2004). For 
example, in a study by Farrer and Frith (2002), the IPC area appeared to be more 
active when participants attributed a visual event to another person rather than to 
themselves, while being aware of causing an action was associated with activation 
in the anterior insula. Likewise, a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study 
(Farrer et al., 2003) observed that activity in IPC increased with the level of 
discrepancy between the executed and the observed action on the screen. Similarly, 
activity in the right angular gyrus (AG) correlates with the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between the intended and actual effects of the action (Farrer et al., 2003). 
The involvement of AG was also confirmed by a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study (Farrer, Frey, van Horn, Tunik, Turk et al., 2008) where loss 
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of agency was found to correlate with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
response in the AG. Overall, increased activations of PPC and IPC in general, and 
AG in particular, were detected when participants explicitly rejected agency over an 
outcome. The Authors of those studies suggested that these regions could be 
involved in the comparison between the efference copy of the intended action and 
the actual sensory outcome. Any mismatch between these signals give rise to the 
explicit awareness of non-agency. Going beyond a correlational approach, also 
virtual lesions studies by means of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have 
investigated the role of the IPC and the adjacent parietal areas in SoAg (MacDonald 
& Paus, 2003; Preston & Newport, 2007; Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Karabanov, 
Christensen & Nielsen, 2014). A noticeable difference between the imaging findings 
and some of the brain stimulation results is that whereas the former consistently 
report higher activity of the IPC with increasing levels of external perturbation (e.g., 
when participants do not experience agency; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; 
Nahab et al., 2011), the latter seem to suggest that disrupting this region modulates 
agency relatively unspecifically regardless of whether the observed movement is 
externally generated (e.g., a manipulated movement) or not (e.g., a self-controlled 
movement) (e.g., Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Karabanov et al., 2014).  
The cerebellum is another brain area implicated in signalling discrepancies 
between predicted and actual sensory consequences of movements. Blakemore et al. 
(2001), by means of PET showed increased cerebellar activation as a function of the 
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delay between predicted self-generated tactile sensations via a robotic arm and 
actually experienced sensations.  
Thus, both the cerebellum, PPC, IPC and AG appear to be plausible 
candidates as neural correlates of the CM. However, the cerebellum, unlike the PPC, 
does not seem to be necessarily associated with the actual comparison of predicted 
and actual signals or the detection of violations (Blakemore et al., 1998). Indeed, 
Sirigu et al. (1999) showed that patients with damage to the parietal lobule are no 
longer be able to differentiate their own hand movements from those of another 
agent. A similar phenomenon has not been reported for cerebellar patients.  
In addition to the mentioned regions, other areas, within the frontal network, 
seem to be active in external-agency conditions, even though there are not enough 
findings to drawn definitive conclusions (Sperduti et al., 2011; e.g., the pre-SMA and 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex – DLPFC - Fink et al., 1999). On the other hand, 
brain areas such as premotor regions, primary somatosensory cortex and insula (e.g., 
Sperduti et al., 2011; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003) appear to be more active 
in self-agency. Indeed, the introduction of a discrepancy between the subjects’ hand 
movements and the visual feedback provided to the participants appears to 
modulate activity in the insular region: the smaller the discrepancy is, the higher the 
activation of the insula, which was also associated with an increased feeling of 
causing the movement. 
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1.3.2 NEURAL BASES OF THE INFERENCE ACCOUNT 
The study of neural bases of the inference account (see Paragraph 1.1.2; Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003) has received little attention, despite its role in the 
emergence of agency. Only two studies have explicitly addressed this issue (Dogge, 
Hofman, Boersma, Dijkerman & Aarts, 2014; Renes, van Haren, Aarts & Vink, 2015). 
Dogge et al. (2014), using EEG, provided the first insight into the neural bases 
underlying agency inferences. Participants completed a computerized task in which 
they pressed a button followed by one of two colour words (‘red’ or ‘blue’) and rated 
the agency they experienced over the colour produced (i.e., to what extent they felt 
their key press caused the presented colour word to occur). Before executing the 
action, participants were explicitly instructed to verbally produce the colour or were 
briefly presented with a prime (e.g., the colour word). Functional connectivity 
between parietal and frontal areas was observed during low agency experiences in 
trials in which goals mismatched with the outcome. On the other hand, the coupling 
within frontal areas was observed during high agency (i.e., when participants 
thought they were the authors of the produced colour), suggesting that the frontal 
network was not involved in case of mismatching outcomes that were not ascribed 
to participants. Subsequently, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
Renes et al. (2015) observed that the experience of self-agency was associated with 
increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral (medial) superior 
frontal cortex and the left inferior parietal lobule. Therefore, the inference account of 
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agency seems to recruit higher cortical regions, such as the prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
more related to conscious monitoring (Slachevsky, Pillon, Fourneret, Pradat-Diehl, 
Jeannerod et al., 2001).  
 
1.3.3 NEURAL BASES OF THE PROSPECTIVE ACCOUNT  
Also the prospective account (see Paragraph 1.1.1, Chambon, Filevich & 
Haggard, 2014; Chambon, Sidarus et al., 2014) has received scant attention. 
Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz and Haggard (2013) using fMRI dissociated action 
selection processes from action-outcome matching by subliminally priming 
responses to a target arrow using a paradigm similar to that of Wenke et al. (2010) 
described in Paragraph 1.1.1. Results highlighted a network involving both left 
DLPFC and left AG. In particular, AG was active in case of non-agency conditions, 
when mismatches between prime and actual response to the target were detected, 
consistently with the other studies described in the Paragraph 1.1.1 (e.g., Farrer et 
al., 2003; Farrer, Frey et al., 2008), suggesting that AG codes for lack of agency. 
Interestingly, AG activation predicted the ‘magnitude’ of agency: indeed, only for 
incompatible trials, activity in the AG decreased as the sense of control over 
outcomes increased. In addition, activity in the AG, always in incompatible trials, 
was negatively correlated with activity in the DLPFC, which might provide conflict 
resolution between action alternatives by reducing activations for incompatibly-
primed responses. In other words, DLPFC activation would reflect willed action, 
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while its deactivation would signal dysfluency in the selection of willed action, 
resulting in a diminished sense of control over action effects. On the other hand, AG 
not only accounts for the CM (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2001) by monitoring mismatches between actions and outcomes, 
but also codes for prospective agency, by real-time monitoring action selection 
processes coming from DLPFC in advance of the action itself, and independently of 
action outcomes to finally shape agency. 
Subsequently, Chambon, Moore & Haggard (2014) combined single-pulse 
TMS over left IPC and left DLPFC, with subliminal priming of action selection and 
judgements of control over action effects. The results confirmed and extended the 
findings from the previous fMRI study (Chambon et al. 2013), showing for the first 
time that the contribution of IPC to the SoAg includes early and prospective 
components related to action preparation and execution, which do not depend on 
processing at the time of action outcomes. No effect on DLPFC was observed. 
Altogether, these studies suggested a functional subdivision of IPC: its ventral 
part would be more involved in retrospectively monitoring the link between the 
action and its consequences (e.g., Farrer, Frey et al. 2008), while its dorsal component 
would be more involved in monitoring the linkage between intention and action, 
prior to action execution and independent of action consequences (Chambon et al. 
2013; Chambon, Filevich et al., 2014; Chambon, Moore et al., 2014; Chambon, Sidarus 
et al., 2014). In addition, the IPC appears to be a candidate area for the neural 
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implementation of the Cue Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Moore & 
Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013), playing a crucial role in monitoring the 
consistency between various action-related signals and action selection fluency may 
be one such cue.  
 
1.3.4 CONNECTIVITY STUDIES 
The experience of agency requires the integration of information generated at 
different brain sites. But how do these regions communicate? To date, only a few 
studies have investigated agency as the result of a network of functionally connected 
brain regions (David, 2012). For example, David, Cohen, Newen, Bewernick, Shah 
et al. (2007) asked participants to indicate perceived control over actions based on 
congruent or incongruent movement feedback. Increased functional connectivity 
was observed between the pre-motor cortex, cerebellum, and PPC when movements 
were correctly identified as externally generated, and between the insula and 
somatosensory cortex when movements were correctly classified as self-generated. 
Then Nahab et al. (2011) identified two main networks. The first one, the leading 
network, consists primarily of the left anterior inferior parietal lobe, the right 
supramarginal gyrus, the right temporoparietal junction and the anterior insula. 
This network would convey information to a lagging network consisting mainly of 
the cingulate, posterior inferior parietal lobe and the prefrontal lobe. The former is 
the first to become active and is likely to be involved in mismatch detection between 
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motor predictions and sensory action effects; the lagging network translates, later in 
time, the outcomes of this comparison into a conscious agency experience. Although 
the aforementioned connectivity studies provide a first glimpse into neural 
dynamics underlying the SoAg, they deal with agency processes informed by motor 
predictive signals. However, as seen before in Paragraph 1.3.2, parietal and frontal 
regions are also associated with the inference account (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999): 
indeed, inferences depend heavily on functional connectivity between these regions 
(Dogge et al., 2014). This is due to the fact that both motor prediction and inference 
involve a comparison between predicted and actual outcomes (Dogge et al., 2014).  
A recent EEG study (Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Nielsen & Christensen, 2014) 
identified an IPC-pre-SMA network in which SoAg is associated with stronger 
coupling from IPC to pre-SMA. When participants experienced agency over their 
movements coupled activity is present. In other words, IPC supplies the pre-SMA 
with information about a mismatch of sensorimotor and visual information after the 
movement has been performed. Attribution of agency (self vs other) does not 
depend on a pure increase or decrease activity in a single cortical area. Instead, it is 
the coupled activity in a specific frequency band within this network that determines 
SoAg. Very recently, Kang, Im, Shim, Nahab, Park et al. (2015) used EEG power 
spectrum measures and phase coherence of alpha, beta, and gamma frequency 
bands to estimate neuronal activity and functional connectivity. They found that the 
alpha band was the most closely correlated with SoAg modulation, in particular 
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within the anterior frontal regions. The degree of desynchronisation was higher at 
greater levels of control and the functional connectivity was lower as the participants 
felt that they could control their virtual hand. This suggests that the system might 
be more active when there is a lack of agency. Indeed, under normal circumstances, 
the self-agency system is ‘in equilibrium’ since for the vast majority of time the 
outcomes produced by one’s own actions match with the actions performed. 
However, when the action does not match what was intended, the discrepancy is 
quickly detected and agency system is activated (Kang et al., 2015). These anterior 
frontal regions were also functionally connected with other cortical regions (e.g., the 
middle central, parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes in the right hemisphere), 
supporting the idea that frontal regions may be a sort of central hub receiving 
various types of information, such as sensory information and state estimation 
between self-movements and perception, adjusting motor output. This functional 
connectivity between frontal and other cortical areas was particularly modulated by 
beta and gamma bands. The study showed that alpha band activity is the 
characteristic neural oscillation of SoAg, which suggests that the neural network 
within the anterior frontal area may be important in the generation of SoAg.  
To sum up, connectivity studies are relevant in order to assess how the 
different areas involved in the SoAg relate to one other. Although these studies are 
increasing, there is still much work to be done in order to identify the processing 
pathways that integrate information coming from these areas to support agency. 
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1.4 THE CLINICAL SIDE OF THE SENSE OF AGENCY  
Two main general classes of dysfunctional agency can be broadly 
distinguished, as a consequence of (i) more diffuse neural changes underlying 
mental illnesses or (ii) focal neurological lesions (for a review, see: Moore & Fletcher, 
2012). The following sections will provide a brief review of the main pathologies 
characterized by a lack of the SoAg 
 
1.4.1 SCHIZOPHRENIA  
Schizophrenia represents an outstanding ‘pathophysiology model’ within 
agency field (Synofzik et al., 2013). Indeed, patients suffering from schizophrenia 
report unusual experience of control over their actions. They may either feel that 
external forces are controlling their actions, or they may feel in control of events that 
are actually not caused by their own actions. SoAg functioning in this population 
has been mainly investigated using explicit judgments tasks. Usually, patients with 
delusions of control show difficulty in self-attribution of the sensory consequences 
of a given action, resulting from a mismatch between internal predictions and the 
actual sensory feedback. Therefore, these problems of agency may be linked to a 
deficit within the CM (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2001), namely in the internal forward model (e.g., Frith & Done, 
1989; Blakemore et al., 1998; Blakemore, Smith et al., 2000; Frith, Blakemore & 
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Wolpert, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001; Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002; Shergill, 
Samson, Bayn, Frith & Wolpert, 2014). According to this idea, patients would 
attribute any deviant sensory information – no longer compensated by internal 
predictions – to external sources rather than to themselves. This mechanism can also 
be explained by referring to the Cue Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; 
Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). For example, according to the cue 
integration approach, schizophrenic patients with delusions of influence - who have 
a reduced reliability of motor predictive signals - would mostly rely on post-hoc 
information about their actions (e.g., visual feedback) rather than on internal 
sensorimotor cues in order to establish the source of agency (Synofzik et al., 2010).  
Another line of research has examined the ability of these patients to 
attenuate self-induced sensory events and has shown that patients suffering from 
misattributions do not exhibit the normal reduction of neuronal response to self-
generated, as compared to externally generated stimuli (Ford & Mathalon, 2004). 
This view has received further confirmation by studies involving perceptual 
decision tasks, showing that perceptual ratings were not decreased for self-induced 
sensory attenuation (Blakemore et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2014). Interestingly, 
different pattern of results has been reported between patients with positive (PS) 
and negative symptoms (NS). Indeed, NS-predominant schizophrenia shows 
markedly diminished SoAg (Maeda, Takahata, Muramatsu, Okimura, Koreki et al. 
(2013) as compared to patients with PS who, on the other hand, present an 
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‘exaggerated’ SoAg (Maeda, Kato, Muramatsu, Iwashita, Mimura et al., 2012). Such 
differences suggest that dopamine (DA) plays a key-role: in fact, PS are 
characterized by a hyper-DA state, which woul boost agency experiences, 
contributing to ‘excessive’ SoAg experiences (Maeda et al., 2012). In contrast, NS in 
schizophrenia seem to be caused by a deficiency of DA circuitry (Maeda et al., 2013), 
which would reduce the SoAg. 
 
1.4.2 OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER 
Another clinical profile in which SoAg appears to be potentially 
‘compromised’, although neglected in the current literature, is the obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD), where ‘dysfunction’ of awareness and control of motor 
actions are at the core of the phenomenological expression of this disorder. 
Specifically, obsessions are intrusive and uncontrolled thoughts, whereas 
compulsions regard the urgency to performed stereotyped mental or physical 
actions, both of which significantly impair everyday functioning. In particular, OCD 
patients exhibit sequelae mainly related to action planning and execution: a study 
conducted by Gentsch, Schütz-Bosbach, Endrass & Kathmann (2012) showed a lack 
of predictive self-attenuation. Specifically, in the EEG signal the typical reduction of 
N1 amplitude following self-generated sensory outcomes in healthy people (e.g., 
Blakemore et al., 1998; 2000) was absent in these patients, which did not rather seem 
to be able to distinguish between self and externally generated visual events. Within 
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this context, the lack of sensory suppression of N1 component - after voluntary 
action generation of visual feedback - exhibited by patients indicates deficient 
internal motor predictions. 
 
1.4.3 AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER 
Knowing whether it is me or another agent that is producing and controlling 
a particular action is fundamental in order to establish self-other boundaries. 
Difficulties in this regard could lead to subsequent impairments in understanding 
the perspective of other individuals, a peculiarity of Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD). In addition, ASD are characterized by impairments in motor planning, 
monitoring and prediction (for a review, see: Gowen & Hamilton, 2013). Based on 
these assumptions, an impairment on the agency domain might be predicted. 
However, until now, literature has reported mixed results, with studies showing 
either preserved or impaired SoAg (for a review, see: Zalla & Sperduti, 2015). 
According to a recent review by Zalla & Sperduti (2015), impairment in the SoAg 
might be featured by a reduced reliance on internal prospective signals, generated 
at very early stages of action selection and planning (Chambon, Sidarus et al., 2014) 
along with spared retrospective mechanisms (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001).  
 
1.4.4 PSYCHOGENIC MOVEMENT DISORDER 
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Psychogenic movement disorders (PMD) are featured by involuntary 
movements (e.g., tremor, dystonia, corea), for which patients usually report a lack 
of control, in the absence of structural, metabolic, or neurological disease. Changes 
within SoAg have been reported in these patients (Pareés, Brown, Nuruki, Adams, 
Navare et al., 2014): using a classic ‘force matching’ paradigm, patients were 
required to match a force delivered to their index finger either by pressing down 
directly on their finger or operating a robot to press down on their finger. PMD 
patients showed reduced sensorimotor attenuation with respect to healthy controls. 
Subsequently, Macerollo, Chen, Pareés, Kassavetis, Kilner et al. (2015) extended 
these findings by exploring sensory evoked potentials, showing that patients are 
characterized by reduced sensory attenuation at onset of self-paced movement. 
 
1.4.5 NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS 
Also many neurological disorders have been associated with modifications of 
agency (for a review, see: Kranick & Hallett, 2013). For example, in Alien Hand 
Syndrome (AlHS), patients deny that the limb is paralyzed and behave as it is not, 
sometimes claiming that it moves. The affected limb is in this respect not under full 
voluntary control and its actions are associated with a diminished SoAg (Moore & 
Fletcher, 2012). Similarly, the Anarchic Hand Syndrome (AnHS) is characterized by 
goal-directed movements performed without volitional control (Marchetti & Della 
Sala, 1998). A recent study conducted by Jenkinson, Edelstyn, Preston & Ellis (2015) 
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provided the first direct examination of agency modifications in parietal-type AnHS 
demonstrating that it is not a mere deficit of motor control. In contrast to AlHS, in 
AnHS the hand is perceived as belonging to the person, but there is also a strong 
feeling of the hand being out of control, with its own will and responding to external 
cues. What is lacking is the sufferer’s sense of being able to control or stop it (Moore 
& Fletcher, 2012). Also tic disorders are characterized by a lack of control over 
voluntary actions (Moretto, Schwingenschuh, Katschnig, Bhatia & Haggard, 2011):  
sudden, repetitive and stereotyped movements, experienced as a voluntary 
response to an urge, are at the core of this neurological disease. The experience of 
intention in these patients was delayed in proportion to disease severity, and 
Authors interpreted these results as symptom of a dissociation between motor 
intentions and sensory feedback.  
 
As has emerged from this brief review, modifications of the SoAg characterize 
a wide range of disorders. Although much work has yet to be done, clinical disorders 
showing modifications of SoAg nevertheless represent an essential first window of 
insight into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying this phenomenon.  
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1.5 TAKE-HOME MESSAGE 
The review presented in this chapter shows how SoAg has become a hot topic 
within the cognitive neuroscience field, as evident from the increasing number of 
relevant articles published in the very recent years (David, Obhi & Moore, 2015). 
Indeed, many researchers have shown interest in this topic in view of the impact 
that SoAg has on individuals and on our society in general. Up to now, significant 
progress has been achieved with regard to models which significantly contribute to 
the understanding of the cognitive processes underlying agency in healthy 
individuals. Most importantly, thanks to this advance, a new window was also 
opened to the exploration of agency ‘dysfunctions’. The fact that SoAg can be 
impaired in certain diseases has then suggested the existence of a neural substrate 
for this phenomenon. Here, although many efforts have been made to shed light on 
brain regions supporting the SoAg, a heterogeneous picture has emerged. Indeed, a 
scatter distribution of areas within our brain has been shown to be implicated in the 
processing of agency. One of the main factors which might have contributed to such 
a mixed picture is the different tasks and techniques usually adopted. Nevertheless, 
considering all these pieces of evidence together, it seems quite clear that frontal 
areas are more involved during agency attribution, while the parietal regions seem 
to be more implicated during loss of agency. However, the complexity of agency 
cannot be reduced to simply ‘turning on’ and ‘turning off’ of particular areas. To 
obtain a more compelling view of how SoAg works, connectivity studies are needed. 
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However, up to now the few connectivity studies present in the scientific overview 
are still incomplete because of the limited number of brain regions considered or, 
more critically, because brain regions associated with the implicit feeling of agency 
have been omitted. In fact, the vast majority of studies utilized explicit measures, 
which have several intrinsic limitations and might have, in some way, introduced 
confounding factors. Therefore, it appears that a straightforward consensus on the 
neural underpinnings of agency has yet to be reached and, despite many 
advancements, much work is still needed to fully appreciate the potentiality of such 
intriguing phenomenon. 
 In the following chapter, the IB effect will be considered as an implicit 
measure of SoAg. The possible adoption of this measure in routine investigations of 
agency, especially combined with neuroimaging techniques, could provide a 
suitable tool for optimal investigations of agency, both in healthy individuals and in 











Our voluntary actions influence the way people subjectively experience time 
(Haggard et al., 2002). For this reason, time perception represents nowadays one of 
the most important implicit measures for studying the SoAg (Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005). More than a decade ago Haggard et al. (2002) observed that voluntary actions 
and their sensory consequences are perceived as temporally shifted together in time. 
This effect has been called Intentional Binding (IB). Using the Libet clock method 
(Libet et al., 1983) - an external metric usually used to report one’s own internal 
subjective experience of willing – Authors examined participants’ awareness of 
actions and sensory effects. Participants had to watch a clock hand marked with 
conventional intervals (5, 10, 15, etc.), which rotated very fast (one rotation every 
2560 ms) on an experimenter-generated clock-face. Their task was to report the time 
onset - in other words, where the clock hand was - when a particular event 
happened. In this study, Authors obtained a baseline measure of people’s awareness 
of four main events: (1) a voluntary action: participants were instructed to press the 
spacebar whenever they felt the urge to do so and to report the clock hand position 
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at the time of their action; (2) an involuntary action: participants had to report the 
time onset of a muscle twitch in the finger triggered by a TMS pulse over the motor 
cortex; (3) a click-sound produced by the discharge of the TMS coil, directed over an 
area of cortex where it would have not induced involuntary movements; (4) a 100-
ms sound. They also obtained agency measures. In these agency conditions, two 
events were presented in each trial: the voluntary action, the involuntary movement 
and the sham TMS click were always followed by the 100-ms sound, after a fixed 
interval of 250-ms. In this case, participants had to report either when they perceived 
the occurrence of the first (i.e., their voluntary, involuntary action or the TMS click) 
or the second event (i.e., the sound). When comparing the agency trials (the ones with 
two events) with the baseline trials (where only one event was present), Haggard et 
al. (2002) observed that participants’ awareness of voluntary actions in agency 
conditions, when followed by the sound, was delayed as compared to the baseline 
condition where only the voluntary action was present. This effect was called action 
binding. On the other hand, awareness of tones preceded by such voluntary actions 
was perceived earlier as compared to the baseline condition where only the tone was 
present. This other effect was named effect binding. In contrast, awareness of 
involuntary, TMS-induced movements was shifted earlier in time, away from the 
tone, whereas awareness of the consequent tone was shifted later in time, away from 
the TMS-induced movement. Awareness of sham TMS clicks and tones following 
such clicks did not change relative to baseline. This bias to perceive actions and 
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effects closer in time than they actually are has been observed only when the first 
event was intentional (Figure 2.1). Indeed, it did not happen when the first event 
was unrelated to the participants’ will. For this reason, IB is considered a reliable 




Figure 2.1. The classic pattern of IB (adapted from Haggard et al., 2002). The perception of onset of     
voluntary actions was shifted later in time and the perception of tone onset was shifted earlier. This 
was not the case for involuntary actions induced by TMS, which showed the opposite effects.  
 
 
Until now, IB effect has been confirmed in many other studies and since its 
discovery it was successfully adopted to study agency in healthy people and clinical 
populations (for a review, see: Moore & Obhi, 2012).  
The following sections will focus first on literature investigating the cognitive 
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models underlying IB, and then a description of the principal factors potentially 
influencing IB will be provided. In the end, results coming from studies focusing on 
the neural correlates of IB and involving clinical populations will be described.  
 
2.1 THE LINK BETWEEN INTENTIONAL BINDING AND THE 
SENSE OF AGENCY 
Understanding the link between IB and SoAg requires many steps. The first 
one is to consider the models proposed to explain the SoAg and attempting to verify 
if they are able to account for IB as well. Starting with the first model discussed in 
Chapter 1 (the CM: Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore 
et al., 2001; see Paragraph 1.1.1), IB was shown to be produced by dedicated motor 
control mechanisms that predict the sensory consequences of an action. Indeed, IB 
requires (i) an efferent signal, similar to the motor command posited by predictive 
models and (ii) reliable temporal relations between action and effect (Haggard et al., 
2002), like predictive models learning the relation between motor command and 
sensory consequence. Support for this view has been provided by different studies 
(e.g., Haggard & Clark, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggards, 2003; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 
2007). For example, Haggard and Clark (2003) tested this hypothesis by inserting 
occasional involuntary movements using TMS. Participants made voluntary key 
presses whilst watching the Libet clock. In some blocks TMS was randomly applied 
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over motor cortex to disrupt the completion of some of these intentional actions by 
triggering an identical involuntary movement. Some actions were therefore 
intentional (i.e., the action precisely matched the participant’s intention) and some 
were not (i.e., the action did not precisely match the participant’s intention). Authors 
reported that the participants’ intention to produce the auditory tone gave rise to 
the IB effect. However, if the intention was interrupted by an involuntary 
movement, followed by an identical tone, no IB occurred. In other words, disrupting 
intentions significantly weakened IB. These results show that the efferent signal 
involved in pressing the button has a critical role in IB. An intention, without the 
motor act, followed by the appropriate effect (the tone) is not sufficient. Therefore, 
predictive models have a critical role in constructing the conscious experience of an 
action. 
However, IB is not only explained by the CM, but also by an inferential process 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003). Indeed, Moore and Haggard (2008) 
investigated the contribution of both prediction (Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001) and retrospective inference (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003) to the action component of IB. In order to isolate the 
contribution of these two processes, Authors devised a modified version of the Libet 
clock method, by varying the probability of action outcomes. The outcome could be 
predictable - the action triggered a tone in 75% of trials – and unpredictable – the key 
press produced a tone in 50% of trials. The contribution of predictive mechanisms 
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was confirmed by an increase in action binding on ‘action only’ trials (i.e., in the 
absence of action outcomes) in the 75% vs. 50% conditions. Indeed, prior knowledge 
of the action–outcome association led to a predictive form of IB. Conversely, the 
contribution of retrospective inference was confirmed by an increase in action binding 
on ‘action + tone’ vs. ‘action only trials’, only in the 50% condition. Here, the 
contribution of prediction was minimal because the outcome was unpredictable. 
Therefore, the increase in binding on ‘action + tone’ trials could only have been due 
to the presence of the tone. This suggested that the tone retrospectively triggered a 
shift in the perceived time of action. Taken together, the results showed that action 
binding depends both on a predictive process - since it occurs even in trials in which 
tones are absent, in a situation where the action is highly predictive of a tone - and 
on inferential process, as action binding occurs even when the action is not strongly 
predictive of a tone, as long as the tone event occurs. Moore and Haggard (2008) 
demonstrated in this way the contribution of both internal sensorimotor prediction 
and external action outcomes to the SoAg. This dual contribution of internal motoric 
signals and external, situational cues was also demonstrated by Moore, Wegner et 
al. (2009). Using a priming paradigm, they investigated how supraliminal primes 
might alter the experience of the relation between actions and their effects. They 
considered two movement conditions: voluntary and passive. Prior to the 
movement in each condition participants were presented with a prime: a high or low 
pitch tone. The movement then produced, after a brief delay, a high or low pitch 
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tone. They found that IB was increased when primes were congruent with the 
outcome. However, the effect was different in accordance to the type of movements: 
extrinsic cues were most effective for involuntary movements. On the other hand, 
when an internal agency cue existed within the motor system, as in voluntary 
movements, alternative external cues to agency have a reduced impact on action 
experience. These results suggest that such cues are not additive, but interactive and 
that their relative influence is determined by their reliability (for similar findings 
within SoAg, see Aarts et al., 2005). For this reason, Moore, Wegner et al. (2009) 
proposed that a Bayesian cue integration process might explain the IB effect.  
Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner and Rowe (2013) provided direct evidence for the 
contribution of Cue Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 
2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). According to the cue integration hypothesis, IB could 
result from using both events (e.g., the internal motor cue and the external sound) 
as informative cues. The time estimates are based on a weighted average of the two 
events, in which the weight of each cue is determined by its reliability. Authors 
tested the contribution of cue integration to the perception of action and its sensory 
effect in IB, by manipulating the sensory reliability of the sensory outcome (e.g., the 
tone), that is, the tone intensity relative to a background white noise. Results 
provided support to the cue integration hypothesis for the action binding 
phenomenon: when sensory uncertainty is high or in the absence of sensory 
feedback, the perception of action relies more on these internal representations, 
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thereby reducing action binding. However, tone binding is not supported by the cue 
integration process. On the other hand, it seems that tone binding depends on a ‘pre-
activation’ mechanism (Waszak et al., 2012). Accordingly, the neural representation 
of a predicted sensory event, such as a sensory outcome following a voluntary 
action, is activated prior to its occurrence since its perceptual representation has 
already been pre-activated by internal motor signals. On the other hand, in the case 
of non-anticipated stimuli the signal accumulation would take longer to reach the 
threshold of awareness (Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013). Other data are also consistent 
with the cue integration model. Desantis et al. (2011) investigated IB by considering 
the role played by the involvement of another potential agent, in different 
conditions: (i) participants were unsure whether they or a confederate had produced 
an outcome; (ii) participants were told that they had produced the outcome; (iii) 
participants were told that the confederate had produced the outcome. They found 
classical IB in the uncertain condition (i), where there was no explicit instruction 
concerning the author of the action. They also found that IB was increased when 
participants were led to believe an outcome was contingent on their own behaviour 
(ii), compared to a condition in which they were led to believe that the outcome was 
caused by the confederate (iii). These results suggest that when the conditions is 
uncertain participants use internal cues (e.g., sensorimotor information) to attribute 
agency, consistent with the idea that these internal cues receive higher weighting. 
However, if external cues to agency are compelling, these may over-ride the 
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sensorimotor information. 
 
2.2 NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR INTENTIONAL BINDING 
IB occurs only if certain conditions are satisfied. The vast majority of studies 
focused on the conditions that are necessary and sufficient in order for IB to happen. 
Haggard et al. (2002), for example, investigated the role of temporal contiguity and 
temporal predictability, by varying the delay between the key-press and the 
subsequent tone (250, 450, or 650 ms). Participants had to judge the time onset of the 
tone, both in separate fixed blocks - in which all trials involved a single interval - 
and in three additional blocks containing a randomized combination of all intervals. 
Authors observed that IB was modulated by temporal proximity and predictability: a 
stronger IB was observed for fixed than for randomized intervals and for short than 
long intervals. The fundamental role of causality has been suggested also by other 
studies (e.g., Engbert & Woschläger, 2007; Engbert, Woschläger & Haggard, 2008; 
Cravo, Claessens & Baldo, 2009; Moore, Lagnado, Deal & Haggard, 2009; Cravo, 
Claessens & Baldo, 2011). Recently, Kawabe, Roseboom & Nishida (2013) have 
shown that IB depends on a time window (starting from the onset of the action and 
extending over a certain period) in which the signals related to the action (i.e., 
internal agency cues) and its effect (effect-related signals) have to be integrated. If 
the delay between an action and its effect increases, the integration of the effect with 
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the action would be less likely because this effect would occur outside this time 
window; as a consequence, the SoAg would be affected. In addition to causality, 
another important factor that needs to be present for the occurrence of IB is 
intentionality (see: Moore & Obhi, 2012 and Paragraph 2.3.3). For example, when 
participants do not directly experience the voluntary act of a movement (e.g., a key-
press) but passively experience it, IB does not occur (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002; 
Wohlschläger, Engbert & Haggard, 2003). Taken together, both conditions – 
causality and intentionality - seem to play a key role in IB. 
Other studies do not support this view. For example, Buehner and 
Humphreys (2009) have shown that the causal relation between an action and its 
consequence is more important than intentionality for the phenomenon to occur (see 
also: Buehner, 2012; 2015). In addition, reliable temporal relations also appear to be 
unnecessary, as temporal binding has been reported in studies employing 
unpredictable intervals between action and effect, including intervals longer than 
one second, well beyond the brief temporal window in which predictive forward 
models related to motor planning are thought to operate (e.g., Humphreys & 
Buehner, 2009; 2010; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013). However, 
these discrepancies seem to be related to methodological differences:  indeed, these 
studies measured IB via numerical estimates or by asking participants to reproduce 
the interval between two event (see Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the 
current paradigms to measure IB).  
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Despite controversy over the underlying mechanisms, IB has been used as a 
proxy for the SoAg in several studies (for a review, see Moore & Obhi, 2012). 
 
2.3 FACTORS MODULATING INTENTIONAL BINDING 
As described in the previous sections, IB seems to arise from the same 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the SoAg. However, in order 
to fully disentangle the linkage between IB and SoAg, a further second step is 
required, that is to investigate whether the factors related to agency are also able to 
affect IB. If this is the case, further supporting the notion of IB as an effective implicit 
measure of agency would be provided. Recent findings have indeed suggested that 
the IB effect, like the SoAg (e.g., Aarts et al., 2005; 2007; Wenke et al., 2010; Damen 
et al., 2014), can also be influenced by several contextual, situational and personal 
factors. The next section will examine the factors which contribute to shape IB in the 
attempt to shed light on the supposed link between IB and agency. 
 
2.3.1 RESPONSIBILITY AND EMOTIONS 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Paragraph 1.1.4) emotions have received little 
attention within SoAg field (for a review, see: Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014). 
Nevertheless, recent studies aimed to investigate how emotions modulate IB. 
Indeed, our actions typically aim at positive rather than negative outcomes and are 
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reward-directed. Therefore, one might expect that IB should vary with the valence 
of action outcomes. For example, Moretto, Walsh et al. (2011) focused on the relation 
between voluntary action and both the moral and emotional consequences of action. 
They embedded the IB task within standard moral and economic dilemmas in order 
to understand how the context and effect of the action can modulate IB. Authors 
observed enhanced temporal compression when an action was followed by a moral 
rather than a merely economic outcome, suggesting that responsibility plays a 
crucial role for our SoAg. In addition, the binding of picture-effects towards actions 
was stronger for more than for less negative outcomes. In other words, people 
experience strong linkage of actions to their effects when actions are morally and 
emotively important, and produce important outcomes. However, opposite results 
have been shown by Yoshie and Haggard (2013) investigating whether SoAg in 
general – and IB in particular -  might be altered by the emotional content of action 
outcomes (e.g., emotionally negative, positive and neutral sound). Contrary to 
Moretto, Walsh et al. (2011), reduced temporal binding between actions and 
consequences eliciting negative emotional vocalizations was observed (Yoshie & 
Haggard, 2013). Yoshie and Haggard (2013) have suggested that a possible 
explanation for this controversial pattern of results could be found in the 
experimental manipulation: indeed, in Moretto, Walsh et al. (2011) the moral and 
non-moral effects may have been by-products of a general influence of magnitude 
on arousal or salience, rather than an effect of valence, as in Yoshie and Haggard’s 
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study (2013). Support for Yoshie and Haggard’s results comes then from another 
study in an economic context which showed reduced IB when participants lost 
money compared to when they gained or retained money (Takahata et al., 2012). 
Similarly, priming participants with positive pictures compared to neutral ones 
seems to lead to an increase of the IB effect (Aarts, Bijleveld, Custers, Dogge, Deelder 
et al., 2012).  
Subsequently, Barlas and Obhi (2014) extended this research area trying to 
understand whether perceived pleasantness - a factor which is potentially shaped 
by cultural differences - can affect the IB. They tested western and non-western 
participants and examined the effect of pleasantness of action effects (e.g., consonant 
and dissonant piano chords) on both control ratings and IB. Authors made two main 
predictions: (i) perceived pleasantness of consonant chords would have produced 
higher feelings of control and liking ratings as well as stronger binding effect 
compared to the dissonant ones; (ii) as consonant and dissonant chords are based 
specifically on western tonal structure, a greater effect of consonance in the western 
group compared to the non-western group was hypothesized. As expected, both 
western and non-western groups showed greater control ratings for pleasant 
(consonant) compared to unpleasant (dissonant) outcomes. The IB effect, on the 
other hand, appeared to be stronger for the pleasant consonant compared to the 
unpleasant outcomes in the western group only. In other words, the western group 
showed stronger SoAg over more pleasant outcomes at both low and high levels of 
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agency while the non-western group displayed the same effect only at the high level. 
This result is in line with other studies in literature showing that cultural differences 
in the degree of self-evaluations and self-enhancement become more evident with 
implicit measures, while explicit measures might not reveal any such difference (see: 
Barlas & Obhi, 2014). Therefore, agency may be differentially affected by the cultural 
background of participants. 
 
2.3.2 PERSONALITY TRAITS AND INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES 
In order to better understand whether IB is linked to agency, it is necessary to 
investigate other factors modulating the magnitude of the effect, such as personality 
traits (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015). For example, narcissistic traits are associated with 
increased dominance and egocentricity, and therefore one might expect that 
individuals characterized by this profile exhibit a high degree of agency and sense 
of control. Hascalovitz and Obhi (2015) tried to explore this aspect. Using the 
narcissistic personality inventory (NPI: Maxwell, Donnellan, Hopwood & 
Ackerman, 2011), a well-known index of sub-clinical narcissism in social 
psychological research, they recruited healthy participants and based on their 
scoring, they divided them into three groups: high, middle, and low NPI score. 
Results showed that different NPI scores were indeed associated with changes in the 
magnitude of IB. Namely, individuals with higher and middle NPI scores displayed 
levels of effect binding greater than those with low NPI scores. Overall, these results 
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provide the first evidence that different scores on a personality trait are associated 
with differences in the degree of binding of effects. 
Another type of intrinsic factor impacting on the SoAg via IB is the recall of 
personal episodes. For example, Obhi, Swiderski and Farquhar (2013) investigated 
whether activating memories of depression, associated with feelings of loss of 
control, alters the magnitude of IB, as compared to activating memories of the 
previous day, or a baseline condition in which specific memories were not activated. 
Results showed that IB was significantly weaker after remembering a depressing 
episode than in the other conditions, indicating that the memory of an episode 
characterized by a negative mood alters the IB effect. Also the perception of personal 
power appears to influence the IB effect, showing that IB is significantly affected by 
low-power perception (Obhi, Swiderski & Brubacher, 2012).  
 
2.3.3 INTENTIONS AND BELIEFS 
Intention attributions have been showed to modulate temporal perception of 
voluntary actions and their sensory effects (Wohlschläger, Engbert et al., 2003; 
Wohlschläger, Haggard, Gesierich, & Prinz, 2003; Moore, Teufel, Subramaniam, 
Davis & Fletcher, 2013; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013). For example, Wohlschläger 
Haggard et al. (2003) measured the estimated onset time of actions that participants 
either executed themselves or observed being executed by someone else or by a 
machine. In three experiments, the estimates of the machine actions always differed 
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from those of self- and other-generated actions, whereas the latter two were 
indistinguishable. According to the Authors (Wohlschläger Haggard et al., 2003), 
this result could be due to the fact that participants usually attribute intentions to 
other biological agents but not to machines. Strother, House, & Obhi (2010) agree 
with this view: in their study participants performed the IB task in pairs and both 
participants were instructed to prepare and execute a key press during each trial, 
provided that the other participant had not pressed the key first. If participants were 
not the first to produce a press they were instructed to passively move their finger 
in concert with the other’s press. Similar binding effect for self-generated and other-
generated actions was observed, even when only one participant of the pair was 
instructed to plan and generate the action. These results are interpreted in the 
context of shared action representations: observing the act of another person 
activates the representations of these actions in the observer’s brain which mediates 
binding (Strother et al., 2010). Furthermore, the temporal feature of intention (e.g., 
distal and proximal) impacts on IB, too (Vinding, Pedersen & Overgaard, 2013). 
Participants were instructed to act either immediately or to wait a certain time-
interval before acting, when they experienced the intention to act. IB was 
significantly enhanced for distal (i.e., delayed) intentions compared to proximal 
intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger SoAg. In a subsequent study 
(Vinding, Jenen & Overgaard, 2015), a series of delays between intention and action 
was included. Results showed that, again, delayed and proximal intentions have a 
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different impact on IB. Indeed, the occurrence of both action and tone was reported 
earlier in the delayed conditions compared to the proximal conditions and this did 
not differ across delays for delayed intentions.  
The perception of the sensory consequences of one's own actions is also 
modulated by beliefs about the cause of the sensory event. Indeed, IB is stronger 
when participants believe that they are responsible for the outcomes as compared to 
when they believed that another person is the cause (Desantis et al., 2011; Haering 
& Kiesel, 2012). These results, together with some other related studies (Aarts & van 
den Bos, 2011; Dogge, Schaap, Custers, Wegner & Aarts, 2012), clearly indicate that 
beliefs and IB are related.  
 
2.3.4 OTHER TYPES OF INFLUENCES ON INTENTIONAL BINDING 
Many other factors interact with our actions and contribute to shape agency. 
For example, our actions are often selected among different alternatives and we can 
freely choose what we desire; other times we decide on our own what to do, but we 
can also execute what other people tell us to do, for instance when we are at work. 
In other occasions, something unexpected happens and we are forced to inhibit what 
we were doing before that event. All these aspects characterize our actions and 
therefore have an impact on them.  
Haggard and Cole (2007), for example, examined the influence of attention 
on IB. They considered a task in which participants were not informed which event 
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to judge (either the action or the effect) until the end of the trial. This clearly 
prevented the participant from strategically attending to one of the two possible 
critical events (e.g., action or effect). They observed that IB was stronger when 
participants were unable to direct their attention to an action or an effect as 
compared to a condition in which they knew what to attend to. This result suggests 
that IB might not be dependent on focussed attention to a particular event.  
When a voluntary action has to be inhibited at the very last moment Haggard, 
Poonian and Walsh (2009) observed that the usual temporal compression effect 
disappears and turns into a sort of repulsion. On the other hand, the magnitude of 
binding is greater when people have the possibility to choose between more than 
one options. Indeed, Barlas and Obhi (2013) varied the number of action alternatives 
(e.g., seven possible buttons compared to one and three possible button presses) that 
participants could select from and determined the effects on IB. Participants made 
self-paced button presses while viewing the classical Libet clock and reported the 
perceived onset time of either the button presses or consequent auditory tones. They 
observed that increasing the number of choices increased the sensation of agency. In 
addition, IB does not change between intentional and instructed actions (Wenke, 
Waszak, & Haggard, 2009), suggesting that we feel agency for actions and events 
both when we decide to perform them, and also when we are externally instructed 
to.   
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2.4 NEURAL BASES OF INTENTIONAL BINDING 
Over the last decade many experiments have investigated IB from a 
behavioural point of view. Besides the studies which appealed a role of 
dopaminergic (Moore, Schneider, Schwingenschuh, Moretto, Bhatia et al., 2011) and 
glutammatergic pathways (Moore, Turner, Corlett, Arana, Morgan et al., 2011) (see 
next Paragraph), the underlying neural mechanisms are still not well understood, 
since only a few studies have explicitly considered the neural bases using different 
techniques within the cognitive neuroscience field.  
The first study appeared in 2010 and was carried out by Moore, Ruge, Wenke, 
Rothwell and Haggard. Using theta-burst TMS they inhibited neural activity in two 
target regions, potentially implicated in IB: the sensorimotor hand area (SMHA) 
concerned with motor execution and sensorimotor feedback (Moore, Ruge et al., 
2010; Weiller, Jüptner, Fellows, Rijntjes, Leonhardt et al., 1996) and the pre-SMA, 
known to be involved in cognitive aspects of internal movement generation and 
with the conscious urge to act (Fried, Katz, McCarthy, Sass, Williamson et al., 1991; 
Picard & Strick, 2001). As control site, they chose the sensory leg area. The Authors 
used the Libet clock method (Libet et al., 1983), but differently from other previous 
studies (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Clark, 2003; Moore, Wegner et al., 
2009), the voluntary action was followed by a cutaneous somatosensory stimulus (a 
mild shock) to the right little finger, instead of an auditory tone. Authors found that 
theta-burst TMS over only the pre-SMA significantly reduced the overall IB in 
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respect to the control area (i.e., the sensory leg area). Testing each shift separately, 
Authors observed that pre-SMA stimulation only affected the effect binding 
component. Disruption of the SMHA with TMS did not significantly reduce binding 
relative to the control area. Taken together, the results of Moore, Ruge and 
colleagues (2010) suggest that pre-SMA contributes to the SogA. In order to 
overcome the fact that TMS did not explore effects of stimulating different sub-
regions within the SMA complex, Kühn, Brass and Haggard run an fMRI study 
(2013). The Authors used a time interval paradigm to measure IB: participants had 
to judge the duration of the interval between an action (an active key press or a 
passive finger movement applied by the experimenter) and its effect (a tone) while 
being scanned. Differently from Moore, Ruge and colleagues (2010), the Authors 
observed a cluster in the left SMA proper, extending into the dorsal pre-motor cortex 
whose intensity activation correlated more strongly with judgment errors when 
performing an active movement rather than when the movement was passive. 
Further, Jo, Wittmann, Hinterberger and Schmidt (2014) adopted EEG in order to 
evaluate a possible correlation between IB and readiness potential. Authors found 
that self-initiated movements following negative deflections of slow cortical 
potentials (SCPs) resulted in a stronger binding effect, especially regarding the 
perceived time of the consequent effect. These results provide the first direct 
evidence that the early neural activity within the range of SCPs affects perceived 
time of a sensory outcome that is caused by intentional action. All together the 
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present data highlight the crucial role played by frontal areas in IB.  
Since the involvement of parietal regions in non-agency conditions using 
explicit measures (Fink et al., 1999; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003), very 
recently Khalighinejad and Haggard (2015) investigated the contributions of both 
frontal and parietal areas to SoAg by combining tDCS and IB. Anodal stimulation of 
the left AG reduced effect binding, in line with other studies where AG activation is 
routinely associated with lack of agency, rather than with experience of positive 
agency (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer, Frey et al., 2008; Sperduti et al., 2011). However, 
anodal stimulations over left DLPFC decreased IB, contrary to the fact that this area 
is normally thought to facilitate intentional action (Rowe, Hughes, Nimmo-Smith, 
2010). No significant difference between cathodal and sham stimulations has been 
detected. In order to clarify the role of the DLPFC, in a subsequent study 
(Khalighinejad, Di Costa & Haggard, in press), Authors investigated whether such 
area may contribute to SoAg when participants select between multiple actions. 
Results found that anodal stimulation over DLPFC increased binding of actions 
towards outcomes, but only in tasks where participants endogenously selected 
between alternative actions. 
 
2.5 THE CLINICAL SIDE OF INTENTIONAL BINDING 
Another approach to study the potential link between IB and SoAg has been 
the characterization of the subjective experience of action in patients showing 
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control and production deficits. The first study was conducted by Haggard, Martin, 
Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod et al. (2003) in a group of schizophrenic patients and 
showed that the IB effect was significantly stronger in patients, with temporal 
intervals between actions and their consequence shorter than for controls. The 
findings of Haggard et al. (2003) have been then replicated by Voss, Moore, Hauser, 
Gallinat, Heinz et al (2010), using the modified probabilistic binding task 
implemented by Moore and Haggard (2008), in order to reveal the mechanisms 
responsible for the patients’ deficits. They examined the contribution of predictive 
(Blakemore et al., 1998; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001) and 
postdictive signals (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003). Results showed that 
schizophrenic patients lacked the predictive component of action awareness, 
showing a shift on ‘action only’ trials, regardless of the probability of tone 
occurrence. Importantly, the schizophrenic deficits in predicting the relation 
between action and effect were strongly correlated with severity of positive 
psychotic symptoms (i.e., delusions and hallucinations). Furthermore, the patients 
showed an exaggerated retrospective binding between action and tone, shifting the 
perceived time of action whenever the tone occurred, relative to when it did not 
occur. As such, their experience of agency appeared to be driven by immediate 
sensory evidence that a tone followed a particular action, without any reference to 
an internal model specifying the prior probability of a tone given an action. 
Conversely, in the control group, IB of actions towards tones arose almost entirely 
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from predictive mechanisms. Therefore, the hyper-binding effect might have been 
due to an increase in the contribution of external agency cues, reflecting their 
reliance on retrospective mechanisms rather than predictive ones. These results 
could be explained referring to the Cue Integration Framework (Moore, Wegner et al., 
2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). SoAg is dominated by the most 
reliable source of information. In schizophrenic patients, unreliable internal 
sensorimotor prediction may explain the stronger retrospective contribution to IB. 
No matter whether SoAg tasks are explicit or implicit, patients with schizophrenia 
are more likely than healthy controls to attribute the source of distorted or 
ambiguous visual feedback of an action to themselves (e.g., Daprati et al., 1997; 
Haggard et al., 2003; Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010; Maeda et al., 2012; Franck, 
Farrer, Georgieff, Marie-Cardine, Daléry et al., 2014; see also Paragraph 1.4.1). On 
the other hand, prodromal patients experiencing symptoms pointing towards a 
psychotic disorder but without a canonical diagnosis, show stronger predictive 
action binding (i.e., hyper-prediction) relative to controls (Hauser, Knoblich, Repp, 
Lautenschlager, Gallinat et al., 2011). This pattern of results suggests that the 
predictive deficits in IB could change during the progression of schizophrenic 
illness. The Authors suggested that these findings, hyper-prediction in the psychotic 
prodrome and hypo-prediction in schizophrenic illness, are consistent with recent 
models emphasising the role of gluttamatergic and dopaminergic pathways in the 
brain (Hauser et al., 2011). In fact, in the early stages of the disease, the excessive 
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prediction is secondary to aberrant prediction error signalling, mediated by 
gluttamatergic pathways. This leads to excessively strong predictions. 
Subsequently, dysregulation of dopaminergic neurotransmission in the later stages 
of the disease adds noise to the prediction error signal and would explain the 
transition from excessive prediction in psychotic prodrome patients to 
disrupted/noisy predictions in patients with schizophrenia.  
The hyper-binding effect observed in schizophrenic patients has also been 
induced in healthy controls following infusion of the drug ketamine (Moore, Turner 
et al., 2011), a useful drug model of schizophrenic illness since in healthy adults it 
produces a state similar to the disturbances of schizophrenia. This exaggerated effect 
was driven primarily by an increase in action binding, rather than effect binding. 
Subsequently Moore et al. (2013), used the probabilistic IB paradigm (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2011; Hauser et al., 2011) to study the effects of ketamine 
on predictive action binding in healthy participants. Replicating previous results 
(Moore, Turner et al., 2011), ketamine appeared to significantly increase the 
magnitude of action binding – in particular the predictive contribution to action 
binding - an effect which closely resembles the performance of patients with 
prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia, reported in a previous study (Hauser et al., 
2011). Therefore, ketamine may best reproduce a state resembling the psychotic 
prodrome, rather than established schizophrenic illness.  
Given its potential as implicit measure of SoAg, IB has been adopted also to 
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study disorders characterized by deficits in the performance or in the experience of 
willed action. For example, in 2010, Moore, Schneider et al. studied SoAg within the 
framework of PD, a motor pathology affecting voluntary motor control. 
Disturbances in willed behaviour in this disease are both a consequence of the 
disease itself, but also a common side-effect of dopaminergic treatment used to 
ameliorate the symptoms. Therefore, Authors were interested not only to 
understand how these patients experience agency but also to elucidate the role of 
DA in this phenomenon. Authors tested both healthy controls and patients ON and 
OFF dopaminergic medication on the same day. Results showed that both PD 
patients and healthy volunteers showed the IB effect but that the overall binding did 
not differ between PD patients OFF and healthy controls. This result suggests that 
PD itself is not associated with abnormal SoAg, since an increased of SoAg was 
present only in patients ON dopaminergic medication, indicating that changes in 
SoAg could be caused by dopaminergic medication used to treat the disease. Two 
possible explanations have been postulated by the Authors: first, the hyper-binding 
might have been linked to an overdosing of the ventral striatal DA system, that is 
crucial for instrumental learning. Indeed, in the earlier stages of the disease, DA in 
the dorsal striatum is more severely depleted than in the ventral striatum (Dauer & 
Przedborski, 2003). Therefore, cognitive functions supported by the dorsal striatum 
are improved by dopaminergic medication, while cognitive functions supported by 
the ventral striatum are worsened by dopaminergic medication because of the 
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overdose. Second, the exaggerated binding found in PD patients ON medication 
could have been driven by a change in dopaminergic prediction error signalling, 
augmenting the strength of action-outcome associations. This hypothesis is also 
consistent with other data showing that IB is sensitive to an associative learning 
mechanisms where a key role is played by the prediction error (Moore, Dickinson & 
Fletcher, 2011). This hyper-binding effect is similar to that observed in schizophrenic 
patients (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010). In fact, in both diseases, there is a 
dysregulation of DA system and dopaminergic medication in PD patients is known 
to induce psychotic-like symptoms (Cummings, 1991). Later, in 2013, Wolpe, Moore, 
Rae, Rittman, Altena et al. studied an other group of patients characterized 
corticobasal syndrome (CBS) with multimodal brain imaging. Patients showed 
increased action binding only for the more affected hand and this effect was also 
correlated with the severity of alien limb and apraxia. Tone binding, on the other 
hand, was normal, suggesting a preservation of sensorimotor prediction for 
awareness of action. Structural neuroimaging analyses showed the behavioural 
variability in patients was related to changes in grey matter volume in pre-SMA, and 
changes in its underlying white matter tracts to prefrontal cortex. Moreover, changes 
in functional connectivity at rest between the pre-SMA and prefrontal cortex were 
proportional to changes in binding. These behavioural, structural and functional 
results converge towards the idea of a key-role of the frontal network for altered 
awareness and control of voluntary action in CBS.  
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Kranick, Moore, Yusuf, Martinez, LaFaver et al. (2013) investigated patients 
with psychogenic movement disorders (PMD), characterized by abnormal 
movements for which patients deny volition. Overall, the Authors demonstrated 
reduced action-effect binding in patients with PMD. Findings are also consistent 
with a recent study by Pareés et al. (2014), reporting both a loss of sensory 
attenuation in these patients and a subjective experience of being unable to control 
their motor symptoms. Diminished motor behaviour is also commonly reported in 
ASD (Gowen & Hamilton 2013). Specifically, motor difficulties in this population 
concern motor planning, monitoring and prediction. Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer and 
Zalla (2014) tested IB using a time interval paradigm in a group of ASD people, 
observing that participants with ASDs exhibited reduced IB, suggesting an altered 
SoAg.  
Taken all together, these results showed that IB represents an invaluable tool 
for the study of disorders of agency, suggesting specific changes in mechanisms of 
motor control and awareness of action for several major neurological and psychiatric 
disorders. 
 
2.6 TAKE-HOME MESSAGE 
A considerable number of studies have been undertaken in an effort to 
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elucidate the intriguing relationship between IB and the SoAg (for a review, see: 
Moore & Obhi, 2012). In the previous sections the most relevant findings have been 
highlighted, helpful to understand why IB is considered an implicit measures of 
agency. From the literature review, it has been shown that IB might be explained by 
the same cognitive mechanisms underlying the SoAg. Specifically, the roles of 
predictive and retrospective processes in producing IB have been elucidated. In 
addition, different internal and external higher-order contextual factors have been 
proved to modulate the degree of IB. Not only IB was able to objectively describe 
essentials aspects of agency in healthy people, but also in clinical populations, 
providing a resourceful tool in clinical settings.  It must be said that some researchers 
rather suggest to consider IB as a special case of general cause-effect processing 
(Buehner, 2015) and recommend great caution in interpreting it in terms of 
intentional processes. However, IB nowadays represents a promising tool to 
discover the most implicit aspects of agency, impossible to explore by means of 
explicit measures. 
 
In the second part of the present thesis, the experimental results obtained by 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY I 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EXPERIMENTAL 




The first time Haggard and co-workers (Haggard et al., 2002) discovered the 
IB effect, the classical Libet clock method (Libet et al., 1983) was adopted. This method 
originally implemented by Libet and colleagues (1983) was conceived to study the 
relationship between the electrophysiological brain activity associated with 
voluntary movements and conscious intentions. Please, see Chapter 2 for a detailed 
description of both the methodology and procedure used to measure IB.  Subsequent 
to Haggard’s initial work (2002), Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas and Haggard 
(2007) introduced the time interval paradigm, a method to implicitly assess SoAg, 
aiming at directly capturing the relationship between action and effect. Participants 
had to estimate how long the interval between an action and its effect had lasted in 
milliseconds and these were recorded by an experimenter. As compared to the Libet 
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clock paradigm, which requires temporal estimates based on the perceived time of a 
single event (i.e., the action and its effect separately), the time interval paradigm 
involves direct numerical judgements of the time interval between action and effect 
(e.g., Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; Humphrey & Buehner, 2009; Kühn 
et al., 2013; Sperduti et al., 2014). This method has reproduced the basic properties 
of IB, such as its dependence on intentional action: in other words, the duration of 
the interval between voluntary action and its ensuing sensory effect is perceived as 
shorter than the interval between an involuntary movement and the same effect. 
However, this methodology is susceptible to a range of subjective biases (Poulton, 
1979). For example, when asked to judge the interval between an action and its 
consequence, participants can give shorter estimates based on their beliefs, and not 
because they actually experienced them together (Cravo et al., 2011). Similar 
findings have also been obtained using a time interval reproduction task (e.g., 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013), where participants, 
after being exposed to temporal intervals between their own action and a 
subsequent tone, had to reproduce the intervals by holding down a key. Instead of 
using verbal estimates of the interval (e.g., Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 
2009; Humphrey & Buehner, 2009; Kühn et al., 2013; Sperduti et al., 2014), motor 
responses are required. 
Although the abovementioned methods are the most commonly adopted to 
investigate the IB and led to an increasing knowledge of it, other psychophysical 
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methodologies have been introduced in the very last years. For example, Cravo et 
al. (2011) proposed a method based on simultaneity judgments, where participants 
were asked to rate whether a flash occurred at the same time as a tone. More in 
detail, participants were exposed to a tone after executing a voluntary action and a 
temporally independent flash, and had to judged whether the two stimuli (i.e., tone 
and flash) were simultaneous or not. IB was revealed when participants made 
‘synchrony’ judgements for visual references occurring prior to the auditory 
consequence of movement, indicating that they perceived the later auditory tone to 
be synchronous with the earlier visual flash. The year after, Nolden, Haering & 
Kiesel (2012) introduced the method of constant stimuli, where participants had to 
compare a standard interval between a voluntary action and a visual effect with a 
tone. More in detail, they had to judge if the tone was shorter or longer than the 
interval between the key press and the visual stimulus. Also this method reproduced 
the classical IB effect. 
Altogether the reviewed studies, using a number of different experimental 
paradigms, speak in favour of the existence of the IB effect, providing its validation 
as converging on a similar pattern of results, namely that action and effects are 
perceived as temporally attracted towards each other. However, the Libet clock 
method (Libet et al., 1983) offers several advantages in the study of IB. First, as 
compared to the other methods - requiring direct numerical judgments of the time 
interval between action and effect (Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; 
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Humphrey & Buehner, 2009; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010) - the Libet clock 
methodology allows for a disentangling between action binding (i.e., the shift of the 
action towards the tone) and effect binding (e.g., the shift of the tone towards the 
action). These two aspects of IB seem indeed to rely on different mechanisms 
(Moore, Ruge et al., 2010; Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013; see Paragraph 2.1). Second, 
mixed results have been reported regarding the question whether IB increases or 
decreases with increasing interval duration between voluntary action and its effect. 
Indeed, with the Libet clock methodology, IB decreases when the action–effect 
intervals increase (e.g., 450 and 650 ms), highlighting the role of causality in IB (see 
Paragraph 2.2). Differently, the time interval paradigm and the method of the constant 
stimuli have produced results with intervals up to 4 seconds (Humphreys & 
Buehner, 2009; Nolden et al., 2012). The simultaneity method proposed by Cravo et al. 
(2011), despite subjected to a smaller variability in IB estimates, does not allow to 
study the action binding since participants are usually asked only to evaluate the 
perceived time of auditory stimuli.  
However, the Libet clock method has also its detractors. Indeed, although it 
has been successfully used in a large number of studies investigating IB (e.g., 
Haggard & Clark, 2003; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Moore, 
Schneider et al., 2010; Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014; Khalighinejad & 
Haggard, 2015), this paradigm has been the topic of several debates and has been 
criticized in many aspects (e.g., Gomes, 2002; Pockett & Miller, 2007). Although the 
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aim of the present work goes beyond a mere description of every single 
methodological problem, the most important limitations could be ascribed to the 
following aspects. (i) The process of action control may be directly influenced by the 
clock structure. In particular, the participant may act in response to a particular clock 
positions, rather than in a truly self-generated manner (Engbert et al., 2007). (ii) 
When judging the position of a clock hand people could have systematic preferences 
for specific clock positions because of the predictability of number sequence. (iii) In 
addition, it has long been known that there are substantial inaccuracies in 
determining the timing and position of moving objects (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; 
van de Grid 2002). As an example, it has been shown that the comparison between 
a moving object (e.g., a clock hand) and an abrupt event (e.g., an auditory tone) can 
lead to spatiotemporal illusions, resulting in a moving object that is perceived as 
being ahead of its original position when the abrupt event occurs (Nijhawan, 1994; 
Cravo & Baldo, 2008). (iv) Finally, the rotating clock method could raise some 
problems with particular populations, like children and elderly people, given the 
fact that the acquisition of both clock and time knowledge changes and improves 
with age (Vakali, 1991). Indeed, the clock knowledge taps into a wide range of 
cognitive abilities, including EFs (Shulman, 2000). As many of these executive 
frontal processes are affected in pathological populations where the SoAg is 
‘compromised’ (e.g., Haggard et al., 2003; Moore, Schneider et al., 2009; Sperduti et 
al., 2014), the clock method is far from being the best choice. In order to try to avoid 
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all the above-mentioned limitations, the present work aims at developing a new and 
more suitable paradigm to assess IB, by taking the method developed by Soon et al. 
(2008) as a reference point. More in detail, Soon et al. (2008) were interested in 
studying the neural underpinnings underlying human conscious motor intentions. 
In order to investigate these processes, they decided to implement a modified 
version of the Libet task (Libet et al., 1983), by using letters instead of the classical 
clock. Taking inspiration from their method, to avoid the number sequence bias, a 
stream of familiar letters was used in the present study, in a non-alphabetic – 
therefore unpredictable - order. In this way, both the problem of the predictability 
given by the clock structure and the inaccuracy in time judgments occurring with 
rotating stimuli (van de Grind, 2002), can be avoided.  
In this chapter the methods and the procedures are common to all the 





Twenty-five participants (18 females; age range: 22 to 29; mean age in years: 
23.37, SD: 1.74; education in years: 16.71, SD: 0.99) were enrolled in the experiment. 
All participants were right-handed, as measured by the Edinburgh Handedness 
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Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and lacked of 
neurological and psychiatric pathologies. The study was conceived according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University 
of Padua. All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment and gave 
their informed, written consent to participate in the study. 
 
3.2.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE 
The experiment took place in a dimly illuminated room. The stimuli were 
presented on a 17-inch monitor controlled by a Pentium four PC programmed with 
E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The participants were 
seated comfortably in a chair at a viewing distance of 60 cm from the monitor. They 
were asked to passively observe a stream of unpredictable white, capital consonants 
at the centre of a black screen. In order to prevent the participants from responding 
immediately after the occurrence of the letters, a series of randomized white 
numbers was displayed before the letters’ presentation (Figure 3.1). Each number 
and letter was presented separately and lasted for 150 ms, without time gaps in 
between. At the end of each trial, a set of response options (called ‘response 
mapping’) appeared on the screen. Five letters were presented on the screen, which 
included the target letter (i.e., the letter that was on the screen at the actual 
appearance of the event of interest), two letters immediately before and two letters 
immediately after the target letter during the stream of letters. All the letters within 
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the response mapping were presented in a different random order. After each trial, 
the participants had to choose the correct consonant using the keyboard with their 
left hand. A ‘response mapping’ has been introduced in order to avoid the 
significant involvement of a memory retrieval component in the task. The 
experiment consisted of four baseline conditions (BCs) and six experimental 






Figure 3.1. Schematic illustration of the task structure. Participants passively observed a stream of numbers 
and letters that was updated every 150 ms. The frame with “. . .” here represents the continuous flow either of 
numbers or letters. After the appearance of the event of interest (e.g., voluntary action, involuntary action, 
tone, control tone) a response mapping was presented and participants chose the letter that was on the screen 



















Table 3.1. Conditions (Baseline and Experimental) and the judged event by the participants 
in each condition.  
Condition Judged Event  
Baseline Conditions 
1)    Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 
2)    Involuntary Action Involuntary Action 
3)    Tone Tone 
4)    Control Tone Control Tone 
Experimental Conditions 
5)    Voluntary Action – 250 ms – Tone  Voluntary Action 
6)    Voluntary Action – 250 ms – Tone Tone 
7)    Involuntary Action – 250 ms – Tone  Involuntary Action 
8)    Involuntary Action – 250 ms – Tone  Tone 
9)    Control Tone – 250 ms - Tone Control Tone 
10) Control Tone – 250 ms - Tone Tone 
 
Among the BCs, only one event occurred per condition (e.g., voluntary action, involuntary action, tone, control 
tone). For the ECs, two events occurred per condition. The time interval between the first event (the voluntary 
action, the involuntary action, or control tone) and the second event (tone) was set at 250 ms. 
 
 
Among the BCs (Figure 3.2), only one event among voluntary action, 
involuntary action, tone, or control tone occurred per condition. The participants 
had to remember which consonant was on the screen when: 
1) they made a free voluntary key-press with their right index finger (acting as 
a baseline for voluntary action condition). Here, participants had to wait until 
the letters’ appearance before responding, in order to avoid response 
anticipation (i.e., a key-press performed immediately after the trial onset);  
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2) they felt their right index finger being passively moved down by a mechanical 
device (acting as a baseline for involuntary action condition), applied to the 
right index finger of the participants. The device was connected and activated 
by computer at a random interval after the trial’s onset. When the computer 
gave the input, the key and, consequently, the right index finger moved 
down, giving the participant the same physical perception as the voluntary 
key-press;  
3) they heard an auditory stimulus presented through headphones (1,000 Hz, 
100-ms duration; baseline for tone condition: tone); 
4) they heard another auditory control stimulus presented by headphones 
(same duration as the tone but with a different pitch; baseline for tone control 
condition: the control tone).  
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Figure 3.2. Schematic representation of the BCs in which only one event (i.e., voluntary action, 
involuntary action, tone, control tone) occurred per condition. While viewing the stream of numbers 
and letters participants had to remember which consonant was on the screen when: (1) they made a 
voluntary key-press; (2) they felt their right index finger moved down passively; (3) they heard the 
tone; and (4) they heard the control tone.  
 
 
For the ECs, two events occurred per condition (Figure 3.3). The participants 
had to judge: 
5) the onset of the voluntary action that produced the tone;  
6) the onset of the tone caused by the voluntary action; 
7) the onset of the involuntary action that was followed by the tone;  
8) the onset of the tone activated by the involuntary action; 
9) the onset of the control tone that was followed by the tone; 
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Figure 3.3. Schematic representation of the Ecs. (A) Participants judged the letter that was on the screen either 
when they made the voluntary action (5) or heard the tone (6). (B) Participants judged the letter that was on 
the screen either when they felt their right index finger moved down passively (involuntary action; 7), or heard 
the tone (8). (c) Participants judged the letter that was on the screen either when they heard either the control 
tone (9) or the tone (10).  
 
Time interval between the first event (the voluntary action, the involuntary 
action, control tone) and the second event (tone) was set at 250 ms. Conditions 
involving the ‘involuntary action’ and ‘control tone’ were introduced as control 
conditions, in order to exclude the possible presence of IB in such conditions and 
investigate whether the results obtained for the voluntary action with the new 
paradigm were specific to SoAg. In all conditions, the stimuli were presented 
randomly, between 3 and 8 s after the trial onset. The stream of letters stopped 
randomly between 1.5 and 5 s after the event of interest. Thirty-three trials per 
condition were administered, for a total of 330 trials. The first three trials of each 
condition were discarded to allow for familiarization and were not included in the 
analysis. Each participant performed all of the conditions (BCs and ECs) in a 
different, random order over a single session.  
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3.2.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.2.3.1 CALCULATION OF THE INTENTIONAL BINDING 
For each trial, a judgment error (JE) was calculated, which is the difference 
between the actual time of occurrence of the judged event and the perceived time of 
its occurrence. A negative JE was interpreted as anticipatory awareness of events 
(i.e., the participants perceived the event happening before it really did), while a 
positive JE was interpreted as delayed awareness (i.e., the participants perceived the 
event happening after it really did). The obtained value could be 0 (the participant 
chooses the correct letter, that is the letter that was on the screen at the actual 
appearance of the event of interest); +1 (the participants chooses the letter that was 
immediately after the target letter); +2 (the participants chooses the second letter 
after the target letter); -1 (the participants chooses the letter that was immediately 
before the target letter); -2 (the participants chooses the second letter before the 
target letter). Each of these values was then multiplied by 150 (i.e., the actual 
duration of each letter on the screen) and then a final mean judgment error (mJE), 
including both negative and positive values, was calculated (Table 3.2). Baseline 
judgments usually vary widely both across people and groups (Haggard et al., 2002; 
Haggard et al., 2003) and may reflect individual strategies in the attention paid to 
the letters. In order to control for such individual differences, the differences 
between the mJE of an identical physical event in two different contexts (the BCs 
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and ECs) were calculated (i.e., the perceptual shifts) by subtracting the mJE of each 
event in the BC (voluntary action, involuntary action, tone, or control tone) from the 
mJE of the same event in the EC. For example, the shift of the action towards the 
tone (i.e., action binding) was calculated by subtracting the mJE of the voluntary 
action in the BC from the mJE of the voluntary action in the EC, whereas the shift of 
the tone towards the action (i.e., effect binding) was found by subtracting the mJE of 
tone in the BC from the mJE of the same tone in the EC. Therefore, calculating the 
perceptual shifts was important to control for the cross-modal synchronization 
judgments, which differ widely across individuals. Finally, an overall binding 
measure (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Clark, 2003) was also computed by 
combining the first (i.e., the action binding) and the second event (i.e., the tone 
binding). By calculating 250 ms - (action binding – effect binding), the obtained value 
represents the perceived linkage between an action and an effect, and provides an 
implicit measure of SoAg.  
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Table 3.2. Schematic illustration to calculate IB 
Trial JE JE * 150 ms 
1 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 0 
5 -1 -150 
6 -1 -150 
7 -1 -150 
8 0 0 
9 0 0 
10 0 0 
11 1 150 
12 1 150 
13 0 0 
14 0 0 
15 0 0 
16 0 0 
17 0 0 
18 0 0 
19 0 0 
20 -2 -300 
21 1 150 
22 1 150 
23 1 150 
24 0 0 
25 0 0 
26 0 0 
27 0 0 
28 0 0 
29 1 150 
30 1 150 
31 0 0 
32 0 0 
33 -1 -150 
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3.2.3.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Analyses have been carried out by using both Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) and R software package (http://cran.r- project.org). Violin plots 
with a Kernel distribution applied were used to represent data (Allen, Erhardt & 
Calhoun, 2012). 
To analyse data two main analyses were run: 
1) paired-sample t-tests were used to compare the mJE of a certain event in the 
BC with the mJE of the same event in the EC. For example, the mJE of a 
voluntary action in the BC was compared with the mJE of the voluntary 
action in the EC; 
2) in order to control for individual differences, perceptual shifts were 
calculated using repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
‘type of context’ (voluntary, involuntary, sensory) and the ‘judged event’ 
(either the first or the second) as within-participants factor. Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to the degrees of freedom of F statistics when 
the Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity showed that the sphericity assumption was 
violated (alpha level: p < 0.05). Post hoc comparisons were then used to 
explore the means of interest and Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons was applied (alpha level: p < 0.05).  
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3.3 RESULTS 
Table 3.3 summarizes the mJEs, the perceptual shifts, and the overall binding.  
Using paired-sample t-tests, significant differences were only observed within the 
context of voluntary action [voluntary action in the BC vs. voluntary action in the 
EC, t24 = - 4.29, p < 0.001, 95% confidence intervals (CI): -79.09, -27.71, mean: -53.4 
ms; tone in the BC vs. tone in the EC, t24 = 5.86, p < 0.001, 95% CI: 52.19, 109.01, mean: 
80.6 ms] (Figure 3.4). Actions were therefore perceived later when followed by a 
tone, as compared to the BC, in which only the action was presented (Figure 3.4, 
left). Differently, a tone was perceived earlier when it was activated by the action, in 
comparison to a BC where only the tone was presented (Figure 3.4, right). 
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Table 3.3. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding. 
 Judged Event mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  20.8 ±  12.49   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  62.6 ±  12.89   
3) Tone  Tone  41.2 ±  11.14   
4) Control Tone  Control Tone  35 ±  9.69   
Experimental Conditions 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  74.2 ± 15.43 53.4 ± 12.45 
116 ± 18.59 
6) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  -39.4 ± 12.64 -80.6 ± 13.77 
7) Involuntary Action - Tone  Involuntary Action  65.4 ± 11.77 2.8 ± 7.81 
222.8 ± 18.38 
8) Involuntary Action - Tone  Tone  16.8 ± 18.22 -24.4 ± 17.65 
9) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  25.2 ± 9.68 -9.8 ± 9.11 
235.4 ± 18.53 
10) Control Tone - Tone  Tone  16.8 ± 11.77 -24.4 ± 14.99 
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Figure 3.4. Violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE. The dashed lines stand for the 
actual onset of the event of interest. The black dots represent the mJE of the whole sample. On the left side, 
differences in the mJE of voluntary action in BC vs. EC are depicted. Here participants perceive the onset time 
of voluntary action later when it is followed by the tone (voluntary action in EC), as compared to the BC in 
which only the action is presented (voluntary action in BC). On the right side, differences in mJE of tone in 
BC vs EC are represented. Here, participants perceive the onset time of the tone earlier when it is activated by 
the voluntary action (tone in EC), in comparison to the BC where only the tone is presented (tone in BC). ** 
indicates the significant difference between BC and EC (p < 0.001) 
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In order to calculate the perceptual shifts repeated-measures ANOVA was 
run. First, no main effect of ‘type of context’ was found, F(2, 48) = 0.17, p = 0.846, η2p 
= 0.074, while the effect of the ‘judged event’ was significant, F(1, 24) = 19.03, p < 
0.001, η2p = 0.442, with a shift of the first event towards the second (15.47 ms; 95% 
CI: 1.85, 29.08) and vice versa (-43.13 ms; 95% CI: -67.37, -18.89). In addition, a 
significant interaction between these two factors emerged, F(2,  48) = 17.74, p < 0.001; 
η2p = 0.425 (Figure 3.5). We thus conducted a post-hoc analysis applying Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons, in order to examine the interaction in more 
detail. The post-hoc analysis revealed that the difference between the first and the 
second event judged was only significant in the case of voluntary action (p < 0.001). 
In addition, concerning the first judged event, a significant difference was observed 
for voluntary action in comparison with the involuntary action (p = 0.001) and the 
control tone (p = 0.001). Involuntary action and control tone were not significantly 
different (p = 0.849). Significant differences also emerged when comparing the 
second judged event (e.g., tone) (‘voluntary action context’ vs.  ‘involuntary action 
context’, p = 0.006; ‘voluntary action context’ vs. ‘sensory context’, p = 0.002). The 
‘involuntary action context’ and the ‘sensory context’ were not significantly different 
(p = 1.000). Such interaction occurred because voluntary actions led to a perceptual 
shift of action towards tone and vice versa, whereas this effect was reduced for the 
involuntary action context and for the sensory context. Additionally, the repeated-
measures ANOVA found a significant effect of the overall binding (i.e., the 
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perceived linkage between action and effect), F(2, 48) = 17.74, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.425. 
Post-hoc comparisons showed a significant difference in both the voluntary and 
involuntary contexts (p < 0.001). In addition, the ‘voluntary context’ and the ‘sensory 
context’ (p < 0.001) were also significantly different. No significant differences were 
detected between the ‘involuntary context’ and the ‘sensory context’ (p = 1.000).  
 
      
Figure 3.5. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the perceptual shift of the first event towards the second one (i.e., the 
voluntary action, the involuntary action and the control tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the 
perceptual shift of the second event towards the first one (i.e., the tone or effect binding).  The dashed lines stand 
for the actual onset of the event of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right 
side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the 
actual onset of the event of interest, while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As 


















First Event Second Event
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 In summary, temporal compression (IB effect) was only evident in the context 
of voluntary action. The overall binding data indicate that the participants perceived 
the interval between their action and its effect as significantly shorter than it really 
was, although no direct judgment of the time interval duration was requested.  
Overall, results revealed that, when participants were actively causing the 
beep (i.e., the tone), which was always presented 250 ms after their voluntary action, 
the onset of the voluntary action was perceived as occurring later, as if the action 
was ‘attracted’ towards the tone. Analogously, the tone onset was perceived as 
‘bound’ to the voluntary action. This temporal compression phenomenon was only 
present in the case of voluntary action; when the beep followed the involuntary 
action or another control beep (control tone), such compression did not occur. 
 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to develop a new and reliable paradigm in 
order to study IB. In line with other studies in literature (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002; 
Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Engber et al., 2007; 2008), the results reported here show 
that only voluntary actions were perceived as occurring later in time than they really 
were (i.e., as more adjacent to the following tone in temporal terms); on the other 
hand, tones were perceived as occurring earlier than they really were (i.e., closer to 
actions in time). Such temporal compression was limited to the context of voluntary 
condition, adding evidence to the fact that IB can be considered a valid implicit 
  97 
measure of agency. Indeed, no robust temporal compression and perceptual shifts 
occurred within the two control conditions, namely the involuntary and the sensory 
contexts. We considered these results as a proof of the IB effect.  
With this new paradigm some of the methodological limitations of other 
approaches to IB (see Introduction) seem to be circumvented. For example, with 
respect to the time interval paradigm (Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; 
Humphrey & Buehner, 2009; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010), the method described 
here does not only provide an overall measure of binding - like the time interval 
approach -  but also and most importantly allows for a disentangling of action and 
effect binding. Indeed, these perceptual shifts seem to depend on different 
mechanisms (Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013), and therefore it is preferable to obtain 
separate values for action end effect binding. Regarding the Libet clock paradigm 
(Libet et al., 1983), although it is the most used approach in the SoAg field, several 
aspects are still problematic (e.g., Gomes, 2002; Pockett & Miller, 2007). With the 
method proposed here, the most relevant issues have been overcome (e.g., 
predictability of number sequence). In addition, and most importantly within the 
context of the present thesis, the present methodology may be adopted to implicitly 
study agency in special populations (e.g., children, elderly, patients), who were 
‘untestable’ before because of the confounders linked to the Libet clock 
methodology. We think that this paradigm might be applied for future research on 
IB, representing a reliable alternative to the methods used so far. This 
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methodological advance will be used in the following experimental studies to 
answer other outstanding and open questions within the SoAg field. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY II 
THE SENSE OF AGENCY ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Craik and Bialystok (2006) stated that “there is a symmetry to our physical lives: 
we are independent and robust in youth and middle age, but dependent and frail in infancy 
and old age”. A similar patter of vulnerability across the lifespan has been also 
identified in our brain. Indeed, there is evidence of dramatic age-related 
modifications in our frontal cortex (for a review, see: West, 1996), which seems to be 
the last cortical area to mature in children and among the first one to be impaired in 
aging (e.g., Fuster, 1993; Giedd et al., 1999; Raz, 2000; Casey et al., 2005). Changes in 
brain structure and functionality inevitably impact on cognitive abilities: among 
these, EFs, which are mediated by frontal lobes’ integrity and activity (Stuss & 
Levine, 2002), are primarily affected by such age-related changes. A considerable 
body of research shows convincingly that there are systematic, age-related 
improvements in EFs during childhood and adolescence, coinciding with a growth 
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spurts in the maturation of the frontal lobes (Zelazo & Müller, 2002; Anderson, 
Anderson, Northam, Jacobs & Catroppa, 2001). Likewise, a decrease of EFs during 
normal aging, even in the absence of pathologies, has been demonstrated (West, 
1996; de Luca, Wood, Anderson, Buchanan, Proffitt et al., 2003; Fisk & Sharp, 2004; 
Zalazo, Craik & Booth, 2004). Even more importantly in light of the present work, 
EFs are intimately linked to the concept of the SoAg. As a matter of fact, SoAg is 
defined as the ability of planning and controlling actions and through them the 
consequences in the external environment (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; see also 
Chapter 1). Therefore, SoAg is entitled to belong to the larger ‘EFs family’ supported 
by the frontal lobes. Indeed, the experience of agency requires (i) a plan to perform 
a goal-directed action and (ii) the identification of the consequences of our behaviour 
in the external world, while avoiding and inhibiting erroneous and maladaptive 
behaviours. With this in mind, one might expect that the SoAg follows an inverted 
U-shaped curve when considered across the lifespan. Up to now, the vast majority 
of investigations within the SoAg field has mainly focused on its cognitive and 
neural bases in healthy people and pathological populations (e.g., David et al., 2008; 
Moore & Obhi, 2012). However, how this capacity changes across the lifespan has 
been neglected so far. This represents an open and important issue to be explored, 
given the impact of SoAg in social and legal aspects of life. In fact, SoAg implies 
individual responsibility for the consequences of our own actions (Moll, Oliveira-
Souza, Garrido, Bramati, Caparelli-Daquer et al., 2007; Frith, 2013, 2014) and in many 
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countries, the law requires that a person is fully responsible and aware of the 
consequences of his/her actions (Moretto, Walsh et al., 2011; Haggard & Chambon, 
2012; Frith, 2013; 2014). However, there are some exceptions to this ‘rule’. For 
example, if the agent is a child, this feeling of being responsible for action 
consequences may not emerge in the same way as for healthy adults. Indeed, below 
a certain age, children are not considered responsible for their actions: the minimum 
age of responsibility is the topic of important legal debates and varies from 7–18 
years old (Frith, 2013). The general idea is that children may not be considered as 
totally responsible for their own actions and consequently not fully entitled ‘agents’ 
since their frontal lobes are not completely matured (Moll et al., 2007; Mackintosh, 
2011). In the same way, healthy elderly could ‘loose’ their agency: cognitive skills, 
motor and sensory speed and many other factors vary across lifespan and might 
impact people’s feeling of agency (e.g., Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Li, 
Lindenberger, Hommel, Aschersleben, Prinz et al., 2004). A question that arises 
naturally is: how does agency present itself in these two populations? A study 
conducted by Metcalfe, Eich and Castel (2010) tried to resolve this issue, studying in 
particular the different metacognitive awareness of agency across the lifespan. They 
observed that young adults were the most sensitive to discrepancies in control over 
their actions compared to both children (8–10 years old) and older adults (mean age 
75), suggesting that agency might follow a possible developmental trend. More 
recently, van Elk, Rutjens & van der Pligt (2015) investigated the development of 
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illusory control and the SoAg in 7-12-year-old children and in young adults. They 
observed that the illusion of control decreased as children got older. In other words, 
adults tended to underestimate their actual performance, whereas children 
overestimated it. Conversely, the SoAg seems to be more stable across development. 
Indeed, in line with adult studies (e.g., Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2003; Aarts 
et al., 2009), agency ratings for both adults and children were similarly affected by 
the congruence between performed and observed outcomes (e.g., when a temporal 
delay or spatial deviation was introduced). However, this last study did not consider 
older participants. Although both Metcalfe et al’s study (2010) and van Elk’s et al’s 
(2015) studies were the first to investigate age-related differences in the SoAg, these 
investigations used explicit agency measures, which may be influenced by different 
biases, such as prior expectations and beliefs about the task (e.g., Gawronski et al., 
2007). As seen in Chapter 1, these explicit measures say very little about the 
experience of agency, since they do not reflect or capture the feeling of agency that 
accompanies normal voluntary actions. Other investigations tried to shed light on 
the emergence of agency, but focussing only on a particular developmental period 
or considering other aspects related to the agency phenomenon. For example, 
studies focusing on the sense of the body (body awareness; for a review, see Rochat, 
2010) and on the phenomenon of action-effect learning (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003; 
Eenshuistra, Weidema & Hommel, 2004; Hauf, Elsner & Aschersleben, 2004; Elsner, 
2007) have shown that (i) the sense of body is already present in the first few months 
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of life. This would suggest that infants can indeed be considered agents in the world 
because they begin to gain control of their bodies and move voluntarily in the 
environment; (ii) action-effect learning seems to emerge even before the first year of 
age (Verschoor, Weidema, Biro & Hommel et al., 2010) even if other studies suggest 
that only 5-year-old children can report a mature experience of agency (Shultz, Wells 
& Sarda, 1980; Astington, 2001; Lang & Perner, 2002). However, all of the 
aforementioned studies are characterized by two important limits: (i) they contradict 
the fact that volition, strictly linked to the concept of agency, matures late during an 
individual’s development (Haggard, 2008), when the brain, in particular the frontal 
areas, reaches its full maturation (Giedd et al., 1999) and (ii) they focus on low-level 
processes implicated in agency, which are considered to be necessary conditions for 
the appearance of goal-directed behaviour and action control, but are not sufficient 
to explain SoAg’s complexity, which is rather a more sophisticated process. No 
similar studies have focused on elderly people.  
The general purpose of the present work is therefore to explore how IB, as an 
implicit measure of SoAg, can develop across the lifespan, by overcoming the limits 
of the verbal reports that characterize the explicit level of SoAg. Based on the facts 
that (i) frontal lobes and EFs seem to play a crucial role in agency and that (ii) they 
seem to follow an inverted U-shaped curve across the lifespan, we expect that 
children and elderly do not present the classical IB effect - as reflected by a reduced 
temporal compression between a voluntary action and the ensuing sensory effect - 
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as compared to the young adults due to their immature and impaired frontal cortical 




A total of sixty participants were recruited for this study. According to their 
age, they were subdivided into three subgroups: (1) a new group of twenty young 
adults (15 females; age range: 22 to 30; mean age in years: 23.75, SD: 2.53; education 
in years: 16.67, SD: 0.98); (2) twenty children (16 females; age range: 8 to 11; mean 
age in years; 10.05, SD: 0.94; education in years: 5.1, SD: 0.85); (3) twenty elderly (12 
females; age range: 66 to 76; mean age in years: 69.75, SD: 3.39; education in years: 
15.1, SD: 4.14). All participants were right-handed, as measured by the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and lacked neurological, neuropsychological and psychiatric pathologies. On the 
basis of these exclusion criteria, two elderlies (Mini Mental State Examination, 
MMSE < 24; Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975) were excluded. In addition, one 
child was omitted because he was not able to finish the task. The final cohort 
consisted of 19 children (15 females; age range: 8 to 11, mean age in years: 10, SD: 
0.94; education in years: 5.05, SD: 0.85) and 18 elderlies (11 females; age range: 66 to 
76, mean age in years: 69.78, SD: 3.21; education in years: 14.78, SD: 4.25). The study 
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was conceived according to the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the University of Padua. All participants were naïve as to the 
purpose of the experiment and gave their informed, written consent to participate 
in the study. Informed consent for children was obtained from parents.  
 
4.2.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
All the materials, the procedure and data analyses were the same of those 
used and applied in Study I (Chapter 3). In this present study, associations between 
the measures of IB (i.e., overall IB, perceptual shifts) and cognitive abilities were 
analysed using non-parametric correlations (Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient). 
 
4.2.3 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES 
Children and elderly received basic neuropsychological screenings in order 
to exclude participants with cognitive issues, which might interfere with the task. 
The neuropsychological evaluation of children included assessment of: (i) problem 
solving and abstract reasoning using the Coloured Progressive Matrices (Italian 
standardization: Pruneti, Fenu, Freschi, Rota, Cocci et al., 1996); (ii) sustained and 
selective attention (Bells Test: Biancardi & Stoppa, 1997); (iii) divided attention (Trial 
Making Test: TMT; forms A, AB, and B; Scarpa, Piazzini, Presenti, Brovedani, 
  106 
Toraldo et al., 2006). The tests administered to elderly included: (i) the MMSE; (ii) 
the Digit Span for memory assessment (included in the Brief Neuropsychological 
Examination 2; BNE-2; Mondini, Mapelli, Vestri et al., 2011); (iii) TMT-A and TMT-
B to assess the cognitive domain of attention and EFs (always included in the BNE-
2); (iv) the Frontal Assessment Battery to evaluate frontal lobe functions and motor 
skills (FAB: Appollonio, Leone, Isella, Consoli, Villa et al., 2005). 
 
4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 RESULTS I: YOUNG ADULTS 
Table 4.1 summarizes the mJEs, perceptual shifts, and overall binding. In 
order to calculate the perceptual shifts repeated-measures ANOVA was run. First, 
no main effect of ‘type of context’ was found, F(2, 38) = 1.59, p = 0.216, η2p = 0.077, 
while the effect of the ‘judged event’ was significant, F(1, 19) = 31.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 
0.627, with a shift of the first event towards the second (22.58 ms; 95% CI: 7.66, 37.51) 
and vice versa (-55.42 ms; 95% CI: -81.74, -29.09). In addition, a significant interaction 
between these two factors emerged, F(2, 38) = 21.37, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.529 (Figure 
4.1). We thus conducted a post-hoc analysis applying Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons, in order to examine the interaction in more detail. 
Concerning the first judged event (i.e., the shift of the first event towards the second 
one), a significant difference was found for voluntary action in comparison with 
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involuntary action (p < 0.001) and control tone (p < 0.001). Involuntary action and 
control tone were not significantly different (p = 0.178). Significant differences also 
emerged when comparing the second event (e.g., tone) (‘voluntary action context’ 
vs ‘involuntary action context’, p = 0.034; ‘voluntary action context’ vs ‘sensory 
context’, p = 0.003). Tone following the involuntary action was not significantly 
different as compared to the tone following the control tone (p = 1.000). The 
interaction occurred because voluntary actions led to a perceptual shift of action 
towards tone and vice versa, whereas this effect was significantly reduced for the 
involuntary action context and for the sensory context. In addition, the repeated-
measures ANOVA detected a significant effect of the overall binding (i.e., the 
perceived linkage between action and effect), F(2, 38) = 17.42, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.478. 
Post-hoc comparisons showed a significant difference in both the voluntary and 
involuntary contexts (p < 0.001). In addition, the ‘voluntary context’ and the ‘sensory 
context’ (p < 0.001) were also significantly different. No significant differences were 
observed between the ‘involuntary context’ and the ‘sensory context’ (p = 1.000). In 
summary, temporal compression (i.e., the IB effect) was only evident in the context 
of voluntary action. The overall binding data indicate that the participants perceived 
the interval between their action and its effect as significantly shorter than it really 
was, although no direct judgment of the time interval’s duration was requested.  
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 Event Judged mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  10.5 ±  61.15   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  70 ±  70.52   
3) Tone  Tone  53 ±  50.51   
4) Control Tone  Control Tone  48 ±  46.58   
Experimental Conditions 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  88.5 ± 76.64 78 ± 51.03 
70.25 ± 73.13 
6) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  -38.75 ± 61.62 -91.75 ± 66.91 
7) Involuntary Action - Tone  Involuntary Action  78.25 ± 13.52 8.25 ± 38.94 
187.25 ± 105.2 
8) Involuntary Action - Tone  Tone  10.5 ± 94.51 -42.5 ± 90.82 
9) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  29.5 ± 48.12 -18.5 ± 43.8 
217 ± 111.05 
10) Control Tone - Tone  Tone  21 ± 62.78 -32 ± 65.28 
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Figure 4.1. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the participants’ perceptual shift of the first event (i.e., the voluntary 
action, the involuntary action and the control tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the participants’ 
perceptual shift of the second event (i.e., the tone). The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of 
interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and 
symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, 
while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, the temporal 
compression occurs only within the voluntary context. 
 
 
Overall, our results revealed that, when participants were actively causing 
the beep (i.e., tone), which was always presented 250 ms after their voluntary action, 
the onset of the voluntary action was perceived as occurring later, as if the action 
was ‘attracted’ towards the tone. Analogously, the tone onset was perceived as 
‘bound’ to its voluntary action. This temporal compression phenomenon was only 
present in the case of voluntary action; when the beep followed the involuntary 
First Event Second Event
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action or another control beep, such compression did not occur. 
 
4.3.2 RESULTS II: CHILDREN 
All participants had an Intelligence Quotient above 100 and obtained normal 
scores on the TMT and Bells Tests. Means and SDs for all the neuropsychological 
measures are presented in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2. Mean and SD of neuropsychological measures in children. 
 Mean SD 
Bells - Accuracy 128.35 8.14 
Bells - Rapidity 30s 60.76 14.83 
TMT-A 3.17 1.2 
TMT-B 2.83 1.15 
TMT-AB 3.06 1.16 
CPM 113.85 11.93 
SD: standard deviation; TMT: Trial Making Test; CMP: Coloured Progressive Matrices. 
  
Table 4.3 presents children’s mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding. As 
we did for results of Study I (Chapter III), we first compared the mJE of each event 
in the BC with the mJE of the same event in the EC using paired-samples t-tests. 
Significant differences were only detected in the perception of the tone in the ECs 
compared to the BCs, in which the tone was presented alone. However, these 
differences were not limited to the case of the voluntary action, t18 = 4.23, p = 0.001; 
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they also extended to the case of the two control conditions: involuntary action 
context, t18 = 3.40, p = 0.003, and sensory context, t18 = 3.7, p = 0.002. The tone (i.e., 
the effect/beep) was therefore perceived earlier when it followed the voluntary 
action, the involuntary action and the control tone, as compared to the BC. The 
perceptual shifts were also analysed in order to investigate IB. The repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed no effect of ‘type of context’, F(2, 36) = 0.107, p = 0.89, 
η2p = 0.006, except for a main effect of the ‘judged event’, F(1, 18) = 19.0, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.514, with a shift of the first event towards the second one (1,23 ms, 95% CI: -
13.29, 15.75) and vice versa (-51.75 ms, 95% CI: -70,47, -33.04). The interaction 
between the two factors was not significant, F(2, 36) = 1.39, p = 0.26, η2p = 0.072 
(Figure 4.2), indicating that no temporal compression occurred for the voluntary 
action as compared to the other control conditions. When considering the overall 
binding, no differences were observed among the three contexts (‘voluntary action’, 
‘involuntary action’ and the ‘sensory context’), F(2, 36) = 1.39, p = 0.26, η2p = 0.072. 
The results showed that no IB was present in the 10-year-old children. Although a 
sort of minimal temporal compression seemed to exist in the case of voluntary 
action, it did not reach significance, when compared to the two control conditions. 
In addition, Spearman correlational analyses were conducted to examine the 
possible relationship between the implicit SoAg and neuropsychological measures. 
The only significant result emerged between the total temporal compression within 
the voluntary context and the TMT-A, r = 0.467, p = 0.044. The higher the score at the 
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TMT-A is, the larger the overall binding’s value (i.e., reduced SoAg). 
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Table 4.3. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding in children. 
  Judged Event  mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  -20.79 ±  68.01   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  82.63 ±  46.92   
3) Tone  Tone  78.16 ±  23.05   
4) Control Tone  Control Tone  81.58 ±  48.13     
Experimental Conditions 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  -5.79 ± 79.09 15 ± 76.08 
170.26 ± 98.9 
6) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  13.42 ± 70.77 -64.74 ± 66.7 
7) Involuntary Action - Tone  Involuntary Action  73.68 ± 59.55 -8.95 ± 43.48 
211.05 ± 90.79 
8) Involuntary Action - Tone  Tone  30.26 ± 60.72 -47.89 ± 59.82 
9) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  79.21 ± 34.65 -2.37 ± 51.22 
209.74 ± 70.79 
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Figure 4.2. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each child’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the participants’ perceptual shift of the first event (i.e., the voluntary 
action, the involuntary action and the control tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the participants’ 
perceptual shift of the second event (i.e., the tone). The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of 
interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and 
symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, 
while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, temporal 
compression is not significantly different across the contexts (voluntary, involuntary and sensory context). 
 
 
4.3.3 RESULTS III: ELDERLY 
All participants included in the final sample obtained normal scores on 
neuropsychological tests. Means and SDs for all the neuropsychological measures 
are presented in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4. Mean and SD of neuropsychological measures in elderly. 
 Mean SD 
MMSE 29.11 1.02 
Digit Span 6.00 0.84 
TMT-A 33.22 10.3 
TMT-B 102.12 48.46 
FAB 17.28 0.96 
SD: standard deviation; MMSE: Mini Mental State Examination; TMT: Trial Making Test; FAB: 
Frontal Assessment Battery. 
 
Table 4.5 presents their mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding. As for 
children, we compared the mJE of each event in the BC with the mJE of the same 
event in the EC using paired-samples t-tests. Again, significant differences were 
only found in the perception of the tone in the ECs compared to the BCs. These 
differences were not limited to the case of the voluntary action, t17 = 2.11, p = 0.05; 
they also extended to the case of the two control conditions: involuntary action, t17 = 
6.25, p < 0.001, and control tone, t17 = 3.86, p = 0.001. The tone was therefore perceived 
earlier when it followed the voluntary action, the involuntary action, or control tone, 
as compared to the BC where only the tone was presented. Perceptual shifts were 
also analysed in order to investigate IB. The repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of both ‘type of context’, F(2, 34) = 13.97, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.451 
and the ‘judged event’, F(1, 17) = 20.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.551. Older participants 
tended to have a quite accurate temporal perception for events within the voluntary 
action context (2.36 ms, 95% CI: -23.33, 28.05) as compared to both the involuntary 
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context (-43.06 ms, 95% CI: -57.34, -28.78; p = 0.003) and the sensory context (-42.08 
ms, 95% CI: -61.17, -22.99; p = 0.001). No significant differences emerged between the 
temporal perception of the events within the involuntary action and the sensory 
contexts (p = 1.000). Regarding the ‘judged event’, the first event was shifted towards 
the second one (10.83 ms, 95% CI: -9.62, 31.28) and vice versa (-66.02 ms, 95% CI: -
93.32, -38.72) (p < 0.001). However, the interaction between the two factors was not 
significant, F(2, 34) = 0.63, p = 0.538, η2p = 0.036 (Figure 4.3), indicating that no 
temporal compression occurred for the voluntary action as compared to the other 
two control conditions. When considering the overall binding, no differences were 
observed among the three contexts (‘voluntary action’, ‘involuntary action’ and the 
‘sensory’ contexts), F(2, 34) = 0.63, p = 0.54, η2p = 0.036. Like in the case of children, 
the results showed that no IB occurred in elderly. No significant correlations were 
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Table 4.5. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding in elderly. 
 Event Judged mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  -21.11 ±  91.37   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  45.83 ±  61.91   
3) Tone  Tone  8.33 ±  56.12   
4) Control Tone  Control Tone  27.5 ±  58.04   
Experimental Conditions 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  23.06 ± 116.75 44.17 ± 94.19 
166.39 ± 140.12 
6) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  -31.11 ± 80.08 -39.44 ± 79.26 
7) Involuntary Action - Tone  Involuntary Action  48.33 ± 57.03 2.5 ± 39.34 
158.89 ± 83.85 
8) Involuntary Action - Tone  Tone  -80.28 ± 70.95 -88.61 ± 60.14 
9) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  13.33 ± 56.33 -14.17 ± 34.22 
194.17 ± 91.22 
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Figure 4.3. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the participants’ perceptual shift of the first event towards the second 
one (i.e., the voluntary action, the involuntary action and the control tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots 
represent the participants’ perceptual shift of the second event (i.e., the tone) towards the first one. The dashed 
lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. 
On the right side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines 
stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, while the black dots represent the perceived event by the 
participants. As the image depicts, temporal compression is not significantly different across conditions 
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4.3.4 RESULTS IV: BETWEEN-GROUP COMPARISONS 
In order to better understand the lack of IB in children and elderly, the 
degree of binding among the three groups was compared. Concerning BCs, using 
univariate ANOVA, no differences among the three groups were detected in the 
perception of voluntary action, F(2, 54) = 1.17, p = 0.318, or in the involuntary 
action, F(2, 54) = 1.75, p = 0.184. However, significant differences emerged in the 
case of tone, F(2, 54) = 11.15, p < 0.001, ω2 = 0.26 and control tone F(2, 54) = 5.34, 
p = 0.008, ω2 = 0.13. Regarding the temporal perception of tone, post hoc tests - 
with Bonferroni correction applied - revealed a significant difference between 
adults and elderly (-60 vs 8.33 ms respectively, p = 0.011, mean difference: 4.67, 
95% CI: 8.18, 81.16) and between children and elderly (78.15 vs 8.33 ms 
respectively, p < 0.001, mean difference: 69.82, 95% CI: 32.88, 106.77). Regarding 
the temporal perception of control tone, a significant difference emerged only 
between children and elderly (81.57 vs 27.5 ms respectively, p = 0.006, mean 
difference: 54.08, 95% CI: 12.67, 95.49). As results show, participants widely 
differed on temporal perception of these baseline events, reflecting individual 
strategies in the attention paid to the stream of letters, in line with other studies 
(e.g., Haggard et al., 2003; Moore, Schneider et al., 2010). In order to control and 
remove such individual differences, perceptual shifts were analysed using 3 
(‘type of context’) x 2 (‘judged event’) repeated-measures ANOVA, using the 
group (young adults, children and elderly) as between-factor. First, a non-
significant main effect of group was detected, F(2, 54) = 0.740, p = 0.482, η2p = 
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0.027. Instead, significant main effects of both ‘type of context’, F(2, 108) = 6.44, p 
= 0.002, η2p = 0.107, and ‘judged event’, F(1, 54) = 70.34, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.566, were 
detected. Participants tended to have a general anticipated temporal perception 
regarding the events within the voluntary action context (-9.79 ms, 95% CI: -22.85, 
3.27) as compared to both the involuntary (-29.53 ms, 95% CI: -39.41, -19.66; p = 
0.015) and the sensory contexts (-29.94 ms, 95% CI: -39.43, -20.46; p = 0.01). No 
significant differences emerged between the involuntary and the sensory 
contexts (p = 1.000). Regarding the ‘judged event’, the first event was shifted 
towards the second one (11.55 ms, 95% CI: 2.37, 20.73) and vice versa (-57.73 ms, 
95% CI: -71.19, -44.27; p < 0.001). Most importantly, the interaction between 
‘group’, ‘type of context’ and ‘judged event’ was significant, F(4, 108) = 3.99, p = 
0.005, η2p = 0.129. Differences between groups were significant only regarding the 
action binding within the voluntary action context (i.e., the shift of the voluntary 
action towards the tone, Figure 4.4). Specifically, action binding was significantly 
different between young adults and children (p = 0.034; 95% CI: 3.56, 122.44; 
mean difference = 63), but not between young adults and elderly (p = 0.514) and 
between elderly and children (p = 0.728). Also, the overall binding was compared 
among the three groups. No main effect of group, F(2, 54) = 1.74, p = 0.186, η2p = 
0.06, was observed while a main effect of overall binding emerged, F(2, 108) = 
9.58, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.151. Temporal compression within the voluntary action 
context was significantly different as compared to both the involuntary action 
context (p = 0.007) and the sensory context (p = 0.001). No differences emerged 
between the two control contexts, namely the involuntary and the sensory 
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context (p = 0.600). Most importantly, a significant interaction between the 
overall binding and the group emerged, F(4, 108) = 3.48, p = 0.010, η2p = 0.114, 
(Figure 4.5). Young adults overall binding significantly differed from both 
children (p = 0.015) and elderly (p = 0.022) only in the case of the ‘voluntary action 
context’. Total voluntary IB did not differ between children and elderly (p = 
1.000). No differences emerged among groups in the case of the two control 
contexts (involuntary action context: children vs young adults, p = 1.000; children 
vs elderly, p = 0.293; young adults vs elderly: p = 1.000; sensory context: children 
vs young adults, p = 1.000; children vs elderly, p = 1.000; young adults vs elderly: 
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Figure 4.4. On the left side, the graph shows the perceptual shifts within the voluntary action context for 
each group. The white violin plots depict the action binding (i.e., the shift of the the voluntary action 
towards the tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the effect binding (i.e., the perceptual shift of 
the tone towards the action). The dashed line stands for the actual onset of the event of interest. The black 
dots stand for the mJE of each group of participants. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and 
symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of 
interest, while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, the 
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Figure 4.5. Differences in the voluntary action overall binding among the three groups of participants. 
Error bars represent the standard error of mean (SEM) and * indicates the significant difference in overall 
binding among groups. Only adults present IB effect, showing an enhanced total temporal compression 





The aim of the present study was to investigate the development and the 
evolution of the SoAg across the lifespan, using IB as an implicit measure, by 
taking advantage of its superiority over explicit tasks (e.g., verbal self-reports) 
(Wolpe & Rowe, 2014).  
 Results in the group of young adults replicate the findings of Study I (see 
Chapter 3). Again, only voluntary actions were perceived as occurring later in 
time than they really were (e.g., as more adjacent to the following tone in 
temporal terms); on the other hand, tones were perceived as occurring earlier 
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was limited to the context of voluntary action. These results provide further 
support for the use of this new paradigm to examine IB.  
As concern children and elderly, findings showed a reduction of the 
overall IB (i.e., larger values and absence of temporal compression), both in the 
context of ‘voluntary action’ and in the two control conditions (‘involuntary 
action’ and ‘sensory context’). In both groups, the temporal occurrence of the tone 
in the ECs was significantly shifted towards the first event which triggered the 
auditory effect, independently of the type of the first stimulus (i.e., voluntary, 
involuntary or sensory). Why did this happen? Some possible explanations have 
been advanced. The first one refers to the alerting system (Petersen & Posner, 
2012). Accordingly, the use of a warning signal prior to a target event produces, 
in young adults, a phasic change in alertness, preparing the system for the 
detection of an expected signal. Generally, reaction times improve following a 
warning signal. A similar phenomenon is also common in children. Indeed, 
considering the ‘warning-signal hypothesis’ (Droit-Volet, 2003; 2011), it has been 
shown that when target stimuli are preceded by warning signals, the amount of 
time required for stimulus processing decreases and accuracy improves. In fact, 
when children had to evaluate the tone in the ECs, judgment accuracy 
significantly increased in comparison to the BCs, in which only the tone was 
presented. In fact, in BCs children perceived the tone after its real onset (78.16 m). 
However, when the tone was activated by the voluntary action, it was perceived 
more accurately (13.42 ms). The same pattern also emerged when the tone 
followed the involuntary action (30.26 ms) and the control tone (35.53 ms). 
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Therefore, it has been speculated that children might have considered the first 
event (voluntary action, involuntary action, or control tone) to be a warning 
signal for the arrival of the subsequent tone. This ‘warning-signal hypothesis’ 
(Droit-Volet, 2003; 2011) finds confirmation in many developmental studies 
showing that a warning event can actually act as an attentional preparation cue 
and then leads to performance improvements. Therefore, the alerting system 
hypothesis (Petersen & Posner, 2012) seems to be suitable to explain children’s 
data. However, when considering elderly, this framework failed to provide a 
convincing account of the findings obtained in this sample. This is partially due 
to the fact that baseline temporal perception of the tone significantly differed 
between the two groups. More specifically, while children had a delayed 
temporal perception of the tone in BC (78.15 ms), elderly tended to be more 
accurate (8.33 ms). As seen before, in children the alerting system hypothesis seems 
to work since the values of the tone in ECs resulted to be more accurate as 
compared to the BCs. However, in older participants the first event could not be 
considered as a warning stimulus since in ECs the temporal perception of the 
second event (i.e., the tone) was worsened as compared to the BC, although being 
perceived earlier in time like in children. This is in line with other studies that 
demonstrated that older participants are not able to use temporal cues to improve 
performance (Vallesi, McIntosh & Stuss, 2009; Zanto, Pan, Liu, Bollingerm Nobre 
et al., 2011). 
Another possible explanation that is worth taking into account refers to 
the lack of inhibitory control, which is suitable to explain both children (Diamond 
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& Doar, 1989; Rubia, Overmeyer, Taylor, Brammer, Williams et al., 2000; 
Durston, Thomas, Yang, Ulug, Zimmermann et al., 2002; Lorsbach & Reimer, 
2011) and elderly data (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher, Zacks & May, 1999). In the 
present study, both children and elderly might have perceived the second event 
in the ECs earlier in time, as compared to the BCs, because they might have been 
influenced by the presence of the first event. In fact, when the tone is activated 
by the first event (voluntary action, involuntary action, or control tone) in the 
ECs, it is perceived earlier compared to the BCs. In other words, when children 
and elderly had to evaluate the second event in the ECs, it is likely that they were 
not able to disengage their attention from the irrelevant stimulus (i.e., the first 
event), which was therefore not well-inhibited. For this reason, the second event 
in ECs was perceived earlier compared to the BCs. Regarding children, this 
hypothesis finds confirmation in several classic developmental studies which 
have demonstrated that the ability to suppress irrelevant information becomes 
more efficient with age (Diamond & Doar, 1989; Rubia et al., 2000; Durston et al., 
2002; Lorsbach & Reimer, 2011). As a matter of fact, performance on Stroop, 
flanker, and go/no-go tasks continues to develop over childhood and does not 
reach its maximum until 12 years of age or later (Carver, Livesey & Charles, 2001; 
Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2002; Durston et al., 2002). 
Regarding elderly, one of the major theories of cognitive aging proposed that an 
important cause of age changes evidenced in cognitive tasks is the decline in the 
efficiency of inhibitory processes (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher et al., 1999). 
More in detail, older adults have difficulties in focusing on relevant information 
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and, at the same time, in inhibiting attention to irrelevant contents. Aging 
resulted in poorer performance in a variety of paradigms that rely upon 
inhibitory processing, including stop signal task (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, 
Logan, & Strayer, 1994), Stroop task (Houx, Jolles, & Vreeling, 1993), and 
antisaccade task (Butler, Zacks, & Henderson, 1999). The lack of inhibitory control 
hypothesis provides therefore a good framework to explain the shift of the tone 
towards the first event in both groups. In addition, with respect to kids, this 
hypothesis could better fit the obtained data as compared to the ‘warning signal 
hypothesis’ (Droit-Volet, 2003; 2011): in fact, in order to control the cross-modal 
estimations in timing judgments, we should consider the perceptual shifts and 
not just the difference between the BCs and the ECs. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show 
that the second event seems to be influenced by the first one: the effect (e.g., tone) 
is perceived earlier towards the first event independently of the context, and the 
shift is numerically different between the first and the second event, with a 
greater shift for the second one. It is, therefore, more likely that children, like 
elderly, were unable to manage the interference caused by the first event and, 
consequently, to correctly evaluate the ensuing tone. Indeed, judging correctly 
the second event implies that attention has to be disengaged from the previously 
presented stimulus (i.e., the first event). In these cases, irrelevant information 
exploited resources that otherwise would have been available to process relevant 
information, which led to a decreased of the global performance.  
Taken altogether, the lack of IB effect in children and elderly seems to be 
related to the fact that the task may be too difficult for them, as a result of their 
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limited attentional control capacities (e.g., Brainerd & Dempster, 1995; Park & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). However, participants reported normal scores on 
neuropsychological measures. Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of effect could 
be simply due to issues with the task. In order to better understand the reduced 
IB in these two special populations, we proceeded to compare their data with 
those obtained in young adults. This helped us to answer the following question: 
did the lack of IB depend exclusively on the complexity of the task? If it was the 
case, when comparing data among the three groups, we should have found 
differences within all the three contexts (i.e., voluntary, involuntary and sensory). 
More precisely, both children and elderly should have differentiated themselves 
from young adults in all the three contexts. However, groups did not differ in 
terms of control conditions; rather, they only showed significant differences in 
the ‘voluntary action’ context, suggesting that the total temporal compression 
only characterizes adults’ performance (Figure 4.5). On the other hand, when 
considering action and effect binding separately, children exhibited a reduced 
action binding (i.e., the shift of the action towards the tone) only as compared to 
adults (Figure 4.4). Children tended to be more focused on their voluntary 
actions, without taking into account the effects produced by them. This result 
might be explained by considering the two different processes implicated in 
action and effect binding (Moore, Ruge et al., 2010; Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013). 
Effect binding seems to rely on a more general pre-activation mechanism 
(Waszak et al., 2012); the neural representation of a sensory outcome following a 
voluntary action is activated before its occurrence. When the predicted sensory 
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event occurs, the perceptual threshold is reached faster than when the event is 
not predicted. On the other hand, action binding depends on both predictive 
motor control and inferential processes (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It might be 
possible that the pre-activation mechanism is already fully efficient in children, 
while mechanisms implicated in action binding might be still developing, though 
functioning in elderly. However, future studies are needed to shed light on this 
issue. 
Data are also in line with literature regarding temporal perception. In 
adults, IB has been proved to be linked to the slowing down of the rate of an 
internal pacemaker (Wenke & Haggard, 2009). In kids and in older participants, 
studies indicate, on the contrary, the speeding up of the internal pacemaker 
(Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2002; Espinosa-Fernández, Miró, Cano, & Buela-Casal, 
2003; Hancock & Rausch, 2010). In line with these findings, the increase in the 
speed of the internal pacemaker made kids and elderly to perceive their 
voluntary actions and their sensory effects to be further apart (i.e., a reduced IB). 
In conclusion, the present study provides new insights into the 
comprehension of the developmental trajectory of SoAg. If we consider IB to be 
an ‘adaptive illusion’ that gives us a strong sense of causality and helps us to 
consider ourselves as responsible for certain effects, such an illusion does not 
seem to deceive children and elderly, maybe because the necessary cognitive 
skills, relevant for the SoAg to occur, have not been acquired yet or have started 
their ‘decline’. It is possible that children and elderly might not have shown IB 
because frontal areas, the most plausible ‘candidates’ as a neural substrate of 
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SoAg, are still developing or have started to deteriorate. For all of these reasons, 
it has been suggested that IB might be acquired gradually during ontogenesis, 
parallel with the maturation of the frontal cortical network, and might be lost in 
an advanced age. Since SoAg and IB seem to share the same common cognitive 
mechanisms and neural networks (e.g., David et al., 2008; Moore & Obhi, 2012; 
Kühn et al., 2013; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014), one might therefore speculate that, in 
conjunction with the reduction of IB, children and elderly also show a diminished 
SoAg, which does not allow them to understand the consequences of their 
actions. However, results reported here refer to IB, and speculations on SoAg 
remain limited. The possible hypothesis of a link between the reduced IB and the 
maturation or decline of frontal areas in children and elderly remains an open 
issue that needs to be tested by means of neuroimaging techniques. Future 
studies are required to confirm our hypothesis in order to provide a further step 
in the contextualization of SoAg dynamics throughout age.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY III 
DISCOVERING THE NEURAL BASES OF THE 
‘AGENT BRAIN’: A tDCS STUDY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As seen in Chapters 1 and 2, the neural bases of the SoAg remain unclear. 
While the role of the AG (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer, Frey et 
al., 2008) and the DLPFC (Fink et al., 1999) have been constantly associated with 
non-agency conditions using explicit agency tasks, the neural underpinnings of 
implicit SoAg (i.e., IB) associated with agency conditions are not well 
understood. Very few studies have tried to explore its neural underpinnings, 
using different methods (see Paragraph 2.4). Kühn et al. (2013) and Jo et al. (2014) 
adopted correlational techniques (fMRI and EEG, respectively), while Moore, 
Ruge et al. (2010) used theta-burst TMS. These studies provided evidence that 
the frontal lobe, namely the supplementary motor complex (SMC), is involved; 
in particular, the latter research demonstrated that disruption of pre-SMA 
reduced IB. A very recent study by Khalighinejad and Haggard (2015) 
investigated the contribution of the AG – usually activated in non-agency 
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conditions - to the SoAg, by mean of tDCS, showing that anodal stimulation of 
the left AG reduced IB. Always using tDCS, Khalighinejad et al. (in press) 
highlighted the potential role of the DLPFC to SoAg when participants had to 
select between multiple actions. However, the available evidence is still too 
scarce for drawing definitive conclusions on the neural bases of the implicit 
SoAg. This is especially true when considering that the same two well-validated 
paradigms (i.e., the rotating spot method – Libet et al., 1983 - and the time interval 
paradigm - Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; Humphrey & Buehner, 
2009; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010) have been used in the above studies, and 
both present several weaknesses (Gomes, 2002; Cravo et al., 2011; see Chapter 3 
of the present thesis).  
The aim of the present study is to collect new evidence on the neural bases 
of the implicit SoAg by focussing, in particular, on the contribution played by the 
pre-SMA. The reason behind this choice is linked to the fact that the experience 
of agency, as seen in Chapter 4, is strictly related to EFs, given that it requires (i) 
a plan to perform a goal-directed action and (ii) the identification of the 
consequences of our behaviour in the external world, while avoiding and 
inhibiting erroneous and maladaptive behaviours. In this sense, the involvement 
of pre-SMA becomes crucial, based on its relevant contribution to the executive 
functioning. This area is indeed considered to belong to the pre-frontal cortex 
and not to the motor cortex (Picard & Strick, 2001; Akkal, Dum & Strick, 2007; 
Nachev et al., 2007). Indeed, differently from the SMA proper, the pre-SMA has 
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extensive connections with pre-frontal regions and is associated with the higher 
cognitive aspects of tasks (e.g., action planning and initiation). In addition to the 
previous findings obtained using TMS (Moore, Ruge et al., 2010), a very recent 
study conducted by Wolpe, Moore et al. (2013) also highlighted the importance 
of this area for the process under investigation. The Authors, using IB as an 
implicit marker of agency in patients with CBS, have underlined that patterns of 
functional connectivity between the pre-SMA and the prefrontal cortex in resting 
conditions seem to change according to IB effects, suggesting that a medial 
frontal–prefrontal network is necessary for awareness and control of voluntary 
actions. Pre-SMA has therefore been selected in the present study as the target 
area of stimulation to further verify its causal involvement in the complex 
phenomenon of SoAg. As compared to Moore, Ruge et al. (2010), tDCS (Dayan 
et al., 2013) was adopted for its potential use in the clinical practice. Indeed, 
establishing a causal relationship between the stimulated area and IB by means 
of tDCS might have direct clinical relevance for the treatment of certain 
neurological and psychiatric diseases in which SoAg is disrupted. tDCS could be 
therefore a suitable tool for intervening in these domains, enhancing awareness 
of voluntary action. The effects of non-invasive brain stimulation on IB have been 
tested in another sensory modality compared to that tested in the aforementioned 
study (Moore, Ruge et al., 2010), aimed to give additional evidence on the 
possible supra-modal nature of the effect. Specifically, unlike the quoted study 
that used a somatosensory feedback, the sensory effect produced by the 
voluntary action in our task was a tone, typically adopted in IB studies. In the 
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present study, tDCS was firstly applied to healthy participants’ pre-SMA. 
Secondly, in the same sample it was applied to a control region involved in 
processing action-auditory effects, i.e., the right PAC. In view of the findings 
provided by the previous TMS study (Moore, Ruge et al., 2010), we expect 
stimulation-dependent alteration of IB only when tDCS is applied over the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), with no contribution by the PAC.  
 
5.2 EXPERIMENT I: tDCS over pre-SMA 
5.2.1 METHODS 
5.2.1.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Fifteen healthy participants (11 females; age range: 20 to 29; mean age in 
years: 22.9, SD:1.9; education in years: 16.67, SD: 0.98) were recruited for this 
study. They all were right-handed, as measured by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and lacked 
neurological, neuropsychological and psychiatric pathologies. In addition, they 
all met the inclusion criteria for participating in brain stimulation studies. The 
study was conceived according to the Declaration of Helsinki and adopted the 
safety procedures of non-invasive brain stimulation. All participants were naïve 
as to the purpose of the experiment and gave their informed, written consent to 
participate in the study. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Padua.  
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5.2.1.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
All the materials, the procedure and data analyses were the same of those 
used and applied in Study I (Chapter 3). The only difference regarded the 
number of conditions applied. In the present study, control conditions (i.e., the 
involuntary action context and the sensory context) were not included. Indeed, 
the main interest of the present investigation was direct to elucidate the brain 
bases of IB related to intentional actions. Therefore, only the voluntary action 
context was considered. The study consisted of two BCs and two ECs, for a total 
of four conditions. Participants underwent three stimulation sessions (sham-
placebo stimulation and two active stimulations), separated by at least 24 h. The 
ordering for the stimulation conditions was counterbalanced across participants. 
To rule out alternative accounts of tDCS effects, a self-report questionnaire 
measuring mood and arousal was administered at both the beginning and the 
end of the experiment.  
 
5.2.1.3 tDCS 
tDCS was delivered through a battery-driven current stimulator 
(BrainStim; EMS Medical, Bologna, Italy), using a pair of surface saline-soaked 
sponge electrodes. The active electrode (4 x 4 cm) was placed over pre-SMA, 
which was localised with the EEG 10–20 system, with the centre of the tDCS 
electrode placed over the site of Fz (Hsu, Tseng, Yu, Kuo, Hung et al., 2011). The 
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reference electrode (10 x 10 cm) was placed over the deltoid muscle of the right 
arm to exclude the confounding effects of the reference electrode. A constant 
current of 1.5 mA was applied for 20 min (including fade-in and fade-out times 
of 30 s each) in both the active stimulation conditions. In the sham condition, a 
1.5-mA current was applied for 20 s at the beginning and end of the stimulation 
period. Testing sessions took place at the same time of the day to minimize 
circadian effects.  
 
5.2.2 RESULTS 
Table 5.1 summarises the mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding for 
sham, anodal and cathodal stimulations.  
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Table 5.1. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding for each stimulation protocol after pre-SMA modulation. 
Stimulation  Baseline Conditions  Event judged Mean judgment error (ms) ± sd Mean shift (ms) ± sd Overall Binding (ms)  ± sd  
Sham 
Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 21.81 ± 52.95     
Tone Tone 23.18 ± 32.06     
Anodal 
Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 18.18 ± 56.03     
Tone Tone 24.09 ± 33.59     
Cathodal 
Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 33.64 ± 46.78     
Tone Tone 32.73 ± 32.71     
  Experimental Conditions        
Sham 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Voluntary Action 95.45 ± 62.97 73.64 ± 48.77 
125 ± 78.87 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Tone -28.18 ± 55.92 -51.36 ± 47.15 
Anodal 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone Voluntary Action 39.55 ± 41.33 21.36 ± 51.59 
181.82 ± 56.69 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone Tone -22.73 ± 47.98 -46.82 ± 40.33 
Cathodal 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Voluntary Action 61.36 ± 57.85 27.73 ± 47.83 
188.18 ± 68.3 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Tone -1.36 ± 22.64 -34.09 ± 33.6 
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In order to calculate the perceptual shifts a 3 (‘type of stimulation’: sham, 
anodal, cathodal) x 2 (‘judged event’: either the action or the tone) repeated-
measures ANOVA was run. No main effect of the ‘type of stimulation’ was 
found, F(2, 28) = 2.97, p = 0.067, η2p = 0.175, whereas the effect of the ‘judged 
event’ was significant, F(1, 14) = 41.3, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.747, with a shift of the first 
event towards the second (40.91 ms; 95% CI: 19.74, 62.08) and vice versa (-44.09 
ms; 95% CI: -58.02, -30.17; p < 0.001). More relevant, a significant interaction 
emerged, F(2, 28) = 5.83, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.294. In order to examine the interaction 
in more detail, post hoc analysis applying Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons was run. The post hoc analysis revealed that type of stimulation 
influenced only the shift of the action towards the tone (i.e., action binding): in 
particular, sham stimulation was significantly different from anodal (p = 0.007) 
and cathodal (p = 0.014) stimulations (Figure 5.1). No difference was found 
between anodal and cathodal stimulations (p = 1.000) which both showed a 
reduced action binding compared to sham stimulation. Regarding the effect 
binding, no significant differences emerged among the stimulations (sham vs 
anodal: p = 1.000; sham vs cathodal: p = 0.753; anodal vs cathodal: p = 1.000). 
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Figure 5.1. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the 
different stimulation protocols. The white violin plots depict the action binding. Conversely, the grey violin 
plots represent the effect binding. The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest. The 
black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical 
representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, while 
the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, the temporal 
compression occurs only in the the sham stimulation condition. 
 
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was then calculated in order to 
study the effects of three tDCS stimulations (sham, anodal, cathodal) on the 
overall binding. Results showed a significant interaction, F(2, 28) = 5.83, p = 0.008, 
η2p = 0.294. Post-hoc analyses with Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons revealed significant differences between the effects of sham tDCS 
and anodal tDCS (p = 0.022) and between sham tDCS and cathodal tDCS (p = 
0.043) on the overall binding. Both anodal and cathodal stimulations reduced 
(i.e., higher values) the overall binding as compared to the sham condition, and 
did not significantly differ from each other (p = 1.000; Figure 5.2). Finally, to 
confirm that anodal and cathodal stimulations of pre-SMA affected primarily the 
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experimental action condition and not the baseline action condition, the effect of 
the ‘type of stimulation’ on participants' judgement error in baseline action 
conditions was assessed using repeated-measures one-way ANOVA. No 
significant effect of stimulation type on baseline action condition was observed, 
F(2, 28) = 1.033, p = 0.369, η2p = 0.069. 
Analyses of the self-report questionnaire measuring mood and arousal 
revealed no significant differences in any of the items as a function of stimulation 
conditions. With regard to the self-report questionnaire assessing the sensations 




Figure 5.2. Differences of the overall binding among the three types of stimulation. Error bars represent 
SEM and * indicates the significant difference in overall binding among stimulation protocols. Only after 
sham stimulation the IB effect is still present. Conversely, both anodal and cathodal tend to reduce IB. 
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5.3 EXPERIMENT II: tDCS over the right primary auditory cortex 
5.3.1 METHODS 
5.3.1.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were the same as in Experiment I.  
5.3.1.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
All the materials, the procedure and data analyses were the same of those 
used and applied in Experiment I. Experiment II was run 1 month after 
Experiment I. 
5.3.1.3 tDCS 
In this experiment, all stimulation parameters were the same as in 
Experiment I, except for the placement of the active electrode (4 x 4 cm). This was 
placed over the right PAC, localized with the EEG 10–20 system and placed 1 cm 
inferior to the midpoint of C4 and T4 (Mathys, Loui, Zheng & Schlaug, 2010; Tang 
& Hammond, 2013).  
 
5.3.2 RESULTS 
Table 5.2 summarizes the mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding for 
sham, anodal and cathodal stimulations.  
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Table 5.2. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding for each stimulation protocol after PAC modulation. 
Stimulation  Baseline Conditions  Event judged Mean judgment error (ms) ± sd Mean shift (ms) ± sd Overall Binding (ms)  ± sd  
Sham 
Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 27.73 ± 60.02     
Tone Tone 29.09 ± 40.04     
Anodal 
Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 53.64 ± 54.6     
Tone Tone 60.9 ± 50.79     
Cathodal 
Voluntary Action Voluntary Action 44.09 ± 63.9     
Tone Tone 42.73 ± 31.19     
  Experimental Conditions         
Sham 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Voluntary Action 66.36 ± 81.06 38.64 ± 59.42 
169.09 ± 92.63 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Tone -13.18 ± 53.16 -42.27 ± 45.96 
Anodal 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Voluntary Action 64.35 ± 61.37 10.72 ± 47.85 
187.93 ± 82.68 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Tone 9.55 ± 47.36 -51.36 ± 56.98 
Cathodal 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Voluntary Action 66.36 ± 57.13 22.27 ± 42.22 
175 ± 66.55 
Voluntary Action - 250 ms - Tone  Tone -10 ± 58.87 -52.73 ± 54.08 
 
 
  143 
In order to calculate the perceptual shifts a 3 (‘type of stimulation’: sham, 
anodal, cathodal) x 2 (‘judged event’: either the action or the tone) repeated-
measures ANOVA was run. No main effect of the ‘type of stimulation’ was found, 
F(2, 28) = 1.75, p = 0.192, η2p = 0.111, whereas the effect of the ‘judged event’ was 
significant, F(1, 14) = 21.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.610, with a shift of the first event 
towards the second one (23.87 ms; 95% CI: 4.76, 42.99) and vice versa (-48.79 ms; 95% 
CI: -70.65, -26.92; p < 0.001). The interaction did not emerge as significant, F(2, 28) = 
0.309, p = 0.737, η2p = 0.022, (Figure 5.2). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was 
then calculated in order to study the effects of the three tDCS stimulations (sham, 
anodal, cathodal) on the overall binding. Results showed no significant differences 
of tDCS stimulations, F(2, 28) = 0.309, p = 0.737, η2p = 0.022. Since the PAC was 
stimulated, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was run to assess the influence 
of tDCS on the temporal perception of tone in the BC. There was a significant effect 
of stimulation type on baseline tone condition, F(2, 28) = 4.78, p = 0.016, η2p = 0.255. 
Bonferroni correction showed that sham significantly differed from anodal (p = 
0.046). Basically, anodal stimulation of the PAC reduced the temporal perception of 
the sound. No significant differences were detected between sham and cathodal (p 
= 0.292) and between anodal and cathodal (p = 0.390). Also for Experiment II 
analyses of the self-report questionnaires measuring mood and arousal and the 
sensations experienced during the stimulation revealed no significant differences as 
a function of stimulation conditions. 
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Figure 5.2. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
stimulation protocols. The white violin plots depict the action binding. Conversely, the grey violin plots 
represent the participants’ effect binding. The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest. 
The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical 
representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, while the 




In the present study tDCS was adopted to gain insights into the neural 
underpinnings of SoAg, using IB as implicit measure. Pre-SMA has been selected as 
a potential region involved in this phenomenon. Subsequently, PAC was also 
modulated, as a control area, given its key role in the processing of the auditory 
stimuli (Pickles, 2012), which here represent the effects of voluntary actions.  
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As we expected, results showed a significant reduction in IB only after 
stimulating the pre-SMA. In detail, sham stimulation significantly differed from 
anodal and cathodal stimulations, which both tended to reduce the overall IB, 
producing an inhibitory effect. Perceptual shifts were also analysed separately 
(action binding vs effect binding) as they seem to be mediated by different 
underlying mechanisms (Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013). Only action binding (i.e., the 
shift of the action towards its auditory effect) was significantly reduced. Also in this 
case, sham stimulation differed from anodal and cathodal stimulations, which both 
tended to inhibit the shift of the action towards its effect. Unlike many previous 
findings in the motor domain, showing that cortical excitability is increased by 
anodal and decreased by cathodal stimulation (for a review, see: Jacobson, 
Koslowsky & Lavidor, 2012), polarity-dependent effects in behavioural measures 
were not observed, as both anodal and cathodal stimulations had an inhibitory effect 
on IB. Although this result could seem surprising at first sight (especially as regards 
the lack of facilitation for the anodal stimulation), the same inhibitory effect of both 
anode and cathode has been reported in other studies (Marshall, Mölle, Siebner & 
Born, 2005; Stagg, Jayaram, Pastor, Kincses, Matthews et al., 2011; Westgeest, 
Morales, Cabib & Valls-Sole, 2014; Zmigrod, Colzato & Hommel, 2014), which 
differed in many aspects from ours, thus making difficult to detect the reasons 
behind the lack of effects dependent on stimulation polarity. To test the hypothesis 
that longer durations of stimulation can somehow change the expected opposite 
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anodal-excitation and cathodal-inhibition effects, additive analyses have been 
performed, similar to those described in the Method section, on data split into two 
halves (i.e., relative to the initial vs final parts of task performance). These new 
analyses did not confirm the above hypothesis as no significant difference between 
the two halves of the data was found (and for this reason they have not been 
reported in the Method’s section). In this regard, one might incline to think that, 
beyond the importance of each single stimulation parameter in shaping stimulation-
induced behavioural effects, these effects can emerge by complex interactions 
between a given combination of stimulation parameters, the targeted cognitive 
functions and the experimental tasks used to test these functions. However, the 
result pattern here observed confirms that the dichotomy between ‘anodal-
excitation’ and ‘cathodal-inhibition’ in the cognitive domain is far from being 
considered unquestionable (for a review, see Jacobson et al., 2012), and that the 
reliability of polarity-dependent effects of stimulation, on both neural and 
behavioural levels, deserves to be investigated in more depth in future studies. 
Another possible explanation for this is based on the contribution of both SMA and 
pre-SMA in the perception of time (Lewis & Miall, 2003; Allman, Teki, Griffiths & 
Meck, 2014), as suggested by Javadi (2015). tDCS of the pre-SMA might have 
changed the expected duration of the delay and consequently reduced the SoAg. 
Anyway, the similarity between the effects of anodal and cathodal stimulation does 
not modify the meaning of the findings obtained by the present study, clearly 
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indicating that the pre-SMA is likely to play a key role in the processing of IB. The 
pre-SMA seems therefore to give a crucial contribution to our feelings of being 
agents of our own actions. Indeed, inhibition of this area leads to a ‘weakening’ of 
IB, which may be interpreted as a decreased sense of control or agency. Moreover, 
our data support the view of distinct mechanisms underlying action and effect 
binding (Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013). Perturbation of pre-SMA indeed altered only 
action binding, maintaining unchanged the effect binding: this peculiarity seems to 
keep participants more focused on their voluntary actions, ignoring however the 
produced sensory effect. Being more focused on the voluntary action itself, without 
considering the produced effects, suggests that SoAg might be decreased. The 
present data might also be discussed in light of the theories underlying the IB, which 
demonstrated that action binding, unlike effect binding, is supported by a Cue 
Integration Theory (Moore, Wegner et al., 2009; Wolpe, Haggard et al., 2013). In detail, 
estimation of time of action depends on an integration of two separate cues: the 
action and the sensory effect. The final estimate is then a weighted average, where 
the weight given to each cue depends on its reliability. In the absence of a sensory 
effect the perception of an action relies more on internal volitional signals, reducing 
therefore the action binding. On the other hand, unreliable information about the 
action event would lead to an over-reliance on its sensory effect and therefore 
increased binding of action. In our specific case, a reduced action binding was 
observed even if its effect was present. It might be possible that participants, who 
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tended to concentrate only on their voluntary actions, behaved as if no sensory effect 
existed, reducing the shift of the action towards the effect. However, although such 
an interpretation is quite plausible, it should be treated with caution since we did 
not vary the probability of action’s outcome and therefore we did not disentangle 
the specific contribution of these two sources of information for IB.  
The present study adds several novelties to the study of SoAg, using IB as 
implicit measures. This is the first study attempting to elucidate the contribution of 
the pre-SMA by using tDCS. Two previous studies, using different neuroimaging 
methodologies (fMRI: Kühn et al., 2013; EEG: Jo et al., 2014), have investigated 
neural correlates and brain dynamics characterising IB, suggesting that the SMC 
might be a key brain region involved in this phenomenon. However, despite having 
put the bases for an initial understanding of the neural correlates of IB, these studies 
did not allow for a clear and definite comprehension of the role of SMC in the IB 
because only information correlative in nature was provided. To our knowledge, 
only one study tried to provide evidence for a causal involvement of the pre-SMA 
to the IB, adopting TMS (Moore, Ruge et al., 2010). Using somatosensory feedback, 
Authors targeted two areas thought to be involved in the cognitive aspects of 
internal movement generation and the sensory feedback: the pre-SMA and the 
SMHA, respectively. They found that TMS over the pre-SMA significantly reduced 
IB whereas no evidence was found for the involvement of SMHA in the 
phenomenon.  
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We decided to use tDCS for reasons relevant for both experimental research 
and clinical applications. As regard the first aspect, unlike neuroimaging methods 
this technique is able to demonstrate a causal link between a given stimulated area 
and a given behavioural effect - hypothesised to be mediated by that area. In 
addition, with tDCS it is easier to conduct placebo stimulation-controlled studies, as 
sham stimulation initially produces sensations similar to those produced by real 
stimulation without inducing changes in cortical excitability, a condition which is 
difficult to achieve with TMS because of methodological problems. As regards the 
clinical side, tDCS can be successfully used in this domain by virtue of the promising 
advantages it offers for the rehabilitation (e.g., more easily tolerated by participants, 
less expensive and potentially portable), especially when compared with other 
neurostimulation tools (Nitsche, Cohen, Wassermann, Priori, Lang et al., 2008).  
Using tDCS we were able not only to replicate, but also to extend, the results 
obtained by Moore, Ruge et al. (2010). As the Authors previously claimed, we 
showed that modulation of pre-SMA reduces IB, with no direct contribution of the 
area which processes the effects of the action (i.e., the PAC in our study and the 
SMHA in Moore, Ruge et al., 2010). The confirmation of these results has relevant 
consequences on both methodological and theoretical sides. As regards the 
methodological implications, we were able to corroborate previous findings on IB 
with a different brain stimulation technique, which is usually described as having a 
lower spatial resolution than TMS. Similar results obtained with tDCS allow 
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enlargement of the domain of application of the technique itself, which has already 
been shown to be a fruitful tool for experimental research in different domains 
(Penolazzi, Di Domenico, Marzoli, Mammarella, Fairfield et al., 2010; Penolazzi, 
Pastore & Mondini, 2013; Penolazzi, Stramaccia, Braga, Mondini & Galfano, 2014; 
Foerster, Rocha, Wiesiolek, Chagas, Machado et al., 2013).  
As regards the theoretical implications, we extended the findings of Moore, 
Ruge et al. (2010) in many ways: (i) by adopting a new paradigm we successfully 
confirmed that pre-SMA contributes to IB; (ii) in our study the action effects were 
presented in the auditory modality, unlike in Moore, Ruge et al. (2010), who 
investigated the somatosensory modality. Therefore, although we did not directly 
test the two modalities through the same task, our results probably suggest that the 
effects of non-invasive brain stimulation on IB can be extended to another sensory 
domain (i.e., the auditory one); (iii) We did not find a contribution of the area 
implicated in the processing of the sensory effect produced by the action. This result 
is line with that of Moore, Ruge et al. (2010); however, as we found it in another 
sensory modality, it supports the supra-modality ‘power’ of IB, which is present 
independently of the type of the sensory feedback. It seems that the perception of 
the sensory effects in IB does not take place in the specific areas engaged in their 
processing (i.e., PAC and SMHA). Future studies should try to further verify this 
hypothesis, stimulating, for example, the whole SMC (both pre-SMA and SMA 
proper), which is a crucial station for the integration of the incoming sensory 
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information, due to the fact that it indirectly receives sensory afferences from the 
primary sensory areas (Narayana, Laird, Tandon, Franklin, Lancaster et al., 2012).  
Summing up, overcoming a correlational approach, the present study 
supports a causal contribution of pre-SMA in the functional genesis of SoAg, using 
tDCS. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that tDCS could also have 
affected neighbouring regions, anatomically and functionally linked to pre-SMA, 
and future studies, combining tDCS and neuroimaging techniques, will provide 
additional critical insights on this issue.  
Our findings may have a strong relevance not only for scientists investigating 
motor, cognitive and neural mechanisms, but also for clinicians working with 
patients who present an altered awareness of action. For instance, exploring SoAg 
in PD (Moore, Schneider et al., 2010) and schizophrenia (Haggard et al., 2003), IB 
was found to be significantly stronger in patients than in controls. According to these 
findings, patients would tend to hyper-associate their actions and outcomes and to 
over-attribute the consequences of their movements to themselves. Based on our 
findings, showing that the active stimulation over pre-SMA reduced the temporal 
compression between actions and their effects (i.e., larger values of IB), tDCS might 
be, therefore, very useful in reducing this tendency in the above pathologies. In other 
words, tDCS might represent a novel therapeutic tool for those psychiatric and 
neurological pathologies in which the SoAg is disrupted.  
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY IV 
THE SUPRAMODAL INTENTIONAL BINDING 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Our brain is immersed in a rich sensory environment. We live and act in a 
world constantly characterized by stimulations across multiple sensory modalities. 
The multisensory nature of everyday life allows for enhanced detection (Lovelace, 
Stein & Wallace, 2003), more accurate localization (Wilkinson, Meredith & Stein, 
1996), and faster reactions (Diederich & Colonius, 2004) to stimuli. In addition to 
these highly adaptive benefits, the integration of information coming from different 
sensory systems is essential to provide a unified perception of our environment in 
order to control actions and its effects (i.e., SoAg). Following this line of reasoning, 
it might be possible that agency and IB can follow the same laws of multisensory 
integration (Eagleman, 2008). A crucial key requirement for multisensory 
integration is represented by the ‘unity of assumption’ (Welch & Warren, 1980): 
stimuli presented in close temporal proximity, originating from a common source, 
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are often integrated into a single, unified percept (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976; 
Shams, Kamitani & Shimojo, 2000; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004). In other words, 
multisensory integration involves the merging of cues from different modalities into 
a single percept (Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004) and occurs only within a small temporal 
window around simultaneity, often called the temporal window of integration (e.g., 
Shams et al., 2000; Bresciani, Ernst, Drewing, Bouyer, Maury et al., 2005). It is clear 
that the temporal relation between the cause and the sensory effect plays a crucial 
role. IB potentially represents a way to confirm the ‘unity of assumption’ (Rohde, 
Greiner & Ernst, 2014): action has to precede its sensory effect in a very brief 
temporal interval. Differently, if the sensory event precedes the voluntary action or 
the time interval between action and effect is too long, IB is violated, the unity 
assumption decreases and multisensory integration is prevented. Based on these 
assumptions, multisensory integration seems to be linked and central to the concept 
of agency. However, few studies have provided support for this. Indeed, the vast 
majority of investigations within the field of agency has neglected its multisensory 
nature (for a review, see: David et al., 2008; Moore & Obhi, 2012). Hypotheses on the 
reason why the multisensory nature of agency has been so far neglected lay on the 
fact that the reproduction of a setting of multi-modal stimulation mimicking the real 
world in the laboratory environment is extremely challenging. Nevertheless, the IB 
effect observed after voluntary actions has been robustly replicated using auditory, 
visual, and tactile modalities as sensory effects (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; 
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Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Moore, Lagnado et al., 2009; Strother et al., 2010; Moretto, 
Walsh et al., 2011). All these studies suggest that the brain might contain a specific 
cognitive module that binds intentional actions to their effects, despite their 
disparate sensory nature and irrespective of differences in neural transmission times 
among the different senses. This mechanism is at the root of a coherent conscious 
experience of our own agency, independently of the sensory modality. However, in 
all these studies, Authors just changed the type of ‘output’, that is the sensory effect 
produced by participants’ voluntary actions, always using visual stimuli as ‘input’ 
or reference point to report the temporal perception of the events - in particular, the 
latter point regarding the ‘input’ is specific for the studies which adopted the Libet 
clock methodology. This peculiarity has prevented to discover the actual 
multisensory nature of IB so far. Indeed, multisensory integration occurs not only 
when both the temporal order and the temporal window of integration are fulfilled, 
but also when different cross-modal stimulus combinations are assessed (Stein & 
Stanford, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been fully 
investigated yet. In order to shed light on this last aspect, the type of input has been 
varied: auditory stimuli were assumed as reference point to report the time onset of 
events. The question whether the use of auditory signals might alter the temporal 
perception of events in other sensory modalities - and therefore impact on IB – will 
be addressed. If IB is indeed a supramodal mechanism and follows the multisensory 
integration’s rules, it should be present also modifying the type of sensory inputs. 
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6.2 EXPERIMENT I: the auditory-visual Intentional Binding 
In the present experiment we modified the classical visuo-auditory paradigm 
usually adopted in the previous chapters. The main change regarded the type of 
input: indeed, instead of a stream of visual letters, participants listened to a series of 
auditory stimuli (e.g., syllables). As a consequence, also the type of sensory output 





Twenty-two participants (14 females; age range: 20 to 33; mean age in years: 
25.32, SD: 3.39; education in years: 17.45, SD: 1.77) were enrolled in the experiment. 
All participants were right-handed, as measured by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and lacked 
neurological and psychiatric pathologies. The study was conceived according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University 
of Padua. All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment and gave 
their informed, written consent to participate in the study. 
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6.2.1.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
The procedure was the same of that described in Study I (Chapter 3). Only 
the stimuli used and their duration changed. In particular, we have been forced to 
modify their exposure time in order make the stimuli high discriminable, avoiding 
possible confounders. Instead of the stream of visual letters usually adopted, 
participants were asked to listen to a stream of unpredictable syllables presented 
through headphones. Each syllable was presented separately and lasted for 250 ms, 
without time gaps in between. Only a subset of syllables has been selected in order 
to avoid that, during the auditory presentation, two syllables in sequence gave rise 
to a meaningful word. In order to prevent the participants from responding 
immediately after the occurrence of the syllables, the visual numbers used in the 
previous studies have been replaced by a continuous sound of randomized 
duration, which was played before the syllables’ presentation. As sensory effects, 
instead of an auditory stimulus, a visual stimulus was adopted, namely a coloured 
circle, which lasted on the screen for 200 ms. The response modality was the same 
of that used in Study I (Chapter 3).  
The experiment consisted of four BCs and six ECs, for a total of ten conditions. 
As in Study I (Chapter 3), among the BCs, only one event among voluntary action, 
involuntary action, visual stimulus, or control visual stimulus occurred per 
condition. The participants had to remember the syllable that they heard when: (1) 
they made a free voluntary key-press with their right index finger (acting as a 
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baseline for voluntary action condition); (2) they felt their right index finger being 
passively moved down by a mechanical device (acting as a baseline for involuntary 
action condition), applied to the right index finger of the participants; (3) they saw a 
green circle which lasted for 200 ms (baseline for the visual stimulus); (4) they saw 
another circle (same duration as the visual stimulus but with a different colour – 
yellow – acting as baseline for the control visual stimulus). For the ECs, two events 
occurred per condition and the participants had to judge: (5) the onset of the 
voluntary action that produced the visual stimulus; (6) the onset of the visual 
stimulus caused by the voluntary action; (7) the onset of the involuntary action that 
was followed by the visual stimulus; (8) the onset of the visual stimulus activated by 
the involuntary action; (9) the onset of the control visual stimulus that was followed 
by the visual stimulus; (10) the onset of the visual stimulus activated by the control 
visual stimulus. Time interval between the first event (the voluntary action, the 
involuntary action, or the control visual stimulus) and the second event (the visual 
stimulus) was set at 250 ms. Please, see Figure 6.1 for a schematic representation of 
the experimental procedure. 
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Figure 6.1. Schematic representation of the task. Participants listened to a stream of unpredictable syllables 
while watching the black screen of a computer. In the ECs, the first event (voluntary action, involuntary action, 
yellow circle) was followed by a visual stimulus, namely a green circle. Participants had to judge which syllable 









First Event Second Event
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Table 6.1. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding of the auditory-visual IB. 
  Judged Event mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  10.11 ±  55.95   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  20.45 ±  46.85   
3) Visual Stimulus Visual Stimulus 26.89 ±  56.69   
4) Control Visual Stimulus Control Visual Stimulus 17.04 ±  29.18   
Experimental Conditions 
5) Voluntary Action – Visual Stimulus Voluntary Action  66.23 ± 94.23 55.3 ± 108.49 
175 ± 125.83 
6) Voluntary Action – Visual Stimulus  Visual Stimulus 7.2 ± 72.34 -19.7 ± 56.02 
7) Involuntary Action – Visual Stimulus  Involuntary Action  -15.91 ± 78.42 -36.36 ± 69.42 
254.17 ± 110.31 
8) Involuntary Action – Visual Stimulus  Visual Stimulus -5.3 ± 93.67 -32.2 ± 82.11 
9) Control Visual Stimulus – Visual Stimulus Control Visual Stimulus -46.6 ± 69.94 -63.64 ± 63.53 
303.03 ± 87.56 
10) Control Visual Stimulus – Visual Stimulus Visual Stimulus 16.29 ± 77.56 -10.61 ± 69.87 
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Using paired-sample t-tests, significant differences were found within all the 
contexts. Regarding the ‘voluntary action context’, participants perceived the onset 
time of the voluntary action later when it triggered the visual stimulus in EC (i.e., 
the green circle) as compared to the BC in which only the voluntary action was 
present (voluntary action in the BC vs voluntary action in the EC, t21 = - 2.39, p = 
0.026; 95% CI: -103.4, -7.2; mean: -55.3 ms). Regarding the temporal perception of the 
visual stimulus (i.e., the green circle) following the voluntary action, it was 
perceived by participants earlier when it was activated by the voluntary action (7.2 
ms) as compared to when it was presented alone (26.89 ms). However, the tendency 
did not reach the statistical significance, t21 = 1.65, p = 0.114; 95% CI: -5.14, 44.54; 
mean: 19.7 ms. Regarding the ‘involuntary action context’, the involuntary action 
was perceived earlier when it triggered the visual stimulus as compared to the BC 
in which participants had just to evaluate the temporal onset of the involuntary 
action [involuntary action in the BC (20.46 ms) vs involuntary action in the EC (-
15.91 ms), t21 = 2.46, p = 0.023; 95% CI: 5.59, 67.14; mean: 36.36 ms]. This happened 
also within the ‘sensory context’: participants tended to perceive the control visual 
stimulus (i.e., the yellow circle) earlier in the EC (-46.6 ms) as compared to the BC 
(17.05 ms), t21 = 4.7, p < 0.001; 95% CI: 35.5, 91.8; mean: 63.64 ms. No differences were 
detected in all the other conditions [‘involuntary action context’: visual stimulus in 
EC vs visual stimulus in the BC (p = 0.008); ‘sensory context’: visual stimulus in EC 
vs visual stimulus in BC (p = 0.484)]. In order to calculate the perceptual shifts, 
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repeated-measures ANOVA was run. First, a main significant effect of the ‘type of 
context’ was found, F(2, 42) = 6.33, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.232. In other words, participants 
tended to have a general delayed temporal perception regarding the events within 
the voluntary action context (17.8 ms) as compared to the involuntary context (-34.28 
ms; p = 0.024) and the sensory context (-37.12 ms; p = 0.016). No differences were 
detected between these last two (p = 1.000). No main effect of the ‘judged event’ was 
found F(1, 21) = 0.12, p = 0.732, η2p = 0.006. Most importantly, a significant interaction 
between these two factors emerged, F(2, 42) = 11.23, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.348 (Figure 
6.2).  
  





Figure 6.2. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the participants’ perceptual shift of the first judged event (i.e., the 
voluntary action, the involuntary action and the control visual stimulus). Conversely, the grey violin plots 
represent the participants’ perceptual shift of the second event (i.e., the green visual stimulus). The dashed lines 
stand for the actual onset of the event of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the 
right side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for 
the actual onset of the event of interest, while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. 




A post-hoc analysis applying Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
was conducted in order to examine the interaction in more detail. The post-hoc 
analysis revealed that the difference between the first and the second judged event 
was significant in the case of voluntary action (p < 0.001). In addition, concerning 
the first judged event, a significant difference was found for voluntary action in 
comparison with involuntary action (p = 0.013) and the control visual stimulus (p = 
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0.001). Involuntary action and the control visual stimulus were not significantly 
different (p = 0.517). No significant differences emerged when comparing the second 
judged event (e.g., the green visual stimulus) (‘voluntary action context’ vs 
‘involuntary action context’, p = 1.000; ‘voluntary action context’ vs ‘sensory 
context’, p = 1.000; ‘involuntary action context’ vs ‘sensory context’, p = 1.000). Only 
voluntary actions led to a perceptual shift of action towards its visual stimulus (i.e., 
action binding). This effect was significantly reduced for the involuntary action 
context and for the sensory context. The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA found 
a significant effect of the overall binding (i.e., the perceived linkage between action 
and effect), F(2, 42) = 11.23, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.348. Post-hoc comparisons showed a 
significant difference in both the ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ contexts (p = 0.04). In 
addition, the ‘voluntary context’ and the ‘sensory context’ (p < 0.001) were also 
significantly different. No significant differences were found between the 
‘involuntary context’ and the ‘sensory context’ (p = 0.191) (Figure 6.3).  
In summary, the total temporal compression (i.e., IB effect) was evident in the 
context of voluntary action. The overall binding data indicate that the participants 
perceived the interval between their action and its effect as significantly shorter than 
it really was, although no direct judgment of the time interval’s duration was 
requested.  
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Figure 6.3. Differences in the overall binding among the three contexts. Error bars represent SEM and * 
indicates the significant difference in overall binding among the three contexts. The temporal compression 
characterizing IB is only present within the voluntary action context. Small values indicate stronger IB. 
 
 
6.3 EXPERIMENT II: the time windows of the classical visuo-auditory 
Intentional Binding 
A recent article by Danquah, Farrell and O’Boyle (2008) suggested that 
participants’ judged timing of events is subject to both (i) systematic biases arising 
from the sensory modality through which they experienced the stimulus and (ii) the 
speed of the rotating clock hand. Experiment I explored the first issue and did not 
highlight differences when manipulating the type of sensory stimuli, corroborating 
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authenticity of IB as implicit measure of agency.  
The following experiment focused on the second issue mentioned by 
Danquah et al. (2008): what happens if, using the classical paradigm adopted in the 
previous chapters, we slow down the presentation of the stream of letters?  
 
6.3.1 EXPERIMENT II-A 
6.3.1.1 METHODS 
6.3.1.1.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A new sample of twenty-two participants (16 females; age range: 20 to 29; 
mean age in years: 23.41, SD: 2.38; education in years: 15.64, SD: 2.7) were enrolled 
in the experiment. All participants were right-handed, as measured by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and lacked neurological and psychiatric pathologies. The study was 
conceived according to the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the University of Padua. All participants were naïve as to the purpose 
of the experiment and gave their informed, written consent to participate in the 
study. 
 
6.3.1.1.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
All the materials, the procedure and data analyses were the same of those 
used and applied in Study I (Chapter 3). The only difference was the duration of the 
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visual stimuli: each number and letter remained on the screen for 250 ms, instead of 
150 ms. 
 
6.3.1.2 RESULTS I 
Table 6.2 summarizes the mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding. Using 
paired-sample t-tests, the only significant difference observed regarded the sensory 
context [control tone in the BC (20.83 ms) vs control tone in the EC (-12.12 ms), t21 = 
2.43, p = 0.024; 95% CI: 4.78, 61.13; mean: 32.95 ms]. 
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Table 6.2. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding (Experiment II-A) 
 Judged Event  mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions     
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  62.88 ±  93.99   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  32.95 ±  111.11   
3) Tone  Tone  26.14 ±  89.02   
4) Control Tone  Control Tone  20.83 ±  98.53   
Experimental Conditions     
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  92.42 ± 107.49 29.55 ± 66.85 
257.2 ± 130.69 
6) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  62.88 ± 81.76 36.74 ± 105.3 
7) Involuntary Action - Tone  Involuntary Action  37.5 ± 110.16 4.55 ± 84.27 
249.62 ± 118.76 
8) Involuntary Action - Tone  Tone  30.3 ± 132.45 4.17 ± 82.28 
9) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  -12.12 ± 96.66 -32.95 ± 63.54 
268.94 ± 85.57 
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In order to calculate the perceptual shifts, repeated-measures ANOVA was 
run. First, a main significant effect of the ‘type of context’ was observed, F(2, 42) = 
5.43, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.205. In other words, participants had a general delayed 
temporal perception regarding the events within the ‘voluntary action context’ 
(33.14 ms) as compared to the ‘sensory context’ (-23.49 ms) (p = 0.017). No differences 
were detected between the ‘voluntary action’ and the ‘involuntary action’ contexts 
(4.36 ms) (p = 0.392) and between the ‘involuntary action’ and the ‘sensory’ contexts 
(p = 0.206). No main effect of the ‘judged event’ was detected F(1, 21) = 0.337, p = 
0.568, η2p = 0.016. Also the interaction did not reach statistical significance F(2, 42) = 
0.173, p = 0.842, η2p = 0.008 (Figure 6.4). Regarding the total temporal compression, 
the one-way repeated-measures ANOVA did not show a significant effect of the 
overall binding (i.e., the perceived linkage between action and effect), F(2, 42) = 
0.173, p = 0.842, η2p = 0.008. 
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Figure 6.4. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the participants’ perceptual shift of the first event (i.e., the voluntary 
action, the involuntary action and the control tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the participants’ 
perceptual shift of the second event (i.e., the tone). The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of 
interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and 
symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, 
while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, no differences 
emerge among the three contexts.  
 
 
6.3.1.3 RESULTS II: comparison between the auditory-visual and the visuo-
auditory Intentional Binding 
Since the timing of stimuli presentation was the same of Experiment I, we 
compared the degree of binding obtained in Experiment I and Experiment II-A. 
Concerning BCs, independent-samples t-test showed a significant difference only 
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regarding the temporal perception of the voluntary action (t42 = 2.23, p = 0.031, 95% 
CI: 4.83, 98.96, mean difference: 51.89). More in detail, participants were more 
accurate in perceiving the temporal onset of the voluntary action using the auditory-
visual IB (10.98 ms) as compared to the classical visuo-auditory paradigm (62.88 ms). 
We therefore analysed the perceptual shifts using 3 (‘type of context’) x 2 (‘judged 
event’) repeated measures ANOVA, with the ‘type of paradigm’ (auditory-visuo IB, 
visuo-auditory IB) as between-factor. First, a significant main effect of the ‘type of 
paradigm’ was observed, F(1, 42) = 4.42, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.095. Using the visuo-
auditory IB, participants tended to perceive the onset time of events later (4.67 ms) 
as compared to the auditory-visual IB (-17.87 ms) (p = 0.042). In addition, a 
significant main effect of ‘type of context’, F(2, 84) = 11.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.209, was 
detected. Participants tended to have a general delayed temporal perception 
regarding the events within the ‘voluntary action’ context (25.47 ms) as compared to 
both the ‘involuntary context’ (-14.96 ms; p = 0.09) and the ‘sensory’ one (-30.3 ms; p 
< 0.001). No significant differences emerged between the ‘involuntary action’ and 
the ‘sensory’ contexts (p = 0.52). No significant main effect of the ‘judged event’ was 
detected F(1, 42) = 0.014, p = 0.907, η2p < 0.001, but the interaction between the ‘type 
of paradigm’, ‘type of context’ and ‘judged event’ was significant, F(2, 84) = 3.98, p 
= 0.022, η2p = 0.087. The only significant difference between the two paradigms 
emerged in the case of the effect binding within the voluntary action context (p = 
0.032; 95% CI: 5.12, 107.76; mean difference = 56.44). The shift of the second sensory 
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effect (i.e., either the the visual stimulus or the auditory tone) towards the voluntary 
action which triggered it, was only detected within the auditory-visual IB. Indeed, 
as depicted by Image 6.5, the effect binding within the visuo-auditory IB was 
delayed in time as compared to the effect binding within the auditory-visual IB.  
Also the overall bindings were compared between the two paradigms. No 
main effect of the ‘type of paradigm’, F(1, 42) = 0.412, p = 0.524, η2p = 0.010 was found 
while the main effect of ‘overall binding’ emerged, F(2, 84) = 5.32, p = 0.007, η2p = 
0.112: the temporal compression within the ‘voluntary action context’ was 
significantly different as compared to the ‘sensory context’ (p = 0.005). No 
differences emerged between the two control contexts, namely the ‘involuntary’ and 
the ‘sensory’ contexts (p = 0.28) and between the ‘voluntary context’ and the 
‘involuntary’ one (p = 0.406). Most importantly, a significant interaction between the 
‘overall binding’ and the ‘type of paradigm’, F(2, 84) = 3.98, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.087, 
was detected. More in detail, the overall auditory-visual IB significantly differed 
from the overall visuo-auditory IB (p = 0.039) only within the voluntary context. The 
total temporal compression characterizing voluntary actions was present only using 
the auditory-visual IB paradigm (Figure 6.6). 
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Figure 6.5. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the two 
paradigms within the voluntary context. The white violin plots depict the participants’ action binding, while 
the grey violin plots represent the participants’ effect binding (i.e., the visual stimulus for the auditory-visual 
IB and the auditory stimulus for the visuo-auditory IB). The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event 
of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and 
symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, 
while the black dots represent the mean perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, the temporal 
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Figure 6.6. Differences in the overall binding within the voluntary action context between the two paradigms. 
Error bars represent SEM and * indicates the significant difference in overall binding between the two 
paradigms. The temporal compression characterizing IB is only present when using the auditory-visual IB. 
Small values indicate stronger IB. 
 
 
Although the two paradigms involved different sensory modalities, making 
difficult a direct comparison of the obtained results, the findings of the present study 
show that when the stream of letters are slowed down using the classic visuo-
auditory IB, the temporal compression disappears. Conversely, when the same 
duration is applied to a different modality (i.e., adopting the auditory-visual IB), the 
effect is still present. Using the classic visuo-auditory IB paradigm, it appears clear 
that the temporal window of visual letters’ presentation plays a crucial role: IB 
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of 250 ms. In the next experiment an intermediate duration, that is 200 ms, was 
tested. 
 
6.3.2 EXPERIMENT II-B 
6.3.2.1 METHODS 
6.3.2.1.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-six new participants (18 females; age range: 21 to 31; mean age in 
years: 24, SD: 3.02; education in years: 16.81, SD: 1.39) were enrolled in the 
experiment. All participants were right-handed, as measured by the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and lacked neurological and psychiatric pathologies. The study was conceived 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics Committee 
of the University of Padua. All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment and gave their informed, written consent to participate in the study. 
 
6.3.2.1.2 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
All the materials, the procedure and data analyses were the same of those 
used and applied in Experiment II-A. The only difference was the duration of the 
visual stimuli. Each number and letter remained on the screen for 200 ms. 
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6.3.2.2 RESULTS 
Table 6.3 summarizes the mJEs, perceptual shifts, and overall binding. Using 
paired-sample t-tests, the only significant difference was observed within the 
‘voluntary action context’ [voluntary action in the BC (41.03 ms) vs voluntary action 
in the EC (73.33 ms), t25 = - 2.39, p = 0.025; 95% CI: -60.15, -4.46; mean: -32.31 ms]. In 
order to calculate the perceptual shifts, repeated-measures ANOVA was run. No 
main significant effects of ‘type of context’, F(2, 50) = 0.509, p = 0.604, η2p = 0.02, and 
the ‘judged event’ F(1, 25) = 1.098, p = 0.305, η2p = 0.04 emerged. The interaction was 
not significant, too, F(2, 50) = 2.11, p = 0.132, η2p = 0.078 (Figure 6.7). Regarding the 
total temporal compression, the one-way repeated-measures ANOVA did not show 
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Table 6.3. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding (Experiment II-B). 
 Event Judged mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
Baseline Conditions 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  41.03 ±  41.98   
2) Involuntary Action  Involuntary Action  61.28 ±  61.74   
3) Tone  Tone  45.38 ±  51.61   
4) Control Tone  Control Tone  41.03 ±  52.21   
Experimental Conditions 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  73.33 ± 61.28 32.32± 68.94 
203.59 ± 112.67 
6) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  31.28 ± 77.72 -14.1 ± 72.67 
7) Involuntary Action - Tone  Involuntary Action  57.44 ± 56.26 -3.85 ± 53.9 
245.9 ± 100.77 
8) Involuntary Action - Tone  Tone  37.44 ± 91.29 -7.95± 93.73 
9) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  44.87 ± 97.6 3.85 ± 90.38 
252.31 ± 112.95 










Figure 6.7. On the left side, violin plots representing the distribution of each participant’s mJE for the different 
contexts. The white violin plots depict the participants’ perceptual shift of the first judged event (i.e., the 
voluntary action, the involuntary action and the control tone). Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the 
participants’ perceptual shift of the second event (i.e., the tone). The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of 
the event of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of the whole sample. On the right side, a schematic, 
graphical and symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the 
event of interest, while the black dots represent the perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, 






The main purpose of the present series of experiments was to evaluate 
whether IB might be present even when changing the sensory modalities classically 
adopted to study the effect. The vast majority of investigations manipulated the type 
of sensory effect following a voluntary action, showing that the temporal 
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compression characterising IB occurred irrespective of the sensory modality used 
(e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Engbert et al., 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; Ebert & 
Wegner, 2010). The present findings are in line with the existing literature, indicating 
that the illusion can be replicated in different sensory modalities and suggesting that 
IB is a reliable multisensory and supra-modal phenomenon, governed by the same 
principal rules at the basis of multisensory integration, that are the temporal window 
of multisensory integration Shams et al., 2000; Bresciani et al., 2005) and the correct 
order of cause-effect (Rohde et al., 2014). More precisely, IB appears when a voluntary 
action precedes its effect - irrespective of the sensory modality - in a close temporal 
proximity. These rules seem to be sufficient for the emergence of the multisensory 
IB. However, the concept of multisensory integration also implies that different 
combinations of cross-modal stimuli are assessed (Stein & Stanford, 2008). 
Therefore, in order to verify whether IB follows the same laws of multisensory 
integration, a further step is required, that is trying to see what happens, for 
example, when the sensory nature of the stream of visual stimuli - adopted to report 
the temporal perception of the events (e.g., the visual numbers of Libet clock, the 
stream of visual letters in our specific case) - is changed into another sensory 
modality (e.g., the auditory one). Do both the visual and the auditory streams of 
stimuli similarly influence the temporal perception of the events to be judged, 
causing the temporal compression characteristic of the IB?  This would not only shed 
light on the real multisensory nature of IB, but would also provide hints to 
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understand whether IB is a direct consequence of the adopted sensory modality, 
depending on the type of sensory stimuli used to report the temporal onset of the 
events. In all the IB studies which adopted the Libet clock method (e.g., Haggard et 
al., 2002; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Haggard & Cole, 2007; Moore, Ruge et al., 2010; 
Moretto, Walsh et al., 2011), visual stimuli have always been used to report the 
temporal subjective experience of the events. However, it is well known that the 
visual system is more reliable for spatial rather than temporal resolution (e.g., Witten 
& Knudsen, 2005). Therefore, using visual stimuli to report the subjective onset time 
of events might have biased the judgments and contributed to the IB. On the other 
hand, audition is usually more reliable for the temporal aspects of perception (e.g., 
Repp & Penel, 2002; Bertelson & Aschersleben, 2003; Morein-Zamir, Soto-Faraco & 
Kingstone, 2003; Freeman & Driver, 2008). Therefore, one might expect that using 
auditory stimuli as reference point might prevent the appearance of IB, since people 
tend to be more accurate in determining the temporal onset of the events. In 
Experiment I we tried to understand this aspect by changing the nature of the 
sensory stimuli used as reference to report the onset time of events. Results showed 
that temporal compression (i.e., the IB effect) occurred also when auditory stimuli 
were adopted to report the temporal perception of the events. Most importantly, the 
total temporal compression characterizing IB occurred only within the voluntary 
context. Regarding the single perceptual shifts, only action binding was reproduced. 
An unexpected result was the lack of effect binding, which did not differ as 
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compared to the other control conditions. More precisely, participants were really 
accurate to report the onset time of the second event and this prevented the 
perceptual shift. This result goes against the tide in respect to the vast majority of IB 
studies, showing a strong binding of auditory, visual and somatic effects towards 
actions and a weaker action binding (Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Cole, 2007; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Moretto, Walsh et al., 2011). However, it is difficult to 
directly compare our results with those of these other studies because there are 
several differences in stimulus manipulation and procedure which might have 
influenced the results. One possible explanation might be that the second visual 
stimulus, independently from its trigger - voluntary/involuntary action or another 
visual stimulus -  was better estimated because it was perceived as more intense - in 
line with Stein, London, Wilkinson & Price (1996) who reported that the perceived 
intensity of a visual stimulus is enhanced in the presence of a sound. Alternatively, 
the first event (either the voluntary/involuntary action or yellow circle) preceding 
the green one might act as a warning signal alerting participants that a visual 
stimulus was about to be presented, thus enabling them to be better prepared to 
temporal detect the upcoming circle (Zeigler, Grahaman & Hackley, 2001). 
Accordingly, participants responded accurately to the green circle since they were 
prepared for its arrival. Despite the reduced effect binding, the overall IB was 
nevertheless still apparent, even changing the type of sensory inputs and outputs. 
This result is extremely relevant since it demonstrates that IB is not only a reliable 
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multisensory phenomenon, but also that it is supramodal, being able to arise (i) for 
different sensory stimuli produced by our voluntary actions and, most importantly, 
(ii) independently of the sensory stimuli adopted to investigate the phenomenon. In 
addition, the present findings contributed to characterize IB as an implicit measure 
of agency. Indeed, as active agents in the world, we everyday face with a multitude 
of multisensory stimuli. Therefore, the demonstration that IB is still present even 
when changing the type of sensory stimuli strengthens its relation with agency. In 
Experiment II-A and II-B we then studied the temporal windows within IB can 
occur. Using the classical visuo-auditory IB paradigm adopted in the previous 
chapters, the speed of the the visual letters was changed. Results showed that when 
the stream of letters was slowed down (e.g., 250 ms and 200 ms), the IB effect 
disappeared, as participants were quite accurate in detecting the temporal onset of 
the different events. These findings suggest that the temporal windows within the 
letters are presented are crucial for the emergence of the IB. In particular, the visuo-
auditory IB occurs only when the stream of visual letter is set at 150 ms (see previous 
chapters).  
To sum up, the present findings, in line with other studies in literature (e.g., 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; Ebert & 
Wegner, 2010; Moretto, Walsh et al., 2011), suggest that SoAg may be considered as 
a reliable multisensory supra-modal mechanism, which is also evident when 
another combination of cross-sensory stimuli (e.g., auditory-visual IB) is tested. 
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Importantly, it appears to be necessary to adjust the timing of stimuli presentation 
accordingly to their sensory nature. 
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY V 
REDUCED AWARENESS OF ACTION CONTROL 
IN PARKINSON DISEASE 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
PD is a neurodegenerative illness characterized by prominent motor 
symptoms (e.g., bradykinesia, rigidity, tremor, and postural instability), which 
reflect, at least in part, a pathological loss of dopaminergic neurons in the ventral 
midbrain and nerve terminal degeneration in the striatum (Bernheimer, Birkmayer, 
Hornykiewicz, Jellinger & Seitelberger, 1973; Jankovic, 2008). However, PD is not a 
mere motor pathology since it is also characterized by a variety of symptoms which 
go beyond motor disturbances, such as cognitive decline especially affecting EFs 
(Elgh, Domellöf, Linder, Edström, Stenlund et al., 2009; Godefroy, Azouvi, Robert, 
Roussel, LeGall et al., 2010). PD is particularly interesting in the context of the SoAg 
research because of its characteristic disturbances in willed behaviour and motor 
cognition, including the difficulty of planning actions and establishing a link with 
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their consequences (e.g., Hughes, Barker, Owen & Rowe, 2010; Hughes, Altena, 
Barker & Rowe, 2013; Wolpe, Nombela & Rowe, 2015). Up to now, only one study 
addressed this issue (Moore, Schneider et al., 2010), reporting that PD itself was not 
associated with abnormal SoAg. Interestingly, IB modifications in PD patients were 
caused by DA medication used to treat the disease. Indeed, according to the 
Authors, an overdose of DA in the ventral striatum – a key structure for instrumental 
reinforcement learning - would have caused a hyper-temporal binding, similar to 
what happens in schizophrenic patients with PS, where excessive DA activity leads 
to an over-association between intentional actions and external events (Haggard et 
al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010). Although the results of Moore, Schneider et al.’s (2010) 
are very attractive, suggesting a relevant contribution of DA in the SoAg, their 
interpretations might be questioned on several grounds. First, they assume that IB 
depends on ventral striatum’s functioning. It is known that the ventral portion of 
striatum, given its extensive interconnections with the limbic part of the brain, plays 
an important role in the circuitry of reward-oriented behaviour (Haber, 2011). 
However, in Moore, Schneider et al.’s study (2010) actions did not produce salient 
or rewarded effects, minimizing the specific role of the ventral striatum in the 
linkage between action and its effects. Second, in PD the differential degeneration of 
DA between the dorsal and the ventral striatum is particularly evident especially in 
the early stages of the disease (Dauer & Przedborski, 2003; Haber, 2003). As the 
disease progresses, dopaminergic deficiency in the ventral striatum increases 
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(MacDonald, Monchi, Seergobin, Ganjavi, Tamyeedi et al., 2013). In the study of 
Moore, Schneider et al. (2010) the vast majority of patients at the time of testing were 
in an advanced phase of the disease, where it is likely that both the dorsal and 
ventral systems are suffering from DA depletion, making their pattern of results 
difficult to explain taking into account the overdose theory. Yet, available information 
about the effects of DA on SoAg in PD patients is inconclusive. In the present study 
special attention will be devoted to understand the role of DA in IB. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, IB is only observed for intentional actions and is mainly supported by the 
frontal SMA (see Chapter 5; Moore, Ruge et al., 2010; Kühn et al., 2013). In PD 
patients, the SMA – a key region associated with internal movement programming 
in the healthy brain (Picard & Strick, 1996) - is systematically poorly activated (e.g., 
Jahanshahi, Jenkins, Brown, Marsden, Passingham et al., 1995; Haslinger, Erhard, 
Kämpfe, Boecker, Rummeny et al., 2001; Sabatini, Boulanouar, Fabre, Martin, Carel 
et al., 2000), causing specific deficits in internal movement generation (Jahanshahi et 
al., 1995; Rowe, Stephan, Friston, Frackowiak, Lees et al., 2002). Indeed, PD patients 
often show specific impairments when relying on internal control processes (Siegert, 
Harper, Cameron & Abernethy, 2002; Michely, Barbe, Hoffstaedter, Timmermann, 
Eickhoff et al., 2012). Although dopaminergic therapy improves motor symptoms at 
all stages of disease, the effects of such treatments on PD-associated cognitive 
impairments are more complex. Previous studies investigating the effect of DA 
medication on EFs revealed inconsistent effects (for reviews see: Cools, 2006; 
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Dirnberger & Jahanshahi, 2013). Of particular interest in the context of the present 
study, deficits in higher internal motor control respond less well to dopaminergic 
medication (Michely et al., 2012), in line also with other studies (Feigin, Ghilardi, 
Carbon, Edwards, Fukuda et al., 2003; Kehagia, Barker & Robbins, 2010; Fasano, 
Daniele & Albanese, 2012; Narayanan, Rodnitzky & Uc, 2013). Based on these 
assumptions we hypothesized that PD patients on medication might show an 





Two groups of participants took part in the study. The first group (N = 13; 8 
females; mean age: 54.39 years, SD: 5,62, range: 44-63; education in years: 13.77, SD: 
3.83; average disease duration: 6.13 years, SD: 3.89; mean age at onset: 46.46 years, 
SD: 5.96) was recruited from the Parkinson and Movement Disorders Unit of the 
‘San Camillo’ Hospital (Venice-Lido, Italy) and participants were all diagnosed with 
PD, according to the United Kingdom Parkinson's disease Society Brain Bank 
(Hughes, Daniel, Kilford & Lees et al., 1992; Gelb, Oliver & Gilman, 1999). Patients 
with atypical Parkinsonism as well as those who had clinically serious 
cardiovascular, metabolic and psychiatric diseases or neurosurgical procedures 
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were not considered. We calculated Levodopa Equivalent Daily Dose (LDED) and 
Dopamine Agonist Equivalent Daily Dose (DAED) for each patient (Tomlison, 
Stowe, Patel, Rick, Gray et al., 2010). Clinical severity was graded using the Hoehn 
and Yahr (1967; H & Y) and the motor Unified Parkinson Disease Rating Scale 
(UPDRS-III; Fahn & Elton, 1987). Demographic data (age, gender and education 
level) and neurological details (age at onset, disease duration) were also collected 
(see Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1. Demographic data and clinical features of PD patients. 
 Mean SD 
Age 54.39 5.62 
Education 13,77 3.83 
Disease Duration 6.13 3.89 
Age onset 46.46 5.96 
LEDD 431.66 232.95 
DAED 124.62 102.74 
UPDRS TOT 21 4.58 
H & Y 1.75 0.82 
ADL 6 0 
IADL 6.38 1.45 
PDQ 5.46 3.73 
BDI-II 5.62 4.87 
SD: Standard Deviation; LEDD: Levodopa Equivalent Daily Dose; DAED: Dopamine Agonist 
Equivalent Daily Dose; UPDRS TOT: Unified Parkinson Disease Rating Scale Total; H & Y: Hoehn & 
Yahr; ADL: Activities of Daily Living; IADL: Instrumental Activities of Daily Living; PDQ: 
Parkinson’s disease quality of life; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory. 
 
All patients participating in the study had a brain MRI with no otherwise 
clinically relevant structural alterations and were tested after medication. The time 
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interval between medication administration and testing varied between 1 and 3 
hours, such that patients were in a relative ON state. None of the participants 
showed therapy-related motor complications that could interfere with the study 
task. The second group was made up of sex- age- and education-matched healthy 
controls (N = 13; 5 females; mean age: 53.62 years, SD: 10.02, range: 30-66; education 
in years: 13, SD: 4.47). The inclusion criteria for all participants comprised an age < 
65 years old (based on results obtained from the Study II - Chapter 4), intact visual 
and auditory senses, no current history of neurologic or psychiatric disease and no 
current history of drug or alcohol abuse. All the participants showed right-handed 
dominance (Edinburgh Inventory; Oldfield, 1971). The experimental sessions lasted 
approximately an hour. The ethics committee of the IRCCS San Camillo, Venice 
(Italy) approved the study, which was carried out in accordance with the principles 
of the Declaration of Helsinki. Written informed consent was obtained from all of 
the participants.  
 
7.2.2 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES 
The neuropsychological protocol for PD patients included the MMSE and the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA: Nasreddine, Phillips, Bédirian, 
Charbonneau, Whitehead et al., 2005) to assess general cognitive functions. 
Attention/working memory domain was tested by the TMT (Giovagnoli, Del Pesce, 
Mascheroni, Simoncelli, Laiacona et al., 1996), Digit Span Forward and Corsi’s Test 
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(Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987). EFs were evaluated by phonological fluency task 
(Novelli, Papagno, Capitani & Laiacona, 1986) and the Stroop Color/Word test 
(Caffarra, Vezzadini, Dieci, Zonato & Venneri, 2002). We used the Beck Depression 
scale (BDI-II) (Yamanishi, Tachibana, Oguru, Matsui, Toda et al., 2013) to evaluate 
the eventual presence of depressive symptoms (range score 0-63). We also 
administered the 8-item version of Parkinson’s disease quality of life (PDQ-8; 
Jenkinson, Fitzpatrick, Peto, Greenhall & Hyman, 1997). In addition, abnormal 
functional independence was assessed by ADL/IADL. Standardized normative 
Italian datasets were used as comparative references to determine cognitive 
impairments. Regarding the control group, only the MMSE, Digit Span, TMT-A, 
TMT-B and Phonological Fluency task were administered. 
 
7.2.3 STIMULI, APPARATUS, PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSES 
All the materials, the procedure and data analyses were the same of those 
used and applied in Study I, described in Chapter 3. The only difference regarded 
the control conditions: only the ‘sensory context’ condition (i.e., that with the two 
sounds in sequence) was included, while the involuntary movement condition was 
excluded in order to reduce the necessary time to perform the task. Specifically, the 
‘sensory context’ condition was added as control to investigate whether any deficit 
was specific to agency or indicated a more general deficit in timing judgements.  
To correlate the IB score with clinical parameters such as the disease’s duration, the 
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motor UPDRS score and the age of onset, non-parametric correlations (Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient) were run. To examine the effects of age and cognitive 
functions, these values were included as covariates in a subsidiary analysis.  
 
7.3 RESULTS 
Table 7.2 summarizes the mJEs, perceptual shifts, and overall binding in the 
two groups. Patients and controls did not differ in terms of age (t24 = 0.241, p = 0.811), 
sex (X2 = 1.39, df = 1, p = 0.434) and education (t24 = -0.557, p = 0.583). Control and 
patient perceptual shifts were submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA, with 
‘group’ (patients vs controls) as between-subject factor, and the ‘type of context’ 
(voluntary action vs sensory) and the ‘judged event’ (first, second) as within-subject 
factors. A significant Group × Context × Event interaction was observed, F(1, 24) = 
5.42, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.184. Only a main effect of the ‘judged event’ was detected, F(1, 
24) = 30.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.559, with a significant shift of the first event towards the 
second one (23.65 ms) and vice versa (-56.25). No main effects of the ‘type of context’, 
F(1, 24) = 1.17, p = 0.291, η2p = 0.046, and ‘group’, F(1, 24) = 0.89, p = 0.353, η2p = 0.166 
were found.
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Table 7.2. mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding for patients and controls. 
Group Condition Event Judged mJE (ms) ± sd Mean Shift (ms) ± sd Mean Overall Binding (ms) ± sd 
 Baseline  
Patients 
1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  -18.46 ±  74.96   
2) Tone  Tone  18.85 ±  40.99   
3) Control Tone  Control Tone  20±  42.67   
Experimental  
4) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  0 ± 85.54 18.46 ± 63.16 
188.08 ± 86.28 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  -24.62 ± 72.59 -43.46 ± 74.31 
6) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  16.15 ± 41.84 -3.85 ± 39.54 
189.23 ± 98.49 




1) Voluntary Action  Voluntary Action  -29.23 ±  95.13   
2) Tone  Tone  53.85 ±  49.67   
3) Control Tone  Control Tone  47.69 ±  48.59   
Experimental  
4) Voluntary Action - Tone  Voluntary Action  41.54 ± 123.35 70.77 ± 85.41 
95.77 ± 97.12 
5) Voluntary Action - Tone  Tone  -29.62 ± 62.63 -83.46 ± 54.06 
6) Control Tone - Tone  Control Tone  56.92 ± 40.24 9.23 ± 20.9 
207.31 ± 99.43 
7) Control Tone - Tone  Tone  20.38 ± 107.62 -33.46 ± 96.34 
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Examining the interaction in detail, post hoc comparisons did not reach the 
statistical power (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). We therefore analysed the overall binding 
across the two groups. A significant Group x Overall Binding interaction emerged, 
F(1, 24) = 5.42, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.184. The two groups differed exclusively regarding 
the voluntary action context (p = 0.017) (sensory context: p = 0.646) (Figure 7.3). Only 
healthy controls presented the classical total temporal compression, which did not 
emerge in the case of the control condition (i.e., the sensory context; p = 0.003). On 
the other hand, no differences between the experimental and the control conditions 
were detected in patients (p = 0.973). In a subsequently analysis controls and patients 
overall binding data were entered into a mixed analysis of covariance, with Age, 
MMSE, TMT-A, TMT-B, Digit Span and Phonemic Fluency as covariates in order to 
verify the role of age and cognitive performance on the obtained results. These 
additional analyses showed no interaction between overall binding and age, F(1,  24) 
= 0.006, p = 0.81, η2p = 0.003, MMSE, F(1, 24) = 0.182, p = 0.673, η2p = 0.008, TMT-A, 
F(1, 24) = 0.169, p = 0.685, η2p = 0.007, TMT-B, F(1, 24) = 0.822, p = 0.374, η2p = 0.035, 
Digit Span, F(1, 21) = 0.01, p = 0.92, η2p < 0.001, and Phonemic Fluency, F(1, 23) = 
0.025, p = 0.877, η2p = 0.001. Regarding baseline judgments, patients’ judgements of 
their actions or the tone in BCs were similar to those for healthy controls, suggesting 
analogous time judging abilities (baseline voluntary action: t24 = 0.321, p = 0.751; 
baseline tone: t24 = -1.96, p = 0.062; baseline control tone: t24 = -1.54, p = 0.126). The 
correlational analysis on the overall binding and the perceptual shift score showed 
  193 
no significant correlations between the performance and the disease’s duration, the 
age of onset, the motor UPDRS score (p > 0.05) in PD patients. In addition, no 
significant correlations between any binding scores and any neuropsychological 




Figure 7.1. On the left side, the graph shows participants’ perceptual shifts within the voluntary context. 
The white violin plots depict the action binding (i.e., the shift of the the voluntary action towards the tone). 
Conversely, the grey violin plots represent the effect binding (i.e., the perceptual shift of the tone towards the 
action). The dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of 
each group of participants. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical representation is depicted. 
Again, the dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, while the black dots represent the 
perceived event by the participants. As the image depicts, the total temporal compression is only evident within 
the group of controls. 
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Figure 7.2. On the left side, the graph shows the perceptual shifts within the sensory context for each group. 
The white violin plots depict the shift of the first sound towards the second tone. Conversely, the grey violin 
plots represent the effect binding (i.e., the perceptual shift of the second tone towards the first control tone). The 
dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest. The black dots stand for the mJE of each group of 
participants. On the right side, a schematic, graphical and symmetrical representation is depicted. Again, the 
dashed lines stand for the actual onset of the event of interest, while the black dots represent the perceived event 
by the participants. No significant differences emerge between the two groups. 
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Figure 7.3. Differences in the voluntary action and sensory overall binding between the two groups of 
participants. Error bars represent SEM and * indicates the significant difference in overall binding between 
and within groups. Only controls present the IB effect within the voluntary action context. No differences are 




The aim of the present study was to assess IB in a group of PD medicated 
patients in order to investigate the impact of dopaminergic treatment on the SoAg. 
The overall binding effect was significantly different in PD patients relative to 
control participants, highlighting a decreased temporal attraction of the perception 
of action towards a subsequent tone in PD patients. This lack of binding has been 
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actions. One might say that such behavioural change of binding might reflect poor 
attention to the task for the high levels of concentration required. However, PD 
patients demonstrated to perform the task quite well, despite its complex cross-
modal nature. Indeed, patients’ baseline judgments of actions and tones were similar 
to those of controls. In addition, a critical internal control came from the results of 
the sensory context (i.e., those with the two subsequent tones), which were not 
different from control participants. The significant findings regarded the overall 
binding, but not the single perceptual shifts, in line with the study run by Moore, 
Schneider et al. (2010). However, contrary to the mentioned study, the pattern of 
results was exactly the opposite. According to Moore, Schneider et al. (2010), like in 
schizophrenic patients (Haggard et al., 2003), DA would boost action-effect binding. 
Authors started from the assumption that IB is supported by the ventral striatum, 
which is supposed to be preserved from the DA loss in the very first phase of the 
disease. Therefore, cognitive functions supported by DA activity in this region (i.e., 
IB) are worsened by dopaminergic medication, inducing - instead of an impaired 
reduced temporal compression as expected by the excessive DA administration - a 
hyper-binding effect, as in schizophrenic patients who present an overactive 
dopaminergic system. However, if the overdose theory of the ventral striatum 
proposed by Moore, Schneider et al’s (2010) was correct to explain their data, they 
should have expected an impaired performance and therefore a reduced - and not 
an increased - IB. This is also supported by evidence suggesting that the excessive 
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DA activity in schizophrenia is mainly associated with the dorsal and not the ventral 
striatum (Kegeles, Abi-Dargham, Frankle, Gil, Cooper et al., 2010; Sorg, Manoliu, 
Neufang, Myers, Peters et al., 2013). In addition, in PD the differential degeneration 
of DA-producing cells in dorsal and ventral striatum is particularly evident during 
the early stages of the disease. As the disease progresses, also the ventral part 
becomes deficient in DA, acting and reacting to DA in the same way as the dorsal 
part. In Moore, Schneider et al’s (2010) the majority of patients at the time of testing 
was characterized by advanced stages of the PD disease, suggesting that both the 
systems were likely impaired. The overdose theory does not seem to be the ideal 
framework to consider in order to explain their results. Such over-association 
between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence in PD seems to be odd. 
Indeed, PD is characterized by an impairment in self-willed action initiation. 
Although DA administration is supposed to ameliorate the basic motor symptoms, 
the SoAg - as previously discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 – seems to belong to the EFs 
family and to reflect a more complex mechanism whose deficits cannot be restored 
with the simple dopaminergic therapy administration. Indeed, as previously 
reported in literature, deficits in higher internal motor control respond less well to 
dopaminergic medication (Feigin et al., 2003; Kehagia et al., 2010; Fasano et al., 2012; 
Michely et al., 2012; Narayanan et al., 2013). Our data are in line with these results, 
showing that DA is not able to restore these functions. Therefore, since IB is reduced 
in patients ON medication, one might also expect that PD itself is associated with a 
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reduced SoAg. However, although this is highly likely, it remains only a speculation 
since patients OFF medication were not included in the present investigation, and 
future studies are required to verify this hypothesis.  
To sum up, the present study showed that medicated patients presented a 
reduced IB as compared to controls. Most importantly, DA medication did not seem 
to improve this higher aspect of motor control (i.e., the awareness of action control). 
The reported inconsistencies between the present results and those of Moore, 
Schneider et al. (2010) might have resulted from different reasons, such as the 
heterogeneous patient populations, the different medication withdrawal methods 
administered as well as the paradigms and the protocols employed. Our data also 
support the hypothesis of Fern-Pollak, Whone, Brooks, and Mehta (2004) suggesting 
a differential motor and cognitive effect following medication withdrawal. 
Accordingly, these effects might arise from the possibility that DA modulates motor 
and cognitive function by different pathways, with motor functions being 
ameliorated through medication via nigrostriatal projections to motor cortex and 
cognitive functions predominantly influenced via mesocortical inputs to prefrontal 
cortex (see also: Mattay, Tessitore, Callicott, Bertolino, Goldberg et al., 2002). Hence, 
our findings add further support to the notion that EFs in higher order control of 
actions in PD may be related to neurotransmitter system dysfunction beyond the 
dopaminergic system, such as, e.g. acetylcholine, noradrenaline or serotonin (Marsh, 
Biglan, Gerstenhaber & Williams, 2009; Narayanan et al., 2013; Ye, Altena, Nombela, 
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Housden, Maxwell et al., 2014; Ye, Altena, Nombela, Housden, Maxwell et al., 2015). 
Further studies are needed to disentangle this issue.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The feeling of being in control of the actions we make is a fundamental part 
of human experience and a is a sine qua non of a well-functioning society. Indeed, all 
civilized human cultures have the concept that individuals are responsible for their 
actions. Responsibility, in turn, takes both an individual dimension - since people 
have to deal and live with what they do - and a social dimension, as society may 
punish people for illegal actions. In lights of these relevant implications, a deep 
understanding of the SoAg seems to be mandatory.  
The experimental work included in the present thesis aimed at extending the 
actual knowledge on the SoAg, capitalizing on an implicit measure, namely the IB 
effect. More specifically, the lifespan (Chapter 4), neural (Chapter 5), multisensory 
(Chapter 6) and clinical (Chapter 7) dimensions have been explored. The advances 
of the present thesis are several and multifaceted, with a significant potential for 
concrete applications.  
A first novelty characterizing the present work was the development of a new 
method to investigate the implicit nature of the SoAg. This methodology showed its 
potential to ‘catch’ facets of agency processing - especially in particular populations 
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(i.e., children, elderly and PD patients) - that otherwise would have remained 
uncovered if simply considering the explicit measures (see Chapter 1) and other 
implicit methodologies currently adopted to investigate IB (i.e., the clock paradigm 
– Libet et al., 1983 - and the time interval paradigms – see Cravo et al., 2011 for a 
brief review; see also Chapter 3 of the present thesis). With respect to the use of 
explicit measures, these are influenced by individual differences related to cognitive 
capacities or personality and to a lack of subjectivity insights. On the other hand, 
concerning the implicit measures, the paradigms currently adopted to study IB are 
still subject to a great deal of both support and criticism (see Chapter 3). For example, 
the time interval paradigm (e.g., Engbert et al., 2007; 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; 
Humphrey & Buehner, 2009; 2010) is not able to disentangle between action and 
effect binding, whereas the clock methodology taps into a wide range of cognitive 
abilities, including EFs, which are affected in populations with a ‘compromised’ 
SoAg. Therefore, the use of such tasks in these ‘special’ populations is far from being 
the optimal way to study the SoAg because of the possible confounders which might 
influence the results. In lights of these limitations, the introduction of a new 
methodology to be used especially in a clinical setting appeared to be necessary in 
order to elucidate the clinical side of the SoAg. In addition, detecting similar results 
(i.e., the IB effect) by means of another method allows the validation of IB as strong 
and reliable phenomenon, which is able to arise independently of the methodology 
used. The paradigm described in this work does not aim at replacing the previous 
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ones (i.e., the Libet clock) which led to the discovery of IB (Haggard et al., 2002). 
However, the choice of a particular method has to take both studies’ aims and the 
peculiarities of their sample (e.g., adults, children or patients) into account. For 
example, the new paradigm here proposed might lead to uncover agency processing 
in ‘special’ populations and might represent a possible prompt for the development 
of new tools in forensic domain. Future studies are needed in order to well 
characterize its potential, by testing larger samples.  
By adopting this new methodology, SoAg was tested across the lifespan 
(Chapter 4) and in a group of patients with PD (Chapter 7). Results showed that 
children, elderly and PD patients presented a reduced SoAg as compared to 
matched controls. These data are relevant for two main reasons. First, our society 
condemns behaviours which have negative consequences on the external world or 
on other people. As a matter of fact, some populations, like those tested in the 
present thesis, present a lack of agency: this aspect should be carefully taken into 
account in the penal domain when establishing penalties. Second, these data shed 
light on the possible neural bases of the implicit SoAg. Indeed, considering the 
relevant role of EFs for a socially responsible conduct and the diminished SoAg in 
childhood, elderly and PD patients, a crucial role of the frontal lobe is expected. In 
the third study (Chapter 5), using tDCS, such hypothesis was tested and a causal 
contribution of pre-SMA in agency was observed. Indeed, modulation of such area 
in healthy participants reduced the SoAg. Even though the present thesis does not 
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provide direct information about the brain mechanisms underlying the SoAg in 
children, elderly and PD patients, these findings seem to be in line with those 
obtained with tDCS in healthy participants. Indeed, the reduced SoAg might be 
linked to a still immature SMA in children (Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, 
Wendelken & Bunge, 2006) and to a SMA hypo-activation both in healthy elderly 
(Inuggi, Amato, Magnani, González-Rosa, Chiefo et al., 2011) and in PD patients. 
However, to fully account for this parallelism, future studies should combine 
behavioural data with advanced neuroimaging techniques in these populations. 
Another important result supporting, although indirectly, the possible involvement 
of the pre-SMA was obtained in Chapter 6 where the multisensory nature of the 
SoAg was explored. Here, findings showed that the temporal compression 
characterizing IB was still present independently of the sensory nature of actions’ 
consequences and did not depend on the ‘sensory nature’ of the task: more precisely, 
the IB effect occurred even when changing the sensory modalities within the 
experimental task. These behavioural results would testify an indirect involvement 
of the pre-SMA, which seems to be crucially implicated in the action-effect linkage 
independently of the sensory nature of the effects (see Chapter 5 and Moore, Ruge 
et al., 2010). However, additional neuroimaging studies are mandatory in order to 
better define the supramodal role of the pre-SMA in the SoAg.  
Findings reported in Chapter 6 are also relevant in order to open a new line 
of research within the agency field. Multisensory integration is a process known to 
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occur not only for vision and audition – well explored within the SoAg – but also for 
other senses, like taste and smell (Driver & Spence, 1998; Stein & Stanford, 2008). 
With respect to smell, odours have a unique scientific potential: these stimuli are 
often consciously neglected, and their processing is mainly automatic, but able to 
modify the course of decisions and actions, partly because of their outstanding 
emotional power and social relevance (Stevenson, 2010). Odors are therefore of 
particular interest in studying agency for many reasons. First, they are omnipresent 
in our daily life and have been proved to modulate human behaviour exerting 
influence on cognitive domains and motor control (Spence, McGlone, Kettenmann 
& Kobal, 2001; Li, Moallem, Paller & Gottfried , 2007; Zucco, 2003; Porter, Craven, 
Khan, Chang, Kang et al., 2006; Tubaldi, Ansuini, Tirindelli & Castiello, 2008). 
Second, and most importantly, olfaction represents information affectively thanks 
to the strong overlap between olfactory cortex and limbic brain structures (Royet, 
Zald, Versace, Costes, Lavenne et al., 2000). This peculiarity of odors is crucial in the 
agency field since recent theories have underlined a link between SoAg and the 
affective domain (Synofzik et al., 2013; Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014). Very recently, 
some Authors (e.g., Moretto, Walsh et al., 2011; Haggard & Yoshie, 2013; Yoshie, Di 
Costa & Haggard, in press) tried to explore such issue by modifying the emotional 
or moral valence of auditory or visual stimuli. However, contrary to olfaction, 
audition and vision are not usually accompanied by the visceral feel of affective 
contact (Stevenson & Attuquayefio, 2013), not representing therefore useful senses 
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to study the emotional side of agency. Odors, on the contrary, modulate neuronal 
responses within the amygdala in a stronger way (Royet et al., 2000), eliciting more 
intense affective self-report (Hinton & Henley, 1993) and emotional memories (Herz 
& Engen, 1996). Therefore, a deep understanding of the emotional dimension of 




So, “how does the brain link voluntary actions with their consequences?” As stated 
by Haggard et al. (2002) “the brain contains a specific cognitive module that binds 
intentional actions to their effects to construct a coherent conscious experience of our own 
agency”.  Altogether the pieces of evidence obtained from the present thesis indicate 
that the pre-SMA represents a crucial region within the SoAg. Such region would 
bind intentional actions with their sensory consequences, independently of their 
sensory nature. Sensory information would reach this region indirectly, namely via 
superior temporal sulcus for visual and auditory stimuli (Narayan et al., 2012). Its 
connections with the superior parietal lobule likely would indicate pathways 
responsible for cross modal sensorimotor transformations. Further neuroimaging 
and behavioural experiments are necessary to validate this proposal. 
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